

THE NEW POLITICS OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY
IN THE AMERICAS

BY

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1999

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
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December 1999

Chairman: Terry M. McCoy
Major Department: Political Science

Hypotheses derived from institutionalism are tested against the pattern of cooperative security observed in Western Hemisphere, especially since the end of the Cold War. The study addresses the hemispheric level and in three subregions: the Southern Cone, the Andean Region, and Central America. Findings confirm that security institutions have an independent effect in the areas of transparency in military matters, reductions in defense postures, and burden sharing. State power and interest play an important role, but power based theories alone are inadequate. At both the hemispheric and subregional levels, the processes of institutional politics produce rules that validated institutional hypotheses. The pattern of security behavior that emerges is generally rule based. The study makes three contributions to theory: (1) improved understanding of security politics in asymmetric systems; (2) the impact of relative gains on cooperation; and (3) the relationship of transparency, democracy and cooperative security.

CHAPTER 1 COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS

Principal Themes

This is a study of the patterns of security cooperation and competition in Latin America since the end of the Cold War. Its focus is on changes in security behavior in the 1990s, or the “process of moving beyond praetorianism and the doctrines of counterinsurgency” (Child, 1996, p. 11), which have characterized the hemisphere’s Cold War alliance system for the past half century, to a new mode of conflict management based on security cooperation and military transparency. The theoretical tools used to study this process derive from realist and institutionalist traditions in international relations, the first based on power and the second on international organizations.

Many observers argue that a new security regime is emerging in the Western Hemisphere, based on an understanding that the new threats to hemispheric security are largely transnational in character and require interstate cooperation. Consensus on how to jointly address these new security challenges remains elusive. But despite the absence of central direction, an astounding array of transparency measures and cooperative endeavors in the security field has arisen to capture the imagination of policy makers throughout the region. The “procedures and mechanisms to ensure a secure, prosperous and democratic region” are in evidence all around us – only awaiting final agreement on organizational architecture to “transform disparate intentions into cohesive, functional, and comprehensive security arrangements” (Downes, 1996, p. 8).

Institutions and new rules regarding the use of military capabilities are emerging, but at the same time interstate rivalries and power politics remain important features of the foreign policies of all states in the region. Security cooperation itself is not new to the hemisphere, but rather a normal tool of foreign policy that occurs within the framework of the shifting informal ententes that characterize many security systems. A critical view of the "new cooperation" might point out that much of the activity is restricted to the conference rooms of international organizations that are far removed from military bases where weapons modernization is ongoing and from borders that remained armed and mined. The sources of conflict have not disappeared.¹ They have endured despite previous attempts to engineer solutions that would replace power as the ultimate arbiter in the international relations of the region.

What theoretical optic is available to sort through these conflicting tendencies? The Latin American experience has been hard on theories. The field of political economy, for instance, has seen the rise and fall – and occasionally the rise again – of theoretical approaches as disparate as modernization theory, hegemonic stability theory, Marxism, dependency theory, and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Explanations for regime change have covered the theoretical waterfront as well. Consensus explanations of macro-social change have been elusive.

¹ For instance, border disputes, which have been the trigger for most militarized disputes in the past two decades, are still an important source of conflict (Mares, 1997). Downes (1998) cites the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States as stating in 1995 that thirty-one border disputes were still active. For a listing of the more than one dozen serious border disputes, see Rojas (1997).

The field of security studies is divided as well. Realism remains the dominant paradigm for understanding patterns of security behavior in this hemisphere, relying on the concepts of power, national interest, and strategic balancing. The contender is institutionalism, which posits that institutions can facilitate communication, forge cooperative commitments, and encourage rule-based behaviors that go well beyond mere balancing.

The basic research design borrows from Grieco (1988a), who develops a set of contending hypotheses, derived from realism and neoliberal institutionalism, which look both at the emergence of security institutions and the security behavior predicted by each theory. Both theories expect states to act in their own best interest. But, can states cooperate to reap the absolute gains implied by lower levels of conflict, reduced defense expenditures, and burden sharing to address transnational threats? The realist approach ranks the likelihood of significant security cooperation as very low, since states are more concerned with relative than absolute gains and, in any case, lack credible assurance that neighbors will respect rules restricting the use of force. Institutionalism offers more hope – the dilemmas of distributive gains and defection can be at least partially ameliorated through international institutions.

With hypotheses derived from these two approaches, I examine security cooperation separately at the hemispheric and subregional levels, looking at the evolution of security institutions and observable patterns of security behavior relevant to those institutions. Comparison of the empirical record with explanations offered by system-level theories based on realism and institutionalism shows the latter to offer a more reliable framework for understanding security behavior in the region.

Contrary to Grieco, I argue that institutions do matter, although not always in ways that promote cooperation. When interests are largely compatible and power evenly distributed, institutions can be effective; institutional mechanisms facilitate cooperation in a wide variety of ways. However, in the absence of clear consensus, especially under conditions of asymmetry, institutions may not foster cooperative behavior. That is not to say they are unimportant. Indeed, it is in these situations that institutional processes can have their most significant impact over power and interests.

As we shall see, the institutional politics of hemispheric security institutions can work against the interests of the most powerful states, particularly the United States.² While military balancing against the United States may not be an option, smaller states can develop a diplomatic line of resistance that rallies opposition and prevents U.S. co-optation of institutional tools. This "institutional balancing" is most likely when the security agenda is complex and issue linkages are available – conditions characterize the 1990s as a result of the processes of globalization. A divided security agenda emerges that stunts the growth of security institutions at the hemispheric level. On the other hand, in subregional areas, where mutual interests are more easily identified, a rough balance of

² The power disparity between the United States and the rest of Latin America is so great that comparisons are not always meaningful. At the beginning of the decade, the United States had more men and women in uniform and spent about twenty times more on defense than all of Latin America. Defense spending accounted for a larger percentage of the U.S. economy (which was roughly three times that of Latin America) than any other country in the hemisphere (with the possible exception of Cuba). Similar comparisons of equipment, organization, technology, and training levels deepen the divide. See Poitras (1990).

power obtains between partners and the number of players is low, the same trends that make security cooperation problematic at the hemispheric level will instead promote it.

These phenomena are best explained through institutionalist analysis. While institutionalized cooperation based on mutual interest can sometimes be explained by realism – "defensive positionalists" argue that states may rationally adopt institutional tools to facilitate cooperation under some circumstances (Jervis, 1986) – realism cannot account for institutional outcomes that contradict the balance of power and interests, particularly in the area of security.

But as with all systemic models, there are gaps in both the realist and neoliberal explanations of the security behavior examined in this study. In the concluding chapter, I suggest that those gaps are best corrected by tools drawn from subsystemic institutionalism, which link external security behavior to the character of civil-military relations within individual countries. Interstate behavior may well be the outcome of a two-level game, in which both states and domestic actors compete and cooperate to realize their interests.

The scope of the study encompasses the Inter-American Security System (IASS), which consists of hemispheric security organizations (the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Defense Board and College, the presidential summits and defense ministerials), security-related legal instruments (treaties, conventions and declarations), and institutionalized rules pertaining to the defense forces of the region

(transparency requirements, cooperative arrangements and arms control).³ At the heart of the IASS lie two permanent organizations: the Organization of American States (founded in 1948) and the Inter-American Defense Board (founded in 1942). The OAS is the principal political organ of the system, with general oversight of conflict mediation and collective security activities. The IADB for its part is charged with the military-technical aspects of hemispheric security, to include defense planning, training, and standardization. The organizational structure of the IASS is presented in Figure 1-1, for reference at the end of this chapter.

The tension between these two organizations over the past half-century reflects uncertainty about the appropriate role of the military in hemispheric security institutions, the debate between broad and narrow definitions of security and the larger issue of civil-military relations in the hemisphere. These themes, which we will revisit later in the study, combine with the asymmetrical distribution of power in the IASS to make organization of hemispheric defense particularly problematic. Efforts to organize hemispheric security are almost inevitably associated with the United States, sparking concern among Latin American states that a centralized system will front for the U.S. security agenda.

³ Grossi (1997, pp. 242-3) sees the IASS as including the "interlinked treaties, agreements and institutions with specific responsibilities on security," including specific instruments like the Rio Treaty and technical bodies such as the Inter American Defense Board. He characterizes the IASS as a "collective security arrangement" with a degree of obligation below that of a formal alliance. Also, see Council on Foreign Relations (1962).

Geographically, the hemispheric case study covers the member states of the Organization of American States, which includes all independent states of the hemisphere minus Cuba. The subregional case studies focus on three subregions that share strong common traits that permit identification as regional sub-systems: the Southern Cone, Central America, and the Andean Ridge. Organizations, legal instruments and security rules particular to these subregions are analyzed in turn. While a part of the hemispheric case study, the English speaking Caribbean is not addressed as a separate subregion because of its markedly different history, language, culture and political tradition, as well as significant differences in its security environment. Only a handful of Caribbean states are signatories to the Rio Treaty and other traditional security arrangements of the region. Few are members of the Inter American Defense Board (IADB). Only recently have the Caribbean states become members of OAS. The subregion is important and merits study, especially in light of the significant security cooperation present there, but cannot be easily compared to the other subregions.⁴

The time frame is post-1990, a start point that coincides roughly with the end of the Cold War, the beginning of recent efforts to integrate trade and the end of authoritarianism in the region. A shift in U.S. policy also became evident early in the decade, from a security agenda focused on the Soviet and Cuban threats to a new set of priorities that included controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, supporting new democracies and addressing transnational security threats – along with a

⁴ Ivelaw Griffith's many contributions are important. In addition, see the recent volume on Caribbean security edited by Michael Desch (1998) features pieces by Rosenau, Dominguez, and Griffith, among others.

renewed willingness to work with multilateral institutions. As an historical point of comparison, previous security institutions of the hemisphere are covered in Chapter 3.

The lack of a fixed end date for the study complicates efforts to draw hard conclusions about the patterns of security cooperation and the effect of regional and subregional institutions and rules regarding the use of force. For instance, there is little that can be said about the robustness of the new institutions and rules in the absence of a significant extra-hemispheric challenge or change in power distribution globally or regionally. Such changes are unlikely in the short term. But we can still analyze how institutions emerge, how they reinforce norms and create rules and how they affect behavior patterns.

The topical focus is on the use of the armed forces in the foreign policies of states in the Western Hemisphere. Thus issues of transparency in military matters, reciprocal verification of defense postures, arms restraint and security cooperation (involving militaries), as well as conflict, are within the scope of the study. Security cooperation that might be present between police forces or other branches of the government is only tangentially discussed. Likewise, domestic aspects regarding the role of the armed forces within states are considered only briefly.

This chapter continues with a short discussion of recent developments in security relations in light of the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization, followed by a more fully developed exposition of the main argument of this investigation. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical literature in order to develop theories and hypotheses. These hypotheses are then situated in a research design that will test their relative explanatory power. Specific research questions will be developed in later chapters, after the requisite

empirical settings are examined. Chapter 2 also develops a working definition of cooperative security, with factors that can be operationalized for the detailed analysis to come. Institutional factors relate to organizational assets (administrative capacity, issue agendas and linkages) and behavioral rules (degree of bindingness and verifiability). Cooperative security behavior is measured in terms of military transparency, reductions in defense postures and combined security operations (burden sharing).

An historic case study – the institutional politics of the IASS during WWII and its aftermath – is the subject of Chapter 3. A convergence of interests, an uncomplicated security agenda, and the interests of United States and its ability to offer assurances and side benefits to key member states help explain the institutional design of the IASS and the cooperative security behavior characteristic of that epoch. When the context changed in ways that complicated interstate relations, divergent interests led to a process of institutional decay.⁵ Institutional balancing replaced “institutional bandwagoning.”⁶ This historical review offers a case study of the enduring political processes present in hemispheric security relations, showing when cooperation is likely and when it is likely to fail.

⁵ This general finding is consistent with Desch (1998), as well as a number of other cooperation “pessimists.” But I do not argue that hemispheric institutions are simply a tool of the United States, as Desch does. The bargaining dynamics are substantially more complex.

⁶ Corrales and Feinberg (1999, p. 8) employ this term, which they credit to Hurrell. U.S. acts of reassurance helped maintain “institutional bandwagoning” towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the early 1990s. But with the loss of fast track authority and a cooling of enthusiasm after the Mexican peso crisis, dynamism has shifted to subregional agreements.

The second case study focuses on the main theme of the study – hemispheric security cooperation in the 1990s. While the dynamics of institutional balancing and bandwagoning are similar, changes in the international context radically altered some of the underlying conditions for cooperation present in the earlier epoch. Efforts to consolidate a new hemispheric security regime have largely been frustrated, because its construction falls along the fault line that separates U.S.-Latin American priorities for regional security.

Despite this failure, however, cooperative security behavior is evident in the region, going well beyond that prescribed by institutional rules at the hemispheric level. Furthermore, significant geographical variations emerge, such as the degree of military transparency and burden sharing in the Southern Cone; the depth of defense reductions in Central America; and levels of security cooperation in border areas within the Andean Pact. While some of the cooperative activity present conforms to the dynamics expected by realism, subregional institutions play an important role.

Since the deviations vary by geographical area, we examine subregions in Chapter 5. Subregional comparisons allow a more thorough test of our contending hypotheses and inform our conclusions with a greater degree of confidence. In the case of the Southern Cone and Central America, hemispheric security institutions are replicated and strengthened at the subregional level, while in the Andean Ridge countries, little security institutionalization exists. Furthermore, in all three subregions, the relative importance of the United States differs significantly. Thus the case studies allow a clearer look at the role of both institutions and power and interests. Here, too, institutionalism offers the better explanation, but here, as at the hemispheric level, it is still incomplete.

In the concluding chapter, we look at the limitations of the systemic approaches, both at the hemispheric and subregional levels, and consider extensions and alternative explanations. An institutional approach that connects domestic politics with hemispheric security institutions looks promising, although its explanatory power may be limited to special circumstances. We explore the approach and suggest a research design for further investigation. The chapter concludes with a modest policy recommendation.

Recent Trends in Hemispheric Security

Is the emergence of security transparency and cooperation a significant break from past interstate behavior in the hemisphere? The level and frequency of interstate conflict in the hemisphere has historically been low when compared to other regions. By most measures – defense expenditures, size of armed forces, numbers of conflicts, battlefield deaths – Latin American is the least militarized major region in the world.⁷ Security cooperation has not been uncommon and third party mediation has sometimes helped limit conflict that does arise. In this environment, slight increases in security transparency and cooperation may not be considered remarkable, especially in light of integrative processes currently ongoing in the political and economic arenas.

This disclaimer notwithstanding, the use and threat of force in Latin American foreign policies has been a frequent feature of the almost two centuries of independence

⁷ This characterization of Latin America has broad support. See Dominguez (1998), Poitras (1990), Kelly (1997), Van Klaveren (1992), and Ramsey (1999). Desch (1998, 256) notes that Singer and Small found that the Western Hemisphere had the lowest number of wars per year (0.11) and the lowest battle deaths per year (3,100). But it does not follow that the region is free of security competition. In the early 1980s, the region accounted for almost 20% of the Third World's total arms expenditures (Varas, 1985, p. 38).

for the region. Mares counts in the twentieth century alone more than two hundred cases where states "either threatened or used military force or were the subject of such threats or force" (Mares, 1997, p. 195). While interventions involving the United States account for a significant portion of this number, most involve militarized disputes between neighboring states of Latin America that bear the same characteristics of conflict everywhere.

The twentieth century disputes that Mares (1997) cites are taken largely from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) database. While many fall short of war, as defined by the standard 1,000 battlefield deaths, at least eight conflicts qualify by that criteria: the Second Central American War, 1906; Third Central American War, 1907; Dominican Republic-Haiti, 1937; Bolivia-Paraguay, 1931-35; Peru-Ecuador, 1939-1941; El Salvador-Honduras, 1969; Argentina-Great Britain, 1982; and Peru-Ecuador, 1995. Other disputes which were not counted came very close to the cutoff criteria. The Peru-Colombia conflict in Leticia in 1932, for instance, resulted in 852 deaths.

Against this historical backdrop of violence and mistrust, developments in the field of security cooperation in the 1990s do indeed present an empirical contrast. In the Southern Cone, Argentina and Chile have participated in joint exercises involving their naval and air forces deployed in the Beagle channel, the object of a near war in 1978. The two countries also sent ground forces to work under Brazilian command on the border of Peru and Ecuador as part of a military observer mission. And in 1999, Presidents Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei, in a reenactment of the 1899 "*abrazo*" which led to the *Pactos de Mayo* in 1902, signed a declaration in the austral port of Ushaiua

pledging even greater security cooperation and military transparency.⁸ That year, the last of two-dozen border disputes between the two countries was resolved.

Argentina recently conducted joint military exercises with Brazil and Uruguay at a 19th century battlefield of what was then Brazil's eastern province of Cisplatine.⁹ Brazilian, Uruguayan and Chilean officers participate in instruction on peacekeeping activities at an Argentine training center at an old base near the same previously conflicted sector. All countries of the region – to include Bolivia and Chile, still with no formal military ties – have signed a declaration that establishes the Southern Cone as a United Nations Zone of Peace. The declaration commits its signatories to the removal of mines in the region – significant given the recent publicity over the minefields that still exist along the disputed international border of Chile and Bolivia (“Foreign Ministers Spar,” 1997).

In the Andean Ridge, Colombia and Venezuela have established a border commission that coordinates joint military operations. Cooperation between those two countries extends to naval operations, despite an unresolved border dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela. And, most significantly, Peru and Ecuador have ratified a peace agreement

⁸ Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed a disarmament agreement in 1902 known as the *Pactos de Mayo*. Under its terms, Argentina and Chile were compelled to resell ships to foreign arms suppliers (Varas 1985). Somewhat ironically, the original agreement was less an expression of trust and confidence than an act to solidify the balance of power system that emerged in 19th century South America (Burr, 1955).

⁹ War began in 1825 between Argentina and Brazil over the Cisplatine province (modern day Uruguay). It ended in 1828 under British mediation leading to the independence of Uruguay.

that promises a definitive end to a conflict which has engendered two wars and a series of militarized disputes.

In Central America, Honduras and Nicaragua are actively demining their common border, under the auspices of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense Board. El Salvador is participating with the deployment of Salvadoran technical experts to Honduras. El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua conduct joint patrols in the Gulf of Fonseca. The armies of those countries, along with Guatemala, have formed a subregional security organization to promote cooperation. And all countries of Central America are signatories to the recently enacted Democratic Security Treaty, which contains many aspects related to cooperative security and military transparency.

Throughout the hemisphere, we find hundreds of examples of close coordination to address common threats, unprecedented transparency in military matters, arms control agreements, and significant changes in force structure, that demonstrate a new spirit of cooperation in the area of security. The incidence of militarized conflict has dropped to near zero.¹⁰

The hemisphere has seen periods of institutionalized security cooperation in the past, generally promoted by the United States in the face of a systemic threat, but cooperation in the 1990s is occurring in an environment that lacks a consensus threat. Furthermore, patterns of cooperative behavior reach across historic rivalries. The United

¹⁰ Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998) compare incidence of Latin American conflict from 1989-97 with other major regions. They report eight militarized disputes in 1989 (out of a global total of 47), and only 2 (of 33) in 1997 (internal conflicts in Colombia and Peru).

States is uninvolved or irrelevant to much of this activity. This empirical puzzle merits serious attention. What is the cause of this palpable change in the tenor of interstate relations in the region?

One possible explanation lies with factors commonly associated with realism. Consider for a moment what the end of the Cold War has meant from the perspective of U.S. strategic interests. As late as 1987, Soviet assistance to Nicaragua, heavy military involvement in Cuba and extensive contacts in Peru were viewed as serious threats to U.S. interests in the region. Argentina and Brazil, in the late 1980s, avidly pursued nuclear technologies and ballistic missile delivery systems.¹¹ As late as 1989, Cuba deployed the most powerful military forces in the region after the United States, Canada and Brazil and provided direct support to guerrilla movements in El Salvador and Guatemala.¹² The Salvadoran conflict was still contested at the beginning of the decade.

By the mid to late 1990s, all of these potential threats to U.S. interests had disappeared. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the collapse of Cuba's military forces, the end to the Central American civil wars and the abandonment of nuclear and missile technology programs in the Southern Cone left the hemisphere without a strategic

¹¹ Into the 1990s, the Tlatelolco Treaty banning nuclear weapons from Latin America had not been accepted by the four countries most likely to proliferate: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba (Varas, 1994).

¹² Dominguez (1998) notes Cuban support of movements in El Salvador, Guatemala and Chile.

threat to the United States, other than the transnational challenges of drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.¹³

These threats represent the “dark underside of globalization and interdependence” (Godson and Williams, 1998, p. 66). The same processes that accelerate the flow of goods, people, ideas and money through the global economy, facilitate criminal transnational networks, mass immigration flows, and volatile capital movements (Muñoz, 1996). To the extent that these threats affect the security of the states, they can be considered with realist tools.

Transnational threats may not be core survival issues for the United States, but they do have an impact on security. The threats to security caused by cross-border flows of contraband (principally drugs), people (immigration and terrorism) and other phenomena (environmental degradation, natural disasters, etc.) affect the U.S. territory both directly (drugs, illegal immigration and terrorism) and indirectly (by undermining newly consolidated democracies and creating an environment of instability which exacerbates transnational threats). Since unilateral action against such threats is not cost-effective, the United States might rationally seek ways to influence behavior through bilateral agreements or the creation of security institutions that foster cooperation and

¹³ See Perry (1997), Wilhelm (1998). General Wilhelm commanded the U.S. Southern Command in the late 1990s. There are numerous official publications that provide detailed lists of transnational threats of concern to the United States. Often cited are the transnational threats of drugs, terrorism, trafficking in arms, migrant flows, and internal instability. The Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the Americas” (1995), offers such a similar catalog. See Einaudi (1996/7), Lowenthal (1992) and Van Klaveren (1992) for good treatments of the topic. Villagran de Leon (1993) offers a review of OAS activity in these areas.

burden sharing in these areas. A pattern of security cooperation consistent with this general optic would largely reflect U.S. interests.

Another possible explanation goes beyond a focus on state power and interest, drawing on the proliferation of new international organizations and the growing transnational linkages characteristic of a globalization of economic, cultural and political issues. The globalization literature emphasizes the important role of new norms¹⁴ and institutions in organizing the "turbulence" of world politics (Rosenau, 1990; Vaky, 1993; Muñoz, 1996). Despite the recent bearish turn in the United Nations (after euphoric predictions following the end of the Cold War), the general belief is that institutions can help, especially if carefully designed with incentives that appeal to national interests. These institutions are thought to be easier to create in regional organizations, such as the OAS (Lepgold and Weiss, 1998; Lamborn, 1998).¹⁵

Corrales and Feinberg characterize the region in the 1990s as passing through a high point of what they term "hemispherism": "the active attempt by the nations of the hemisphere to redirect their foreign policies in favor of closer and coordinated cooperation with one another" (Corrales and Feinberg, 1999, p. 2). Unprecedented cooperation in the 1990s is based on acceptance of new norms, creation of new

¹⁴ For example, some argue that a new norm on democracy and human rights appears to be challenging the old, statist norm of sovereignty and non-intervention (Cronin, 1998).

¹⁵ The importance of organizations as ways to institutionalize norms is emphasized here. Ideas untethered from institutions are unlikely to have lasting impacts. Institutional treatments of Kant's "perpetual peace" are not vulnerable to assaults such as Carr's (1964) attack on WWI idealism.

institutions, and the inclusion of new items on the inter-American agenda. The U.S decision to work through hemispheric institutions and willingness on the part of Latin American states to engage in "institutionalized bandwagoning" has been key to the success of cooperative initiatives (Corrales and Feinberg, 1999, p. 8).

A renewal process at the OAS ¹⁶ was initiated in 1991 through the adoption of OAS Resolution 1080, "The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the renewal of the Inter-American System."¹⁷ The resolution established a "firm resolve to stimulate the process of renewal of the Organization of American States, to make it more effective and useful in the application of its guiding principles and for the attainment of its objectives." While the renewal process is in large part an administrative reform to increase organizational efficiency, responsiveness and transparency of resource allocation, the movement includes rethinking and redefining several of the core functions of the OAS. For instance, economic development has been broadened and redesignated under the rubric of sustainable development and support for democracy has been strengthened by the creation of institutions to monitor, verify and improve governance in newly consolidating democracies.

Corrales and Feinberg claim that a new historical peak of hemispherism was reached in 1994, at the Miami presidential summit. At that meeting, the presidents of the

¹⁶ See OAS (1995a) for a review of that process.

¹⁷ OAS Resolutions are listed by resolution number and title when that additional information adds to the argument. OAS conferences are referred to by title or subject matter and date. OAS publications are available through the Office of the Secretary General, Organization of American States, Washington, DC.

Americas committed their countries to: "cooperate toward an impressive array of goals in politics (advancement of democracy, good governance), in economics (free trade in the hemisphere, financial coordination), and in security (the fight against the drug trade, the collective defense of democracy)."

As Corrales and Feinberg indicate above, hemispheric security and conflict resolution have been caught up in the reform movement. As a part of that process the ministers of foreign affairs and heads of delegations, through OAS Resolution 1080, "expressed their decision to start a process of consultation on hemispheric security in light of the new situation in the region and worldwide, from an up-to-date and comprehensive perspective on security and disarmament."

The renewal process initiated change in the IASS in several areas: (1) reorganization of the institutions that address security; (2) redefinition of the principles that underlie hemispheric security; and (3) an ambitious plan of action that includes concrete measures for adoption by member states that constrain use of force and promote a vigorous defense of democracy.

In 1993, the President of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, Dr. Hernán Patiño Mayer, presented a new model of hemispheric security – "cooperative security" – to replace the flawed collective security arrangement established by the Rio Treaty. Under "cooperative security," countries would join together to address potential threats instead of waiting until open conflicts developed. Patiño recognized that such a model was based on the premise of shared interests, shared threats and a willingness to cooperate to address these threats, using all elements of national power, to include the armed forces. In his view, the hemisphere was ready (OAS, 1995b).

There is substantial evidence that elements of this vision have taken root in the hemisphere. Institutionalized cooperation is emerging at all levels – locally, subregionally and regionally. Its constituent parts overlap in places and leave voids in others, and mechanisms of coordination between levels are underdeveloped. Despite these limitations, this network of security institutions is becoming an important factor in security relations between states of the region and may be directly responsible for much of the security cooperation observed in the 1990s. This study is designed to evaluate that challenge to the realist paradigm.

The New Politics of Cooperative Security

Just as regional trade integration has slowed at the hemispheric level, giving way to subregional pacts, security cooperation demonstrates a similar trend. The evidence shows that cooperative security generally coalesces at the subregional level, especially where security can be nested in other cooperative regimes, such as Mercosur (*Mercado Común Sur*) in the Southern Cone and the peace process in Central America. But the security institutions that have emerged at the hemispheric level as a result of this process are far from fulfilling the vision of Patiño Mayer. Understanding of how the renewal process actually unfolded in the IASS requires a theoretical model that can encompass the dynamics of power, interest and institutional behavior.

The U.S.-led intervention in Haiti (1994) and the shock of the Ecuador-Peru conflict (1995) confronted states in the region with two guideposts to the future: the first, an example of outcomes likely under an effective hemispheric security regime and the second, an example of outcomes likely under a failed regime. Latin American states, for the most part, were not satisfied with either scenario. On the one hand, Latin American

countries traditionally see hemispheric defense schemes and U.S. hegemony as "two sides of the same coin ... the power of the United States to dictate Latin America's foreign and domestic affairs" (Poitras, 1990, p. 123). The Haitian intervention, although it followed years of negotiations within the OAS and was based on an emerging norm of international relations (Tesón, 1996), did nothing to allay Latin American suspicions that a new cooperative spirit in security meant cooperation on U.S. terms (Maingot, 1996). On the other hand, conflict between two democratic states of the hemisphere, Peru and Ecuador, both of which had participated in the development of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) shown to be effective elsewhere in the region, undermined the new spirit of Latin American security cooperation.¹⁸ These seminal events corresponded with a turn away from new initiatives at the hemispheric level and a new focus on subregional security.

At first glance, such a trend seems inconsistent with the integrating processes of globalization. But given the asymmetrical power relations in the hemisphere, it is plausible to argue that globalizing influences in fact accelerated the trend towards subregionalism. Economic globalization, for instance has led not to consolidation of a free trade area of the Americas (still a goal for the year 2005), but rather to new or

¹⁸ Much of the work on security institutions in this hemisphere focuses on CSBMs, which are also central to this study. *Fundación Latino-Americana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO) of Chile has published two important volumes on the subject, under the editorship of Francisco Rojas Arevana (1996a, 1996b). Both volumes adopt an institutionalist focus, describing the hemispheric concepts and institutions that deal with security and illustrating their influence in a series of regional case studies.

revitalized subregional trading blocks: Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market (CACM).

In the area of security, subregionalization was driven by a number of related factors. In the first place, security issues were thought to be less salient with the end of the Cold War. The unifying theme of East-West confrontation had disappeared, given way to a new focus on economic relations. In particular, Latin American security issues were thought to be of marginal importance, given the lack of U.S. strategic concerns in the region. This new "marginalization" opened space for subregional initiatives (Druetta, Tibiletti, and Donadio, 1991).

In the second place, the "dark side" of globalism, with the emergence of transnational threats, complicated the regional security agenda significantly, leading to a natural breakout of specific subregions based on particular security challenges (Stanely, 1999). Hence, while the Southern Cone focused on overcoming a rather standard security dilemma in order to move economic integration forward, Central America and the Caribbean were confronted with the transnational challenges of contraband and criminality. In the Andean Ridge, countries faced a witch's brew of tense interstate relations and deeply rooted transnational security threats.

Transnational threats are often considered likely triggers for cooperative security, since solutions require multilateral approaches. But U.S. attempts to include transnational threats on the hemispheric security agenda have been met with resistance. Latin American countries are nervous about a broadly defined security agenda that includes many threats of a non-military nature and are unwilling to allow the United

States to dominate a process of "securitization"¹⁹ that defines hemispheric threats (Inter-American Dialogue, 1997). The asymmetry in power relations – driven home by the 1989 invasion of Panama to address the results of a "narco-regime" – make hemispheric consensus difficult to arrange around these sorts of issues.

The "internationalization of politics" is another feature of the impact of globalization (Muñoz, 1996b). Its first order effect – the awakening of ethnicities and nationalities in Eastern Europe – did not have a major impact in Latin America, where the business of nation building is largely complete. But new norms in the area of human rights and democracy found ready acceptance in the region, which was just completing its transition from authoritarianism as the 1990s began. With democracy as a unifying theme and the absence of "alliance handicaps" stemming from ideological differences (Liska, 1962), the possibilities for hemispheric convergence seemed bright.

But as applied to security relations, the picture is more complex. In the early 1990s, ground work was laid for the "collective defense of democracy": OAS Resolution 1080 adopted in Santiago (1991) and the Washington Protocol amending the Charter strengthened automatic responses within the OAS to ensure a strong reaction in the event that democratic processes were interrupted in a member state. But as demonstrated during the Haitian crisis, the political will to violate sovereignty in the defense of democracy proved impossible to muster (Maingot, 1996). Mexican opposition to U.S. policy in this incident was strong. Mexican policy remains anchored in the principle of

¹⁹ This is the term employed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) to explain how an economic, social or cultural issue becomes identified as a threat within a given regional security complex.

non-intervention, which also forms the basis of its Cuba policy (González Gálvez, 1998). In 1999, when the United States pushed for an even stronger mechanism to "defend" democracy, resistance from key Latin American states killed the initiative.²⁰ Sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as democracy, are norms of OAS Charter.²¹

Thus at the regional level, democracy has not been as significant an integrating factor as some expected, in part because of the presence of marked power asymmetry. But at the subregional and unit levels, the impact of democratization on security policies has not been any easier to characterize. While most analysts agree that democracy has an impact on security, few agree on precisely what that impact is (Hirst, 1996). The consolidation of democracy in Latin America has taken a variety of paths and its foreign policy expression is equally varied.

Perhaps more significant than the simple adoption of democratic forms of government is the general rise in transparency between countries, based on enhanced information flows, open markets and open political systems. This transparency has its major impact in security relations between neighboring states.

For all of these reasons, conditions for subregional security cooperation were enhanced in the 1990s. In subregions with substantial economic interaction, shared civil-

²⁰ At the 1999 OAS General Assembly in Guatemala City, the United States authored language to supplement Resolution 1080. An automatic OAS response would be initiated upon detection of warning signs that democracy was failing, instead of waiting for an actual disruption.

²¹ The "guiding principles" of the OAS are numerous. As stated in the Charter, they include respect for international law, human rights, sovereignty, noninterference in domestic matters, rejection of wars of aggression, and a recognition of the importance of social development, justice and education, among others (OAS Charter, Articles 2 and 3).

military traditions, and common security threats, significant security cooperation has emerged. Often the trend towards more cooperative security was facilitated by specific institutions that allowed defense policies to gradually adjust from confrontational to cooperative strategies. In many cases, these subregional institutions have filled gaps in the overarching hemispheric model, which has remained incomplete and rift by divergent interests.

In Mercosur, for instance, links between economic and security institutions appear to be mutually reinforcing. This is not to say that economic integration always promotes cooperative security. The Andean Pact, created in 1969, initially triggered a dramatic improvement in relations between Ecuador and Peru, whose leaders signed a number of bilateral agreements for economic cooperation, but militarized clashes between the two countries increased dramatically from 1977 onward (Mares, 1996/7). Colombia and Venezuela engaged in an arms race during the height of the Andean Pact's success.²² El Salvador and Honduras fought a war in 1969 at the peak of Central American integration, over the status of Salvadoran nationals in Honduras who were in a sense the physical embodiment of that economic integration.²³

²² Mares states that "Venezuela had previously reinforced border defenses after Colombian guerrillas crossed. But the 1987 appearance of a Colombian navy vessel in Venezuelan-claimed waters provoked mutual military mobilizations. Similar incidents in the early 1970s also fueled arms acquisitions" (Mares, 1997, p. 213).

²³ Perhaps these economic pacts leave behind institutional traces. Van Klaveren (1992) asserts that CACM, almost moribund in the 1980s, nevertheless provided a framework to begin the Esquipulas process that culminated in the Central American peace accords.

If the processes of globalization in the 1990s have favored subregional security integration, what are the prospects for a hemispheric counterpart? Based on the pattern of institutional security politics in asymmetric systems, they are poor. Varas (1992) categorizes U.S. security behavior in the region as varying between "hegemonic control" and "coercive control." These labels exaggerate the influence of the United States, but nevertheless offer a key to understanding the new security politics. What Varas means by "hegemonic control" is a U.S. policy of using regional institutions to give a multilateral flavor to its security policies. When this course of action seems more cost-effective than unilateral action ("coercive control"), the United States attempts to create or remake security institutions that reflect its own interests in the region.

Under the best of circumstances, this is not easy. Because institutions tend to restore symmetry – through common decision-making procedures, opportunities for small countries to "voice" their interests, and facilitation of issue linkage – new forms of political behavior are possible: "institutional bandwagoning" (support to U.S. initiatives) and institutional "balancing" (resistance to U.S. initiatives). The United States is forced into an assurance game to maintain support, requiring constant displays of multilateralism (acquiescing to majority decisions, accepting binding obligations, refraining from unilateralism), as well as significant side payments to potential balancers (e.g., Mastanduno security "outlets" and other benefits). This is because the U.S. commitment to multilateralism is rarely credible on its own merits. The "shadow of the future" for Latin American states is the certainty that the United States will defect or change the rules of the game when necessary to secure its own interests.

However, as long as there is a mutual interest in the gains to be secured through security cooperation (e.g., defense of the continent against the Axis countries in WWII), institutional support for U.S. initiatives is likely to be forthcoming. Over time, a natural decay may set in, as more issues are brought under the purview of the institutional arrangement, leading to a more complicated agenda that is harder to support and easier to subvert. At some point, a balancer may emerge – at different times in U.S.-Latin American relations, that role has been played by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Since in an assurance game, cooperation quickly unravels once defection is probable, institutional balancing can quickly develop into significant resistance.

The conditions wrought by globalism in the 1990s are particularly auspicious for institutional balancing. The complicated security agenda makes it much more difficult to define a set of security objectives that are equally important to all member states. This same phenomenon makes it easier to link issues in ways that benefit smaller states. Finally, the expansion of the inter-American system, with the incorporation of Canada and the English speaking Caribbean, has added to the pool of potential balancers and exacerbated the well known cooperation dilemmas facing large groups.

If all of this simply meant that multilateralism is difficult and likely to cause the U.S. to resort to unilateral action or engage in states bilaterally ("divide and conquer" tactics), then the institutional politics described above would be of little import. But in fact, the outcomes that the process generates are important; they have an independent impact on cooperative security behavior and the behavior that results is not always consistent with U.S. priorities.

The logic of security politics at the hemispheric level is a special case that applies to institutions that encompass asymmetrical power relations. As such, it can be derived from the more general form of institutional theory. That theory, along with realism, is developed in the next chapter. Both provide a set of hypotheses with which to examine the successful security cooperation at the subregional level, as well as the limited cooperation at the hemispheric level.




Figure 1-1: Inter-American Security System

CHAPTER 2 THEORY

Introduction

Following a brief introduction, this chapter develops a theory-based description of the components of a cooperative security regime, made up of institutions that facilitate cooperation by providing organizations for negotiation and rules that prescribe specific behaviors.¹ Once that important mark is established, the chapter investigates the realist and institutionalist traditions in some depth, particularly with regard to the obstacles and opportunities these paradigms posit for security cooperation between states. From that examination, contending hypotheses emerge to explain the patterns of security cooperation present in the hemisphere. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the operationalization of key explanatory factors.

Realism and neoliberal institutionalism both address the problem of security cooperation and conflict in the international system. The theoretical frameworks share many of the same assumptions of how the world works. Both assume that states are the principal actors in an anarchic global “system.” In the absence of world government, states must rely primarily on their own resources to ensure survival. Since the main threat to survival is aggression from other states, international relations, especially in the

¹ Mere membership in international organizations does not constitute participation in a regime because independent decision-making is in no way constrained (Stein, 1990).

area of security, tend to be conflictual. Cooperation is difficult to achieve, even if all participating states would be better off in absolute terms.

The simple fact that a cooperative strategy exists that might reap absolute benefits for participating states does not mean that states, acting rationally, will adopt such a strategy. The dilemmas of cooperation – the collective action (free rider) problem, cheating and relative gains – must be overcome for states to reap the absolute benefits of cooperation. Institutionalism admits the possibility that multinational institutions comprised of states and non-governmental organizations can foster cooperation. Realism denies institutions any independent role.

Since the two theories differ strongly on the relative importance of institutions, these offer solid analytical traction for examining cooperative security behavior and the links between that behavior and norms regarding the use of force. However, neither the realist nor institutionalist approaches in their elementary form explain patterns of security competition and cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Both theories need to be modified to reflect the marked power asymmetry present in the region. Power-based approaches must recognize that the United States, with its long time horizon and generous resource base, will at times bear the costs and promote the agenda of multilateral institutions, even in the face of short-term, tactical reversals. By the same token, institutional approaches must recognize that no multilateral regime can effectively constrain the United States from privileging its global or domestic interests in ways that may offend institutional norms.

From a theoretical standpoint, the net affect of this great power asymmetry is to mute the differences between the two theoretical approaches, making it more difficult to

design research questions that ably weigh the available evidence. In cases where institutions appear to succeed, success might in fact be due to institutional effectiveness or U.S. support. On the other hand, the failure of an institution to constrain the United States says little about the impact of institutions on state behavior in less extreme cases of power asymmetry.

One way to escape this complication is to drop down one level of analysis to the subregional level. Within the geographical confines of Central America, the Andean Ridge and the Southern Cone power is distributed more evenly. At this level, sharp distinctions appear in the behavior patterns predicted by realism and institutionalism. This becomes evident in the analysis of the subregional case studies in Chapter 5. At this point however, it is useful to consider what a cooperative security regime might consist of, in order to better focus discussion of the two theoretical paradigms.

Cooperative Security Regimes

The purpose of this section is to describe an ideal type that represents a potential end point for the developing set of security institutions in the region. We begin with a discussion of cooperative security, and then develop the constituent parts of what would make up a cooperative security regime. The end result of this discussion is a set of variables that can be operationalized and used to measure the degree to which such a regime might be evolving in the hemisphere.

To develop the concept of cooperation security, we will rely on the work of Janne Nolan (1994), Antonia and Abram Chayes (1994), Joseph Nye (1991), and Ivo Daadler (1992). According to Nolan et al. (1994), cooperative security is “designed to ensure that

organized aggression cannot start or be prosecuted on any large scale.” It seeks to accomplish this purpose “through institutionalized consent, rather than through threats of material or physical coercion,” an important element being the creation of “collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishments” (pp. 4-5).

A cooperative security regime supports these objectives through a set of institutions, with norms that specify behaviors with regard to use of force.² Sometimes the norms simply proscribe force (with the caveat that use of force in self-defense is always permitted); sometimes they encourage cooperative security arrangements to address certain shared threats; sometimes they create the expectation of collective responses to aggression.

An important point is that cooperative security requires a proactive attitude on the part of participating states to deal with emerging threats before they become open acts of aggression. Cooperative security is not collective security. Its relationship to collective security is like that of preventive medicine to surgery (Nolan et al., 1994).

As Nolan et al. (1994) point out, a “rich fabric of constraints” has already appeared in some parts of the world that offers instructive examples of elements that might help construct a cooperative security arrangement:

limits on military operations, such as the various CSBMs in place in Europe and the Middle East; agreements for averting wars, such as measures covering accidents, hot lines, and crisis centers between the superpowers; limits on force

² For Daadler (1992), cooperative security is based on a “set of principles, norms and rules that govern the military dimension of interstate relations” created through an “intensive dialogue and habitual cooperation” (p. 52).

size, weapon types, and operational practices, such as those contained in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreements; and the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missile nonproliferation regimes ... cooperative verification and transparency measures, such as the data exchanges and on-site inspections required by various arms control agreements, the UN arms sale registry, and the 1990 Open Skies agreement. (p. 7)

All of these measures have been described as CSBMs.³

In this hemisphere, in the 1990s, there are rules already in place associated with the composition of forces, such as prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction, arms control/restraint, ceilings on troop strength and constraints on military exercises and deployments, and restrictions on certain other military activities. There are also rules relating to transparency, such as exchange of information about military activities (e.g., exercise notification), capabilities (e.g., participation in arms transfer registries), and doctrine (e.g., publication of so-called white papers). There are mechanisms to promote coordination in security matters, including meetings between high-level representatives of the defense ministries, exchanges of personnel and military units, and participation in conferences, symposiums, etc. Some measures are designed to develop cooperation in certain joint endeavors. They include measures that promote interoperability, such as

³ It is easy to see that such an expansive catalogue of CSBMs may cause some to decry the vagueness of the concept of CSBMs – one author calls them “the fastest growing business of the post-Cold War era” and points out the lack of accepted theory to explain their growth or impact. Without a doubt, the term CSBM has become a watchword for all sorts of new security relations throughout the world and includes procedures that go well beyond the “modest measures” agreed to at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, where the concept was first coined. These observations come from Desjardins (1996), a critic of generalized acceptance of the value of CSBMs. Desjardins’ work is an invaluable corrective for tendencies prevalent in the literature to expand the definition of CSBMs and exaggerate their value.

development of common military doctrine, establishment of a common military education system, and participation in joint training operations. There are discussions in some subregions regarding procedures to create multinational units, share logistics and purchase common hardware, and adopt unified command structures.

How can we make sense of these disparate elements?

The recent work in the area of cooperative security shows that there are several important features to consider.⁴ First, a cooperative security regime should have the administrative capacity to facilitate negotiation of rules, track compliance (through data collection), evaluate results (through data analysis) and report to members. Second a cooperative security regime should have binding rules regarding use of force. Use of force may only be employed as a last resort (after exhausting all other means), must be applied multilaterally (except in the case of self-defense), and can only be used in support of multilateral, consensus objectives (Nolan et al., 1994). Clearly, there must be prior agreement on what sorts of crises should invoke a military sanction. Third, rules must be produced through an inclusive decision making procedure. The Chayes (1994) assert that “a regime is inclusive to the extent that the states affected by it have a reasonable opportunity to participate in its processes and it does not unfairly discriminate against any of its members” (p. 72). These two general requirements for rules – that they be binding and produced via an inclusive decision making process – are important characteristics that should be present regardless of the particular aspect of security cooperation considered.

⁴ This derives from Nolan (1994), the Chayes (1994) and Daadler (1992).

Other characteristics help define specific security behavior. First, capabilities of member states must be transparent. Information must be reliable (verifiable), relevant and timely, providing early warning of defection. Second, military postures should be kept at low levels, with limited armaments capacity and constraints on exercises, ceilings on forces, restrictions on deployments (Daadler, 1992). Third, a cooperative security regime must have operational capacity to respond to crises at varying levels, through good offices, formal mediation and ultimately through collective response and burden sharing agreements. This operational capacity need not include a command element (as is the case with NATO), but some mechanism should be available for organizing a collective response to violations of the regime norms.

These three specific injunctions yield the behavior clusters that form the key components of rule-based security behavior: transparency and verification; reduced defense postures; and burden sharing (collective capacity to sanction offenders).

There are clear absolute gains from cooperation in these three behavior clusters.⁵ Military openness allows states to make a more informed choice about their security needs. Their calculations can thus avoid a "worst case" analysis requiring them to expend more resources than necessary. Reduced defense postures offers a similar absolute gain. With a lower requirement for defense, states can spend resources on other priorities, such as economic development and social programs. Regional burden sharing takes this one

⁵ The presence of absolute gains is an important prerequisite for cooperation under the assumptions of institutionalism. See Keohane (1984), Keohane and Martin (1995) and Hasenclever, et al. (1997). Military relations among states must be seen as a problem of "common security" (Nye, 1991, p. 162).

step further. If states pool their capabilities or agree to specialize in roles where their individual capabilities are already substantial and devote those capabilities to the region as a whole, all states enjoy the benefits of more efficient allocation of security resources. In addition, there are some regional security problems which may require cooperative approaches for their solution. Problems such as trafficking in contraband, illegal immigration, environmental degradation are either impervious to unilateral action or extremely costly.

This last point brings us back to the beginning. What sorts of threats or acts might trigger multilateral military action under a cooperative security regime? Presumably, an aggressor state that openly attacked a member or members of the regime would invite a military response. But what about the Haitian crisis? Does the disruption of democracy, the violation of human rights or the threat of instability also merit military intervention? What about uncontrolled trade in contraband—trafficking in drugs or small arms, for instance? If a state becomes a regional base for “narco-terrorism,” is military intervention then justified? What about use of the armed forces to cooperate in nontraditional roles, such as natural disaster relief, environmental protection, peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations? The short answer to this is that an urgent security threat is whatever the regime members say it is.

In this study, we will focus on two conceptual clusters that can be derived from this discussion: institutions and behaviors. Institutions are “related complexes of rules and norms,” which vary in terms of their level of “institutionalization,” ranging from

informal conventions to formal intergovernmental organizations.⁶ Their rules “prescribe behavioral roles for actors” in accordance with general norms (Keohane, 1989, p. 163). Together, organizations, norms and rules regarding the use of military force make up what we identify as the cooperative security regime in the hemisphere. Tracing the evolution of these elements and comparing them to underlying power and interests of states in the region – especially along the fault line of U.S.-Latin American relations – offer a constructive comparison of realism and institutionalism.

I treat institutions as conceptually distinct from observable behaviors in areas of transparency and verification, defense postures and burden sharing.⁷ Those behaviors demonstrate a pattern of security cooperation that can be compared to that promoted by security institutions. Such an exercise offers a second test of the explanatory power of the contending theoretical paradigms. This research requires, then, data that can support discussion of the evolution of institutions vis-à-vis power and interests, as well as data that substantiates the depth and scope of cooperative security behaviors. These are the principal methodological challenges of the study.

The remainder of this chapter examines both the realist and institutionalist paradigms in light of their explanatory power regarding cooperative security behavior, first at the hemispheric level and then at the subregional level. The dilemmas of

⁶ See Keohane (1989) for a longer discussion of typologies and factors related to this discussion. Nye (1991) offers a similar definition: “persistent sets of norms that shape expectations and constrain behavior” (p. 155).

⁷ Not all forms of institutionalism adopt this perspective, as we shall see when reviewing “reflective” approaches to the study of institutionalism.

cooperation, especially in the context of the current theoretical debate over absolute and relative gains, figure largely in this examination.

Contending Paradigms

Realism

Realism, tracing its origins back to Thucydides, has enjoyed a long run as the principal paradigm for understanding interstate behavior, especially as relates to security. classical realism, which took its modern form under Hans Morganthau (1973) after World War II, adopts the state as its basic unit of analysis and the twin factors of power and national interest as the best explanations for state behavior in the international system.⁸

The tradition, while rich and varied, coalesces around a set of mainstream assumptions. Keohane (1989) lists three which together make up what he calls the "hard core" of Classical realism: (1) states are the principal actors in world politics; (2) they act as unitary, rational actors; and (3) seek power and define their interests in terms of power.⁹ Because power is a relational concept, international politics becomes a "struggle for power" (Morganthau, 1973). States tend not to trust one another, tend to rely on their own capabilities to ensure their survival and strive to maintain their military capabilities

⁸ Keohane (1986) offers a useful review of the development of this school of thought.

⁹ Mearsheimer (1994/5) lists five: (1) states operate in an anarchic system; (2) the principal threat to a state is another state; (3) intentions can never be known with certainty; (4) survival is the highest goal of states; and (5) states are rational actors. By rational, we mean that states select strategies based on consistently ordered sets of priorities (Keohane, 1986).

relative to other states in the system. The result is constant security competition, whereby one state's efforts to enhance its security degrades the security of others.¹⁰

Waltz (1979) refined classical realism with a systemic approach, carefully laying the baseline assumptions of neorealism: States are unitary, rational actors attempting to maximize power in relation to other states in an anarchic, self-help system. His assumption that states are unitary actors meant that detailed analysis of the source of preferences was unnecessary. State interest could be reduced to the need to ensure survival. Thus, as rational actors states will seek strategies to ensure survival in the interstate system. That system is anarchic in the sense that no world government exists to manage security relations between states. States operate in a self-help system – meaning they can only rely on themselves to ensure survival. Consequently, states vie inexorably to maintain a position of relative strength vis-à-vis their rivals.

Perhaps because of its privileged position, realism has been subjected to periodic challenges that depart from its basic assumptions and attempt to construct an alternate view of international relations. The principal challengers since the advent of the Cold War have been variations of liberalism, ranging from the functionalism of the 1950s to the regime theory of the 1970s, to what is now known as neoliberal institutionalism.¹¹

Realism, as we shall see, is not sanguine about the possibility that institutions can change the basic conditions in the international system in ways that promote cooperation.

¹⁰ Jervis (1978) found that some cooperation was possible in a defense-dominated world. See Glaser (1997) for a recent answer to Jervis' challengers.

¹¹ Keohane (1989) adopts this term, from the "liberal institutionalism" coined by Grieco (1988a).

Institutions simply reflect the underlying power and interest of participating states. Institutions are arenas for acting out power relationships (Mearsheimer, 1994/5) or representations of power aggregation in the form of alliances.¹²

This does not mean that security cooperation never occurs, just that it is closely circumscribed and not likely to result from institutions. To better understand why cooperation under the assumptions of realism is so difficult to achieve, it is necessary to examine more closely the theoretical literature on the standard dilemmas of interstate cooperation.

Olson (1964), and others, laid out a "logic of collective action" to show why "collective goods" are normally supplied at suboptimal levels. Because collective goods are "public" or non-discriminatory in the sense that no state can be excluded from reaping the benefits, states have powerful incentives to shirk and free-ride.¹³ States will tend to allow others to bear the costs for the provision of collective goods because the benefits accrue more or less equally to all. Clearly, if each state follows this logic, collective

¹² Classical realists such as Aron (1973) and Morgenthau (1973) recommended formation of alliances as stabilizing, balance-of-power mechanisms. Alliances are institutions, based on Snyder's (1990) definition: "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for security or aggrandizement of members" (p. 104). But latter day realists have disagreed on the impact of alliances, as we will discuss shortly.

¹³ Olson also listed as a key characteristic 'jointness of supply,' meaning "an individual's consumption does not preclude consumption by others" (Gowa, 1989, p. 1245). Public goods theorists also employ these concepts (Kindleberger, 1973).

action will normally not be possible in the international system and as a consequence collective goods will not be supplied.¹⁴

Of the three clusters of behavior we are most concerned with – military transparency, defense postures and burden sharing – transparency and the enhanced regional security produced by burden sharing most closely approximate collective goods. Information about military activities, once made public, is available to all and its utility does not diminish as the number of states with access to the information increases. Enhanced regional security is more problematic – more difficult to organize and much easier to privatize. But in its pure form, regional security also approximates a public good.

Thus both of these “goods” are subject to free rider problems, which means, that absent other factors, we should expect to see transparency and regional security provided at suboptimal levels.

Another dilemma of cooperation is nicely illustrated in the context of the security dilemma described earlier. There are two distinct problems captured by the security dilemma: cheating and relative gains.

Cheating problems are often illustrated by game theoreticians through the Prisoners’ Dilemma.¹⁵ In brief, two prisoners, accused of collaborating in a criminal activity carrying a stiff sentence, are held in separate cells. Their jailers have only

¹⁴ See Stein (1990) for a summary of this reasoning and a list of its major contributors.

¹⁵ The numerous models used in game theory to describe the strategic behavior of states are presented in Oye (1986).

enough information to convict on a less serious charge. Both are offered freedom in exchange for evidence against their partner. If only one provides information, the other will receive a harsh sentence. Absent reliable information and assurances that the partner will remain silent, both prisoners are likely to offer evidence against each other – leading to imprisonment. In short, they rationally select strategies that lead to suboptimal outcomes.¹⁶ This problem potentially affects all three of our behavior clusters.

In the case of transparency, states that report information about their military activities may expose critical weaknesses. If potential rivals do not also report their activities, then the reporting state may increase its vulnerability by compliance. Thus states may not provide information or may provide partial or misleading information.

Reduction of defense postures is also affected by the possibility of cheating. States that do reduce their postures will increase their vulnerability if potential rivals do not reciprocate. Thus states may not reduce their postures, or may offset those reductions by seeking alliances – engaging in competitive balancing.

Burden sharing faces a similar dilemma, to the extent that it is based on the pooling of capabilities and specialization of roles. States that design their forces based on the assumption that others will provide support in certain areas (sea patrols, air defense, etc.) become vulnerable if others do not uphold their commitments. Thus states will tend not to cooperate or may offset vulnerabilities by building military capabilities, thus affecting the second behavior cluster.¹⁷

¹⁶ See Oye (1996) for a description of the Prisoners' Dilemma and related games.

¹⁷ See Snyder (1990) on burden sharing concerns.

The theoretical literature attempts to address the problem of defecting as illustrated by the Prisoners' Dilemma through a variety of means. To the extent that security cooperation is not a "one-move game," states can signal their cooperative intent by small incremental steps designed to elicit a positive response. If cooperation is not forthcoming, a state can retaliate. Because of the "shadow of the future" – gains from future cooperation – states are likely to cooperate if they do not discount future gains too heavily and the last move of the game is unknown.

Axelrod (1984) allows for cooperative activity between two partners following such a "tit-for-tat" strategy. If communication is enhanced through iteration, some cooperative behavior could theoretically emerge. But in the security field this would rarely amount to more than small incremental steps related to specific security problems, such as protocols to reduce tension caused by unforecasted troop movements near disputed border areas. These steps would have to be reciprocal and easily reversible (Oye, 1986).

In any case, even if the problem of lack of communication and uncertainty of intent were somehow solved, the security dilemma contains the seeds of a second dilemma to cooperation, the problem of relative gains. While inherent in the security dilemma, the relative gains problem is not obvious in the Prisoners' Dilemma. Even if information and commitments are somehow made reliable, states will gain in different measures from cooperation.

Grieco (1988a) clearly lays out the problem of relative gains from the realist perspective, his argument rooted in the core assumptions of realism. He recognizes that under some circumstances relative gains matter less and states may be able to cooperate

to realize absolute gains. But in the area of security, because of core concerns regarding survival and easy translation of relative gains into military capabilities, this possibility is limited.¹⁸

Matthews (1996), drawing heavily on the offense-defense balance developed by Jervis, shows the impact that future, cumulative gains might have on a state's strategy to cooperate in the area of security: "If a relative gain in a current round of interaction creates advantages that allow additional gains in future rounds, relative gains will be more important" (Jervis, 1978, p.114). In an offense-dominated world, first round wins can confer enormous positional advantages. If defense is dominant, recovery is possible and hence cooperation more likely. However, as Mearsheimer (1994/5, p. 23) reminds us, in practice it is very difficult to distinguish offensive weapons from defensive ones.¹⁹

Other criticisms are more general. Snidal (1991) shows that in large groups, relative gains do not offer important obstacles to cooperation, since "each cooperative dyad can achieve relative gains against the other actors" (p. 394). But Snidal's overly stylized model is sharply criticized by Grieco (Snidal, Powell and Grieco, 1993) for its assumption of constant returns from cooperation. There are apparently no empirical examples of such a system (Mearsheimer, 1994/5). In any case, not all "cooperative dyads" are equal, at least with respect to security issues. It matters if a state's neighbor

¹⁸ See Grieco, (1988a, 1988b) and Powell (Snidal, Powell and Grieco, 1993) for a discussion of various factors which affect the acuteness of the relative gains problem. Jervis (1999) and Keohane and Martin (1995) note a convergence on the issue of when relative gains will matter.

¹⁹ See also Jervis (1999).

reneges on an arms control agreement. That a distant partner did not may offer little solace.

In the case of transparency, some states may rely on secrecy more than others. A weak state may wish to present misleading displays of strength, while a strong, aggressive state may wish to hide its strength. A strong, status-quo state, on the other hand, would have no reason, based on relative gains, to fear transparency. In fact, transparency could enhance deterrence in this case. Thus, even in the absence of cooperation, transparent behavior on the part of these states might be observed.

A different argument, based on the nature in which military information is handled in various states, exposes a second relative gains dilemma related to transparency. In some states with open systems and mature civil-military relations, much information about military activities is already public. That is not the case in other states – in fact military information may not even be available to representatives of the government. Thus, some states do not incur additional risk by endorsing military transparency, while others do. This dilemma is well documented in studies of transparency measures attempted between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.²⁰ In short, states that have much to lose from transparency may refuse to provide information or may provide misleading information intending to dissimulate weaknesses or intent.

With regard to reductions in defense postures, the most obvious relative gains problem is the impact on arms producers, principally the United States but also including

²⁰ See Desjardins (1996).

Brazil, Argentina and Chile (three countries who together account for 90% of intra-Latin America arms transfers). Other relative gains problems associated with defense reductions are present as well. Some types of reduction (mechanized arms, aircraft, etc.) will fall more heavily on states with modernized forces, while others (troop ceilings, limits on maneuvers) may primarily affect states with larger, but less technologically advanced forces. Some states may rely more heavily on defensive systems (such as landmines or anti-aircraft missile systems) than others. Thus reductions in some areas may not be possible, or may be offset by increases in other areas. The net effect would be marginal reductions, at best.

The issue of regional burden sharing raises a different question. To what extent will a state compromise its security autonomy for advantages gained by cooperation, accepting increased vulnerability in exchange for gains associated with efficient allocation of regional resources to address common problems?

Regional burden sharing allows all states to use their defense assets more efficiently. But some states will benefit more than others by the reduction of regional threats. Clearly a state without a coastline receives no immediate benefit from agreements to share sea-patrolling duties. In cases of more complex, transnational threats, such as illicit trafficking in narcotics, calculating relative gains is much more difficult. How are the benefits of reduced drug trafficking distributed among producer, transit and consumer states?

Another relative gains problem relates to the training advantages of taking part in combined operations. These exercises and operations require intense interactions that provide access to state-of-the art military techniques and technology, perhaps most

valuable to less advanced states. These considerations make burden-sharing arrangements difficult to achieve under the assumptions of realism.

Taken together, the three dilemmas to security cooperation discussed here – free-riding, cheating and equitable distribution of benefits – combine to form a powerful deterrent to cooperative security behavior. Table 2.1 summarizes the problems associated with cooperation.

Table 2-1: Dilemmas of Security Cooperation

Security Behavior	Absolute Gain	Collective Good Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior	Cheating Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior	Relative Gains Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior
Military Openness	Better security calculation – avoids worst case analysis	Transparency approximates a collective good. Strong incentive to free ride.	Increased vulnerability if weaknesses are exposed. States may not provide information or may provide partial or misleading information.	Some states may rely on secrecy more than others, to hide weaknesses or disguise aggressive intentions. Since transparency may not be reciprocated, it is unlikely to develop.
Reduced Defense Postures	More resources available for development and other goals	No collective goods problem; gains are private.	Increased vulnerability if other states do not reduce defense postures. States may not reduce postures or may offset vulnerabilities by seeking alliances (balancing).	Some types of reduction may benefit some more than others. Reductions in some areas will not be possible or will be offset in other areas.

Table 2-1-- continued

Security Behavior	Absolute Gain	Collective Good Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior	Cheating Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior	Relative Gains Problem and Non-Cooperative Behavior
Regional Burden Sharing for Regional Security	More efficient allocation of security resources	Regional security can approximate a collective good. Strong incentive to free ride.	Increased vulnerability if states to do not uphold commitments. States may not cooperate or may offset vulnerabilities through increase in defense posture or seeking alliances (balancing.)	Some states may gain more from interaction and some members may gain more from increased regional security or solutions to transnational problems. Cooperation in many areas may not be possible.

Thus, under the assumption of realism, the logic of collective action and the security dilemma demonstrate that sustained security cooperation is difficult to achieve. And yet we know that realism admits some forms of security cooperation. To better understand what cooperative security behavior might emerge under realism, it is necessary to look at the questions of sensitivity to relative gains and the dynamics of alliance formation.

Grieco (1988b) develops the concept of sensitivity to relative gains (his "k" factor), arguing that, among other criteria, states faced with increasing levels of threat, an

historical adversary and a relative decline in power will have a high sensitivity to relative gains. Threat, as laid out by Walt (1987), includes the systemic elements of capability, proximity, and state of technology (offense-defense), as well as the classic realist factor of aggressive intent. This last element enriches Waltz's systemic approach with a unit-level variable, at the cost of some loss of parsimony. Nevertheless, to the extent that the presence of active border disputes can be taken as an indicator of aggressive intent, it is relatively easy to measure and incorporate into our analysis.

Thus, in bounded subregions composed of proximate states with a history of conflict, enduring border disputes and recent changes in power distribution, relative gains dilemmas should be difficult to surmount. This will be especially so during times of technological and organizational change which favor offensive operations, such as the current "revolution in military affairs," based on unprecedented mobility, precision weaponry and information technologies (Mares, 1996/7; National Defense University, 1995 and 1996). Conversely, in subregions with a pacific history, low threat levels and stable power relations, relative gains sensitivity will be lower and some cooperation may be possible, using standard "cooperation under anarchy" techniques (Oye, 1986).

Grieco (1988a) also argues that high levels of economic interaction in these situations will tend to make relative gains problems more severe, assuming economic advantages can be transformed into military capabilities (Grieco, 1988b). Taken together, these factors help explain patterns of security cooperation and conflict between states.

From Walt (1987), based on his theory of alliance formation,²¹ we would expect to see balancing behavior predominate – states will seek partners to rally against states they perceive as most threatening. Balancing patterns should be readily observable in the behavior clusters developed to explain the make-up of cooperative security regimes: transparency/verification, defense postures and burden sharing.

In his empirical work, Walt deals with the broader concept of “alignment,” of which alliances are a subset. Alignments need not be formalized (Snyder, 1990). The “tightness” of such arrangements is the subject of much debate, but the presence of a common enemy is probably the most important factor.²² Of course, high levels of threat may not always induce “external” balancing; arming, or “internal” balancing is also a rational response to threat (Morrow, 1993). In any case, alliances are still subject to the same problems inherent in less formal forms of security cooperation.²³

²¹ Walt, studying alliance formation in the Middle East, found that regional balancing and bandwagoning were not closely related to superpower penetration even during the Cold War. He determined that security behavior can best be explained by the dynamic of competitive balancing. The study of military conflict and cooperation in the Middle East remains attractive to security analysts. For a recent look at regional security cooperation during the early 1990s, see Jentleson and Kage (1998), who find that realist factors best explain the trend.

²² See Christensen and Snyder (1990) and Weitsman (1997) on the “tightness” of alliances.

²³ Snyder (1990) describes the alliance “games” as burden sharing (concern that costs are borne equally), abandonment (fears that commitments will not be upheld when a state’s security is threatened) and entrapment (fears that binding commitments will draw a state into a conflict it would have rather avoided).

Grieco does not believe that relative gains are a significant problem in strongly asymmetric power situations (Hasenclever, et al., 1997). To gain a better idea of what patterns of security cooperation and conflict might be under that condition, we return to Waltz. The main variable left after Waltz's depiction of the international system is the distribution of capabilities within that system. Waltz focused on the different behaviors expected under conditions of bipolarity and multipolarity.²⁴ Bipolarity was deemed more stable, because of the clarity that such a system offers and the subsequent predictability of great power behavior. Interventions by the United States in Central American and the Caribbean during the Cold War are consistent with this theoretical model.

Great powers in a bipolar world also engage in cooperative behavior with smaller states, as great power competition for influence and positional advantage penetrates local conflicts throughout the globe. Cooperative arrangements entail some level of risk, since a prospective partner could defect once conditions change, but great powers can accept risk in their relations with smaller states since local, tactical reversals do not affect the overall balance of power.²⁵ Smaller states do not have this luxury (Waltz, 1979, p. 194), and hence would be unlikely to cooperate with each other in the absence of great power leadership. Hence, the Cold War pattern of security behavior was marked by security

²⁴ Unipolar systems were not specifically addressed by Waltz. But we can infer from his discussions on the disadvantages of world government that he would have predicted them to be unstable because a powerful center invites revolution.

²⁵ The longer time horizon of large states with little direct threat to survival from smaller states is an argument that appears in numerous works. See Stein (1990, Chapter 4, esp. 109-110) for a representative argument.

competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and security cooperation within each allied camp.

A strong current in the theoretical literature develops this point further. Olson (1964) had already shown that under special conditions the provision of collective goods may be possible notwithstanding strong incentives to free ride. If one state, or a small group of states, determined that the provision of such a good provided private benefits that outweighed the costs of provision, then a collective good could be produced. The great powers would bear the costs.

Working from this framework to address problems of international political economy, Krasner (1976) and Gilpin (1987) accomplished much theory-building in the area of hegemonic stability and produced strong hypotheses and a compelling research agenda that proved very popular for a time. Under hegemonic stability theory, a large power establishes rules for cooperative behavior for its own benefit and bears the costs of maintaining those rules. This approach is consistent with Walt's view that great powers can accept the costs of short-term tactical reversals.

In recent years, this approach has suffered a decline, in part as a result of its own overreaching. As Lake (1993) points out, a great power or small group of great powers may not necessarily choose to exert its influence. In any case, great power behavior can be either benevolent (tolerant of free riding behavior) or coercive (payment extracting). Coercive behavior will depend partly on the resources available for coercion and the likelihood that coercion will be effective.

Even if coercion can be cost effective, however, it does not follow that a hegemon will adopt coercive practices. Mastanduno (1997) demonstrates that a hegemon might

choose to provide positive incentives for cooperation even if coercion can be cost effective in the short run. It is possible that a great power such as the United States might choose to underwrite significant security cooperation at this particular juncture in history. Mastanduno argues that the United States, which enjoys privileges of the "unipolar moment," faces strong incentives to reassure the other states in the system of its peaceful intent.

In making this argument, Mastanduno relies on the hypotheses developed by Stephen Walt to explain alliance behavior. In point of fact, Waltz had little to say about security behavior in a unipolar world, which characterizes to a great extent conditions in the Western Hemisphere during the 1990s. Waltz believes that any "unipolar moment" will be short lived because of the propensity of other states to revolt against overweening power at the center. In any case, the kind of security cooperation that Waltz envisioned was simply a byproduct of superpower competition. Absent that competitive dynamic, cooperation with prospective allies should diminish.

Mastanduno borrows from Walt to argue that the United States would rationally take steps to appear less threatening to other states, in order to preclude their forming a balancing alliance that would act as a counterweight to U.S. power. Thus the United States could be expected to work through multilateral institutions, promote transparency to signal peaceful intent and offer security outlets to potential rivals (burden sharing opportunities such as leading roles in peacekeeping operations). While this hypothesis may not square with current U.S. policy in Central Europe and Russia, it offers a theoretically sound prediction of U.S. behavior to enhance security cooperation that is consistent with realism.

A set of security institutions designed by the United States under these conditions might look very much like a cooperative security regime. For instance, the United States can facilitate transparency by providing examples (its own public reporting, for instance) and training ("how-to" instruction on preparation of defense white papers, for instance). The United States can facilitate verification by sponsoring specific mechanisms, such as "open skies" fly-overs, and by participating in third party verification, such as the Military Observer Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE). In addition, the U.S. traditional guarantee of protection against extra-hemispheric threats may permit lower levels of defense postures.

Finally the predominance of the U.S. military model in the hemisphere means that simply by following U.S. standards (protocols, communications, arms, training, doctrine, equipment) – which are readily available and essentially cost-free – coordination for regional burden sharing is substantially facilitated. Largely, though not exclusively, it is the exercise of U.S. influence over the militaries of the region and the strong presence of the United States in multilateral institutions that is responsible for the emergence of a common "military" language which promotes interoperability – a prerequisite for effective burden sharing and collective security action. In the functional language that Keohane (1984) applied to regimes, the United States would be reducing the "transaction costs" which serve as one barrier to cooperation.²⁶ But such a regime would be based on

²⁶ The existence of a common military framework helps solve some "coordination" problems (e.g., coordination of ship passage), but is not enough by itself to forge security cooperation. Coordination solves dilemmas of common aversions (Stein, 1990). Cooperation, practiced to realize common interests, requires policy adjustments to accommodate partners (Keohane, 1984).

and responsive to U.S. security priorities. Krasner (1991), in his study of power and institutions, provides some examples of how those priorities might be expressed in institutional arrangements: (1) determination of who plays; (2) establishment of the rules of the game; and (3) manipulation of payoffs through tactical linkages.

In sum, realism maintains that cooperation is especially difficult in security matters, due to the security dilemma, cheating, shirking and free riding, and relative gains considerations. Security cooperation, unless supported by a large power, is only likely as a short-term instrument to balance threats. When the threat subsides, so will the cooperation. While some cooperation is possible through unilateral bargaining strategies of “defensively positioned states” (Grieco, 1988a, p. 507), the degree of cooperation actually taking place will be limited to small, incremental, reversible steps, in issue areas where survival is not at stake and early gains do not translate into large advantages.²⁷

Institutions matter little in this conceptualization. The institutions “governing” cooperative activities in the hemisphere reflect underlying power realities. They are more likely to be arenas of conflict than instruments to enhance cooperation. States may be involved in “talks,” but are more likely to view them as an instrument of power politics

²⁷ See Stein (1990) and Jervis (1999) for a more expansive view of the possibilities of cooperation under anarchy. In his attempt to bridge the gap between realists and neoliberal institutionalists, Jervis includes many cooperative strategies within what he terms “defensive” realism. Institutions, even effective ones, are also in his view consistent with some forms of realism because they are created when states see them as instruments to reap benefits of cooperation. Stein adopts a similar approach, although he is not sanguine about the possibilities of cooperation in security matters. In any case, I do not employ such a broad version of realism, partly because it makes development of contending hypotheses impractical.

than good faith bargaining. In Krasner's view, institutions are "crucial means by which winners win and losers lose" (Moe, as cited in Krasner, 1997, p. 361).

Liberal institutionalism, as we will see, is much more sanguine about the possibilities of cooperation. Institutions can be designed to overcome incentives to cheat and address distributive gains problems.

Institutionalist Theory

The theoretical framework of institutionalism focuses on how multinational institutions help states cooperate. The approach has a long pedigree, which derives from the liberal belief that progress is possible in human affairs, partly through the design of social institutions.²⁸ Classical idealists believe that international organizations, norms, and values are important. If institutions are properly constructed, peace is the "natural" state of affairs.

Institutionalism benefited from the work of the functionalists of the 1960s - developed by authors as disparate as Mitrany (1966), Haas (1964), Deutsch (1957) and Pentland (1973) - who sought to generalize the experience of European integration, hypothesizing that increased cross-border flows would build a web of cooperation due to spill-over and spin-offs from the core economic cooperation, creating a matrix of peace that war could not sever.

²⁸ I use "liberalism" here in the sense that Keohane (1989) applies the term: a school of thought that "stresses the role of human-created institutions in affecting how aggregations of individuals make collective decisions (Keohane, 1989, p. 10)."

In the 1980s, a particular form of institution – international regimes – became the subject of most the conceptualizing and theory building associated with the institutionalist framework. Hasenclever, et al. (1997) offer a detailed analysis of the principal concepts employed in institutionalist theory, beginning their conceptual review with the consensus definition of “international regime” proposed in 1982 in a special issue of *International Organization* devoted to theoretical discussion of the concept. In the introduction to that volume, Stephen Krasner defines regimes as set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Principles are “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.” Essentially, they offer a coherent set of theoretical statements about how the world works in a given area of international relations. Norms are general standards of behavior. Rules are “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.” Decision-making procedures are “prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”

Various regimes have been catalogued in terms of their constituent parts. The interstate system itself can be considered as a regime that operates on the principle of sovereignty, a norm of non-intervention and rules/procedures established in the UN charter (Krasner, 1985). Cohen (1983) outlines an international monetary system that operates on the principle of a stable international currency, the norm that states should receive adequate but not unlimited funds for balance of payment problems and rules/decision making procedures as outlined in the charter of the International Monetary Fund. Keohane, in After Hegemony (1984), defines the international liberal trade regime as one

based on a set of neoclassical economic principles that demonstrate that global utility is maximized by the free flow of goods ... a basic norm ... that tariff and nontariff barriers should be reduced and ultimately eliminated ... specific rules and decision-making procedures ... spelled out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.²⁹ (p.4)

While most of regime-based analysis belongs to the field of international political economy, the approach has a strong tradition in environmental studies and international law. Theoretical work in the area of security regimes is much less common, partly in recognition of the power of realism to predict interstate security behavior, although Keohane and Martin (1995), among others, express the hope that regime analysis will “gradually invade security studies” (p. 44).³⁰ Security regimes have been “discovered” in the area of strategic nuclear weapons reduction, the “European military order,” prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear non-proliferation.³¹

Efforts to categorize the theoretical insights developed within the institutionalist paradigm are legion. Haggard and Simmons, working specifically with the concept of international regimes, organize variants by their theoretical component. From their

²⁹ The application of institutionalist theory to explain international trade behavior is perhaps more complete than in any other area of interstate relations. The scholarly debate on the topic emerged in the context of the declining U.S. economic hegemony in the 1970s. Institutionalists argued that what they saw to be an enduring practice of free trade despite the U.S. decline was linked to the presence of institutions and norms. Critics disagreed both with the institutionalist characterization of trading practices as largely free and with the claim that such behavior was in any case due to the impact of institutions. See Keohane (1984).

³⁰ Axelrod and Keohane (1986) advocate a “single framework” for military-security and political-economic issues (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986, p. 227). See Jervis (1983) for the classic explanation of “why security is different.”

³¹ See Mueller (1993), Tate (1990) and Brzoska (1992).

analysis, four basic forms emerge: structural, which links regime creation and maintenance to hegemonic power (Gilpin, 1987); functional, which claims that regimes play a facilitating role that reduces the transaction costs associated with formulating agreements (Keohane, 1984); game theoretic, where regimes help structure the context in which states make strategic choices in pursuit of their preferences (Stein, 1990); and cognitive, which is strongly related to the conditioning role that norms/ideas have on behavior (Ruggie, 1983 and Haas, 1964).

Institutionalism, as currently employed (Keohane, 1989), contains strong traces of this prior work. Its principal characteristic is its view that institutions have independent causal significance rather than simply reflecting power relationships.³² Thus, hegemonic stability theorists, who see institutions simply as creations of powerful states, are not liberal institutionalists. However, the functional notion that institutions can help states reduce costs associated with forging cooperative agreements, as well as the game theoretic concept that institutions affect “pay-offs” for cooperation and defection, are central to what Keohane (1989, 166) calls the “rationalistic” study of institutionalism, commonly referred to a “neoliberal institutionalism.” Cognitive regime theorists have contributed to what Keohane refers to as “reflective” institutionalism, which is distinct from neoliberalism in that it operates below the system level, where unit-level processes (such as the formation of preferences) are important variables.

³² As Jervis (1999) notes, it is not enough to show that cooperation and the presence of institutions are correlated, as they most certainly are (see work of Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998). Institutionalism must demonstrate causality.

Neoliberal institutionalism, operating at the system level, accepts the neorealist assertions that states are the most important actors of the international system and that they act rationally in their interactions with each other. However, the assumption that the distribution of capabilities is the most important system-level variable is sharply questioned. Neoliberal institutionalism holds that “deeply embedded institutions are as fundamental to world politics as are the power resources of units” (Keohane, 1989, pp. 8-9). Institutions change the context in which states operate (a game theoretic notion) by facilitating communications so that agreements can be made (a functional notion), by providing information to reassure states that agreements are being respected, by institutionalizing norms so that expectations converge around rule-based behaviors, and by linking compliance to other areas of concern to states so that the costs of defection are raised.

These institutionalized settings facilitate cooperation in two primary ways. First, they reduce uncertainty by providing information that can be considered in a state’s decision making process. Second, they reduce the transaction costs of entering into negotiations by providing an arena for communication.

Institutionalists hold that even in the absence of changes in the international distribution of power or the preferences of actors, information can “profoundly affect international political behavior” (Keohane, 1986, p. 19). In the area of security cooperation, information is especially valuable because it avoids worst-case analysis (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Jervis, 1986). In fact, Keohane (1984) sees the provision of high quality information as a main function of these institutions.

If agreements are to be made on the basis of this information, however, its relevance and reliability are critical. Information about the resources and formal negotiating positions of potential partners is not sufficient. What is needed is information about their “internal evaluations of the situation, their intentions, the intensity of their preferences” (Keohane, 1989, p. 118). That information must be verifiable, through formal inspections, visits, exchanges, data cross-checking, or other mechanisms (Nye, 1991; Oye, 1986; Anthony, 1993). Institutions can provide this service by levying reporting requirements on members and establishing rules for verification. Institutions also help verification through “explicit codification of norms,” making it easy to evaluate the degree of compliance (Oye, 1986, pp. 16-17). Since these mechanisms taken together greatly facilitate the operation of reciprocity, they are critical to agreements regarding reductions in defense postures and burden sharing.

In addition to providing information, institutions facilitate the making of agreements in a variety of ways. In the first place, they provide a forum, or “constructed focal point” for negotiation (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 45), which increases opportunities to negotiate (Nye, 1991). This allows bargaining to proceed in an iterative fashion, promoting the tit-for-tat pattern of cooperation. Furthermore, institutions can enhance communication by standardizing signals through the adoption of standard formats and reporting calendars.

These steps make it easier for states to reach agreements regarding cooperative security. They also create the expectation that states will comply with security rules. This is because institutions formalize standards for behavior and create the means to monitor compliance and evaluate state reputations (Hasenclever, et al., 1997). As long as

states “discount the value of agreements on the basis of past performance” (Keohane, 1984, p. 105), a reputation for compliance is valuable due to the prospect future gains.³³ The costs of defection are raised because of the existence of institutions, just as the transaction costs of cooperation are lowered.

Institutions that can be effective in this sense must have the administrative capacity to support negotiations and collect, analyze and report data. These are essentially performance criteria, which can be observed and measured in security institutions.

Institutions rarely operate in a vacuum. They may overlap issue areas with other institutions (Keohane, 1986), creating multiple links between states that connect, for instance, rules on cooperative security with regional mechanisms to promote respect for human rights, encourage economic development and strengthen democratic governance. In the broadest sense, the effect of these issue linkages is to create a dense web of constraints that fortifies rules and makes rule-based behavior more likely.

More specifically, linkage is important to institutionalist theory in several concrete ways. First, linkage allows for more iteration, increasing the opportunities for “tit-for-tat” reciprocation (Oye, 1986). Second, linkage may erode hierarchy, by allowing small states to link security issues to other areas (Keohane and Nye, 1989). Third, linkages increase the benefits of cooperation and the costs of defection. They “allow for

³³ Institutions can also reward cooperative behavior through provision of leadership positions (president of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, for example) and sponsorship of security conferences.

more effective retaliation against cheaters and ... create scope for mutually-beneficial exchanges" (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 49-50).

This last point touches on the globalization literature,³⁴ which resurrects some of the early thinking regarding the beneficial impact of trade (Viner, 1944). Oneal et al. (1996) note that Kant, in his treatise *Perpetual Peace*, asserted that "economic interdependence reinforces constitutional constraints and liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than conflict" (Oneal et al, 1996, p. 12). This proposition is contrary to the realist view that interdependence creates vulnerability and heightens concerns over distribution of gains, thereby increasing the propensity for conflict (Waltz, 1979). Realists see this as especially valid in cases of asymmetrical interdependence, such as Latin America (Hirschman, 1945; Sanderson, 1992).³⁵

Empirical tests of the "perpetual peace" proposition have failed to sway proponents of either side of the debate, in part due to disagreements over testing

³⁴ Barbieri and Schneider (1999) note that "the term 'globalization' has largely superseded the term 'economic interdependence' to describe the rapidly growing links between nations, economics, and societies" (Barbieri and Schneider, 1999, p. 387). For two recent critiques of the liberal argument that free trade leads to peace, see Rowe (1999) and Ripsman and Blanchard (1996/7).

³⁵ Mares (1997) argues that economic globalization will not change the nature of security relations in the hemisphere: "economic growth ... in the absence of a stable and credible balance of power" is likely to lead to "increased conflict, rather than the first steps toward integration or a pluralistic security community" (Mares, 1997, p. 215).

methodology.³⁶ Even if agreement were possible on the methodology, however, results showing simple correlation are not convincing, since causal connections are not clear. Gowa (1989) finds for instance that because of the security externalities associated with open borders, free trade is more likely between allies than adversaries. In her analysis, the security environment determines trade relations, not vice versa.

Even if institutions are able to craft linkages between security and trade that expand potential gains, the struggle over distributional gains still needs to be addressed. Despite claims that institutionalism has ignored relative gains (Grieco, 1988a, Mearsheimer, 1994/5), Keohane and Martin (1995) assert that situations where relative gains considerations are important offer an especially productive area for institutions:

Liberal theory argues that institutions provide valuable information, and information about the distribution of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the relative-gains logic is correct. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members. (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 45-46)

Thus, the mechanism of reciprocity, facilitation for negotiation of side agreements, and the presence of linkages all help institutions deal with distributional problems.

Institutions do not always have a strong impact on behavior. According to Hasenclever, et al. (1997), institutions differ in terms of their robustness (the extent to which institutions resist change when the interests of the most powerful member diverge from the norms) and effectiveness (the extent to which actual behavior can be

³⁶ See the recent debate in *Journal of Peace Research* (vol. 36, no 4), especially Barbieri and Schneider (1999) and Oneal and Russett (1999). Also, see Morrow (1993).

characterized as rule-based). But the important point is that while institutions may reflect the distribution of power and the interests of their members, they have an independent impact on behavior and mute the impact of power over outcomes (Keohane and Nye, 1989). Cooperation between states, acting as unitary, rational actors attempting to maximize interest in an anarchic, self-help system, is possible: (1) because states are interested in attaining benefits of reduced tension and enhanced security cooperation and (2) because institutions help them overcome the dilemmas of defection – free riding and cheating – and help them negotiate solutions to the distributive problems that relative gains present.

How might this work in situations of asymmetry? The kind of cooperation described under realism in which a large power establishes institutions as tools to achieve its own ends is a possibility admitted by neoliberalism. In fact, where mutuality of interests is high, it may be difficult to find significant differences in the manner in which these kinds of institutions evolve. But the politics of security cooperation under asymmetry are likely to be more complex. Keohane and Nye (1989) provide a set of potential outcomes that differ sharply from realism. While these were constructed for a specific context – what the authors called "complex interdependence" – I argue that the effects they predict are evident in cases where a large state practices a policy of reassurance (as described by Mastanduno) that opens negotiating room for smaller states.

The United States may opt for a multilateral approach as a cost-effective solution that simultaneously reassures its security partners and engenders the cooperation it seeks. However, such a strategy is likely to produce perverse outcomes over time. This is because the institutional forum it promotes restores symmetry by offering smaller states

an opportunity to voice preferences, build coalitions and reinforce negotiating positions through linkages.³⁷ Small states can leverage these advantages to engage in balancing behavior that would not be possible in the absence of the institution. Furthermore, in order to build support for its agenda, the United States may need to provide side benefits and security outlets which ultimately strengthen the bargaining position of the smaller states. While an equilibrium may be theoretically possible, a more likely outcome is an eventual retreat from multilateralism, leaving the institution void of resources and effectiveness. Mutuality of interests declines and the shadow of the future shortens as smaller states come to expect a return to unilateralism on the part of the United States.

The determinants of U.S. security behavior are largely beyond the reach of hemispheric institutions. The primacy of global interests and the impact of the domestic agenda are clearly more important to the formulation of U.S. security policy than regional concerns. When global concerns dominate, support for regional cooperative security and respect for regional rules take a backseat to other strategic priorities. When domestic concerns dominate, U.S. offers of assistance (arms, training, resources, information) can be subject to intrusive end-use agreements which fall outside of the regime. The certification process which oversees provision of counterdrug assistance and the Leahy amendment which makes military assistance contingent on human rights performance are two examples.

³⁷ Jervis (1999) claims that institutions, even if created by the system's most powerful states, can erode power by giving "voice, legitimacy and forms of influence to weak or new actors" (p. 61). Institutions could restore some symmetry to U.S.-Latin American relations. This finding can also be derived from Krasner (1985), although his argument is a realist one.

The ever-present threat of unilateral U.S. action and the knowledge that institutional constraints are insufficient to prevent such action undermines confidence that other states in the hemisphere have in hemispheric institutions. Eventually they will decay. But along the way, an agenda of security issues and related rules that is substantially different from U.S. power interests is possible.

By contrast, realism rejects the possibility that institutions can have significant effects and denies them any independent impact on state behavior. Even if institutions facilitate agreements and make information available, that does not mean agreements will actually be consummated or respected when interests clash with regime norms. In the ultimate instance, regimes cannot guarantee survival. In a self-help system, what matters is a state's relative position. Created in the interests of their most powerful members, institutions will not constrain behavior and will be abandoned when no longer convenient.

What happens when we move from the system level and look at preference formation within member states? This is the focus of the "reflective" version of institutionalism, reviewed only briefly here, since we will not return to it until the conclusion of the study when we consider the limitations of systemic approaches. Keohane (1989) offers this summary of the reflective approach: "Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are therefore constitutive of actors as well as vice versa" (Keohane, 1989, p. 162). "Reflective" approaches encompass "constructivist theory" (Checkel, 1998), "critical theory" (Mearsheimer, 1994/5) and "grotian theory" (Krasner, 1983). These labels in turn lump together a wide

variety of approaches. Wendt (1995), for instance, identifies “postmodernists (Ashely, Walker), constructivists (Adler, Kratochwal, Ruggie ... Katzenstein), neo-Marxists (Cox, Gill), feminists (Petersen, Sylvester) and others” (Wendt, 1995, pp. 71-72) as belonging to critical international relations theory. The approaches are united by a belief that structures are sociological constructs that shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just behavior.

Hasenclever, et al. (1997) usefully divide the reflective approach into weak and strong cognitivists. Weak cognitivists believe that institutions can change preferences through learning gleaned from the experience of cooperation. Strong cognitivists believe that the institutions themselves are deeply embedded constructs that form actors’ identities.³⁸ Both of these versions of institutionalism delve into the ideas that statesmen use to form policies regarding security competition and cooperation. New ideas can cause normative change and lead to corresponding changes in behavior (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Thus, the penetration of new ideas pertaining to appropriate roles for the armed forces under democratic regimes could give rise to strong proscriptions on use of force and restrictions on military activity.³⁹

³⁸ See March and Olson (1998) for a recent review of this approach.

³⁹ This argument is tangentially related to the debate over the effect of democracy on interstate conflict. The observation that democratic dyads tend not to fight one another has been thoroughly studied, although there is still debate as to whether common interests or common politics explain the phenomenon (see Chan, 1984, and Farber and Gowa, 1995, for opposing views). Within the camp of those that believe democracy makes a difference, there is disagreement over whether democratic norms of peaceful resolution or democratic mechanisms of leader accountability explain the phenomenon (Starr, 1997). Recent work on democratization shows that it may positively correlate to conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).

Weak cognitivists hold that institutions contribute to this process both by providing “opportunities for contacts which may contribute to learning” (Nye, 1991, p. 157) and through dissemination of new information which changes preference formation (Keohane and Martin, 1994/5). Haas (1964) found that successful integration in Europe was partly due to a learning process experienced by technocrats. Success in one area “spilled over” into others as elites expanded the process of economic integration. Adler (1988) looked at the power of ideas and learning by technocratic elites in the area of nuclear power policy in Argentina and Brazil.

Hasenclever, et al. (1997) describe an interesting extension of this idea, based on the work of Putnam and Zurn. Introduction of domestic institutions creates a two-level game – actors within the state apparatus bargain with each other and with counterparts outside the state simultaneously. This relates to the “second image” and “second image reversed” logic that frequently appears in the security literature. For instance, Mares and Bernstein (1999) argue that Argentina's high level of participation in peacekeeping operations is promoted by the government as a way to provide the military with an external mission. Laurance (1996) blames slow progress in arms control in Latin America to the pressure that the military, anxious to protect its budget, exerts on the process. Jervis (1999) notes that arms control agreements favor “doves,” strengthening their hand in internal negotiations.

There is a vast body of literature related to this theme in Latin America, especially dealing with the two domestic institutions we are most concerned with – the military and civilian sectors of government. The literature on corporatism, authoritarianism and transitions and consolidations to democracy are well developed in the field of Latin

American studies. Clearly the more general literature on the relationship of democracy and war, the role of domestic institutions in other areas of international relations (particularly trade) and studies linking military culture and strategic doctrine are also valuable. These issues will be discussed further in the concluding chapter.

Returning to the neoliberal institutionalism, we can now readdress the issues posed by the cooperation dilemmas outlined in Table 2-1. We will look to see if institutions facilitate cooperative behavior in each of the behavior clusters without regard to the institutional politics described for asymmetrical situations. Behavior there is driven by the twin dynamics of reassurance and institutional balancing and not necessarily a search for the absolute gains promised by cooperation, thus institutional design may be only partially effective in addressing cooperative dilemmas.

Since military transparency can expose free riding, cheating and relative gains problems, it is fundamental to institutional attempts to promote security cooperation. The challenge is to verify military information through various mechanisms, designing reporting formats that can be easily cross-checked and building an extensive network of contacts that produces significant information flows. Institutions can promote reductions in defense postures by addressing distributive gains through safeguards, and trade-offs in types of reductions. But, as we shall see, there are no hemispheric or regional regimes that include these measures as yet. Relative gains are normally not addressed. Will that matter?⁴⁰ With regard to burden sharing, again transparency exposes cheating and

⁴⁰ These kinds of rules, which have been present in the international trade regime for many years, include safeguards (related to balance of payment crises) and exclusions (agriculture, textiles, etc.). See Hasenclever, et al. (1997).

relative gains problems. Free riders may enjoy benefits of enhanced security but are denied benefits of interaction. These points are summarized in the table below.

Table 2-2: Cooperative Problems – Regime Solution.

Security Behavior	Absolute Gain	Regime Solution
Transparency	Better security calculation – avoids worst case analysis	Reliance on reciprocal verification. -- importance of reciprocal visits/exchanges. -- designing formats that can be easily cross checked.
Reduction of Defense Postures	More resources available for economic development and other goals	Transparency exposes free riding, cheating and relative gains problems. Institutions can address distributive gains through safeguards, and trade-offs in types of reductions.
Regional Burden Sharing for Regional Security	More efficient allocation of security resources	Transparency exposes cheating and relative gains problems. Free riders may enjoy benefits of enhanced security but are denied benefits of interaction. Institutions can promote equitable sharing of costs and benefits, such as rotation of leadership roles, cost sharing for exercises, negotiation of side benefits.

Contending Hypotheses

Hemispheric Level

At this point, we are ready to summarize contending hypotheses for security cooperation from the two theoretical frameworks discussed above – realism and institutionalism. We will formalize hypotheses that address organizational characteristics, rule creation and security behavior in each of the clusters examined. In this section, we focus only on the hemispheric level. Subregional hypotheses are developed in the following section.

As we shall see in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, there is no denying the substantial institution building process in the area of hemispheric security that has been underway since the advent of WWII. Old hemispheric security organizations have been substantially renovated and several new ones have been created during that period. But are they sufficiently resourced by member states to effectively facilitate negotiations and carry out the functions of regime management? Realist thinkers doubt that possibility, except where such an arrangement might serve the interests of the most powerful states.

A realist hypothesis would make resourcing contingent on an agenda consistent with the new, post-Cold War security agenda of the United States. Thus institutions should be largely underwritten by the United States and generally supportive of the U.S. security agenda, notwithstanding small deviations that do not threaten core U.S. security concerns. Other countries are likely to participate only in areas of common interests.

Institutionalism may not differ markedly from this prediction, since no hemispheric institution or regime could be expected to resist U.S. influence. However, even under conditions of marked power asymmetry, institutions may demonstrate some

autonomy. Through issue linkage and the legal principle of formal equality of members, institutions work to reduce asymmetry and promote a more representational agenda that may confound large power interests.

Sharper distinctions are possible with regard to the rules that these institutions promote. Grieco (1988a) offers a set of contending hypotheses for international agreements (rules), built around the problem of relative gains. These hypotheses can be fairly easily adopted to our study of patterns of security cooperation in the Americas.

In the first instance, Grieco notes that under realism, states will in general eschew cooperative arrangements with binding commitments that present high exit costs. This should be particularly true in the area of security, where relative gains problems are most acute. Thus realism would expect that hemispheric rules regarding transparency, verification, defense postures and burden sharing would be voluntary and non-intrusive. In the absence of reliable verification, the effectiveness of reciprocity will be limited.

This contrasts with agreements made between the United States and its security partners, such as the network of mostly bilateral agreements for tracking and interdicting illicit drug production and trafficking that exists between the United States and source and transit countries. As rules become more inclusive, they will lose their specificity.

Under institutionalism, theory tells us that states, given the opportunity to negotiate, will tend to insist on binding rules, with strong verification, whenever relative gains may present an obstacle to cooperation, so that the potential absolute gains can be "locked-in." These steps are not coercive; member states are simply binding themselves to reassure partners of their cooperative intent.

We can derive some realist predictions for specific behaviors in transparency/verification, defense postures and burden sharing as well. Transparency in military matters should be limited to information that is already public. Reductions in defense postures should be based on threat perception, not regime rules. And burden sharing, unless sponsored by the United States or another major power, should be extremely tentative. In states that share the kind of cross-border problems that we have dubbed transnational threats, burden sharing should be even more difficult because of the added source of conflict.

Institutionalists, by contrast, would expect that relevant and reliable information will emerge from institutional arrangements. Institutions with the administrative capacity to handle the information will add considerably to the degree of transparency in the system. The increase in transparency will allow reductions in defense postures to proceed in a reciprocal manner, where levels might be higher than threats warrant. Under these conditions, transnational security problems should attract cooperative behaviors, since absolute gains to such cooperation are relatively high. Again, transparency will insure that no state benefits unduly from such cooperation. Side negotiations facilitated by institutions can redress distributional problems that might emerge.

Finally, with regard to institutional effectiveness, realism would contend that rules will not be effective outside of the U.S. agenda. Patterns of cooperative security behavior should conform to U.S. priorities. Participation will not be inclusive, but rather concentrate on key U.S. security partners. This pattern may attain even in the absence of security institutions, since the United States will pursue its own agenda bilaterally when multilateral approaches do not advance its interests. Finally, from Mastanduno, realism

would predict that the United States is likely to act with restraint towards more powerful Latin American states in order to avoid eliciting a balancing reaction.

Institutionalism expects to find rule-based behavior – not behavior driven by balancing or U.S. influence. Bolstered by expectations of convergence (supported by binding rules and strong verification schemes) and eased by the facilitation that institutions provide (reduced transaction costs), states will tend to follow the rules established in organizations formed for that purpose. However, if acts of reassurance are insufficient to maintain cooperation, then the dynamics of institutional politics will predominate. These contending hypotheses are summarized in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4.

Table 2-3: Contending Hypotheses at the Hemispheric Level for Institutions

Dependent Variables	Realist Hypotheses	Institutionalist Hypotheses
Security Institutions:	Given institutions as “constructed focal points” for negotiations and absolute gains from military transparency, reduced defense postures and burden sharing, under conditions of marked power asymmetry ...	
Organizational Features	1. Institutional agendas will not stray significantly from U.S. interests and will be resourced only where interests coincide. Issue linkage will complicate cooperation.	1. Institutional procedures and issue linkage will restore symmetry, providing opportunities for institutional balancing. Agenda will be multilateral, focused on issues where absolute gains are evident.
Rule Creation	2. Rules will not be binding and comprehensive, but rather voluntary and partial. 3. Rules will not be supported by verification mechanisms sufficient for reciprocity.	2. Rules will be binding wherever the potential for defection exists. 3. States will insist on strong verification mechanisms so that reciprocity can function.

Table 2-4: Contending Hypotheses at the Hemispheric Level for Behavior

Dependent Variables	Realist Hypotheses	Institutionalist Hypotheses
Security Behavior:	Given institutions with the administrative capacity to carry out the functions of regime management (data collection, analysis and reporting) and rules promoting transparency, defense reductions and burden sharing	
Transparency, Defense Postures, Burden Sharing	4. Transparency measures will not reveal information of value, reporting instead information that is already largely public. 5. Defense reductions are unlikely and in any case will reflect perceived threats. 6. Burden sharing is unlikely unless sponsored by the United States or resulting from balancing and/or bandwagoning. The presence of transnational security problems makes cooperation even less likely because of the added potential for relative gains.	4. Transparency will be considerable, providing relevant and reliable information. 5. Defense reductions will take place where transparency provides assurances of reciprocity. 6. Burden sharing will take place where transparency provides assurances of reciprocity. The presence of transnational security problems makes cooperation more likely because of the added potential for absolute gains.

Subregional Level

What modification of these hypotheses might be necessary at the subregional level? There is good reason to believe that the basic tenets of realism and institutionalism will operate there with little modification. Under realism, the dynamic of security

competition should not be any less salient. If anything, security competition will be more intense at the subregional level where fundamental security dilemmas operate and where threats are more proximate - to use Walt's terminology. Under institutionalism, the dynamic of security cooperation should also be more intense, since neighboring states are likely to share compatible security interests – especially transnational security problems – leading to the possibility of greater absolute gains through cooperation.

The fact that both security competition and cooperation are more intense has an impact on subregional institutions – if they are to be effective, they must be more binding in nature than their hemispheric counterparts.

There are other reasons why two theories should work well at the subregional level. The question of multiple linkages becomes intensified at the subregional level, both because neighboring countries often share transnational concerns over a wide range of issue areas and because subregional institutions are normally nested in their hemispheric counterparts. These factors taken together mean greatly amplified connectivity between states in a given subregion. Of course, subregions may differ in terms of the density of their interrelations, but this factor simply adds another testable hypothesis to a comparative analysis.

Grieco (1988a) offers an additional comparative test of the relative explanatory power of realism and institutionalism that fits nicely within the subregional framework. He bases this comparative test on the “number of partners states prefer to include in a cooperative arrangement” (Grieco, 1998a, p. 506). According to his review of the theories, advocates of institutionalism assert that a “smaller number of participants facilitates verification of compliance and sanctioning of cheaters.” Thus, Grieco points

out, states that can choose the context of cooperative arrangements will normally prefer to limit membership. Realism, according to Grieco, predicts the opposite, since arrangements with more members provide more partners and hence more opportunities to offset relative gains advantages. For these reasons, realism would expect that cooperative arrangements at the subregional level will be even more difficult to accomplish than at the hemispheric level.⁴¹ Institutionalism predicts precisely the opposite pattern.

In sum, institutionalism expects more institution building and more binding rules at the subregional level than the regional level. Realism predicts the opposite pattern. In any case, both paradigms are operative at this level of analysis.

What then about the effectiveness of rules regarding security cooperation? Institutionalism predicts that security behavior will be rule-based, following the logic laid out in the previous section. Transparency will be critical because of its important role in communication. Reductions in defense postures and burden sharing are likewise important because of the absolute gains they promise. Realism, on the other hand, expects that patterns of security behavior will follow the logic of balancing; cooperation will be limited to informal ententes formed to counter subregional threats. We can approximate the predicted pattern through balance of threat analysis for each subregion.

⁴¹ "Defensive realists" who, according to Jervis (1999), adopt many of the standard "cooperation under anarchy" strategies, would disagree with Grieco's formulation. The security dilemma/collection action literature highlights the difficulties of large alliances, since detecting cheaters and enforcing obligations is difficult with large groups. But Grieco is not focusing here on cheating, but rather on the relative gains problem, which is more intense in smaller groups.

What of U.S. power? The United States is still an important security externality that affects subregional security behavior. But it may be possible to abstract some of that impact from the security equation by adopting a comparative approach that selects subregions differing in terms of their relationship with the United States. In which context is the United States essentially one more player in a subregional security order, a potential ally for balancing conflict? Where does it act as a security manager – mediating, shaping and preventing conflict?

The answers to these questions will depend on the security issues important to the United States and the national capacity it can mobilize for influence.

A hegemonic power that provides some public goods may, as Lake (1993) points out, engage in benevolent behavior that is tolerant of free riders or coercive behavior that attempts to extract payments. Lake predicts that coercive behavior is a function of the resources available for coercion and the likelihood that coercion will be effective. In this study, we are less concerned with outright coercion than with influence attempts, which may range from shaping the security environment to direct bilateral negotiations on specific issues. Regardless, we can assume that more resources are available for security issues high on the U.S. agenda. We can also assume that those resources will be more effectively employed in regions with less autonomy relative to the United States.

For example, the United States may be able to induce regional cooperation by supporting verification mechanisms (arguably in Central American demobilization), providing significant side-benefits (perhaps in the case of the Peru-Ecuador peace accord), or sanctioning uncooperative behaviors (as in decertification of Colombia). In

other regions, states may be able to choose whether or not to cooperate with the U.S. agenda.⁴²

Regions more distant from U.S. power and security concerns and more developed in terms of national power should retain some measure of autonomy, since relative capabilities are less asymmetrical and intervention is less likely. In fact, such subregions may enter into agreements that allow them to resist U.S. influence. Examples addressed later include Brazilian resistance to U.S. attempts to influence peacekeeping training and the reluctance of the Andean countries to enter into a multinational, operational agreement with the United States to combat production and trafficking in illicit narcotics. But even less autonomous regions can demonstrate some independence. For instance, Nicaragua's participation in almost all aspects of Central American security cooperation demonstrates independence from the United States, which until very recently followed a policy of limited military-to-military contact with Nicaragua.

Despite this last example, it seems evident then that the subregional security order in Central America will more closely approximate a situation of hegemonic control due to the region's proximity to the United States and its relatively lower level of development. Countries of the Southern Cone, on the other hand, operate with relative independence. The Andean countries fall somewhere between these two extremes. In any case, if a

⁴² They will have two calculations to make: (1) does "cooperation" provide absolute gains (given unreliability of the United States as a partner and potential incompatibility of interests) and (2) will neighbors will enjoy relative gains through their own cooperation with the United States.

particular security issue is not high on the U.S. agenda, then resources are not likely to be available for influence attempts.

With the end of a threat of nuclear proliferation in the Southern Cone, the main U.S. strategic concerns in Latin America are threats posed by illicit trafficking in drugs and general social instability in nearby regions (causing illegal immigration or providing a haven for terrorist/guerrilla groups). These threats intensify as they become more proximate.

Aside from the sharpened distinctions between contending hypotheses, moving to the subregional level offers a key methodological advantage. It creates more case studies and allows use of the comparative method. The comparative method allows us to gain analytical traction and arrive at a more robust case for our contending paradigms. I plan to deal with the "small-*N*" problem by focusing on the comparable cases – cases that are similar enough to allow for good comparison, but that differ in important ways that affect the relative gains problem.⁴³

The subregional cases considered in this study – the Southern Cone, Central America and the Andean Ridge – certainly do not exhaust the possibilities for scholarly research. There are other regions that merit examination: the Rio de la Plata subsystem; the Amazon region, the Caribbean, North America; the Pacific Rim countries, etc.

⁴³ Collier's (1991) update of Lipjhart's (1971) influential essay on the comparative method is useful. On the "small N, many variables" problem, the literature offers two approaches: (1) Most Different Cases: gaining analytical traction by selecting disparate cases to isolate explanatory variables and (2) Most Similar Cases: gaining analytical traction by selecting similar cases so that other variables are "canceled" out, leaving the explanatory variable to explain differing outcomes.

Nevertheless, a focus on the Southern Cone, Central America and the Andean Ridge should suffice to provide a valid test for contending hypotheses derived from realism and institutionalism.

These cases correspond to geographical regions with long histories of security cooperation and conflict. All have been conflictual at various times; all have border problems and militarized disputes; all have sought ways to resolve those conflicts cooperatively. They evidence an established balance of power and their member countries have used power – both demonstrations and applications of force – to maintain that balance. This balance also allows us to depart from an assumption of stability, and eliminates the methodological problem of cataloguing power indices for realist arguments.

All of these subregions are attempting to address regional security issues within the context of democratic orders, with civilian control of armed forces, albeit in varying degrees. All are developing states, albeit at widely disparate levels of development. All are dealing with the implications of a new global economic order and have adopted, in varying degrees, a similar developmental model, although populism bubbles beneath the surface. All inhabit a hemisphere dominated by the United States, although U.S. impact on the security policies other states varies. This difference, of course, is central to the research design.

The subregions also differ in terms of their principal security threats. This difference is welcome, because it allows a more robust test of the contending hypotheses. The Central America countries are beset by transnational threats (drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal immigration) that overlay the standard security dilemma between

states in the region. This is largely the case with the Andean countries as well, although relative power concerns may overshadow transnational threats in some border regions, such as the Cenapa region along the Peru-Ecuador border. In the Southern Cone, there are few transnational considerations, aside from smuggling of contraband in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. The primary security problem is the traditional one of maintaining a reasonable balance of power.⁴⁴

These variations in security problems can be handled by our existing theories. All require some sort of security cooperation for their solution. They differ only in the details of the absolute and relative gains that result from that security cooperation. Thus, the differences can be expressed in specific research questions derived from the basic theories. Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 summarize the hypotheses developed here for the subregional cases.

⁴⁴ Military spending in Latin America has historically been concentrated on the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. During the arms build-ups of the 1980s, these three countries accounted for almost two-thirds of the total military expenditures in the region (Varas, 1985).

Table 2-5: Contending Hypotheses at the Subregional Level for Institutions

Dependent Variables	Realist Hypotheses	Institutionalist Hypotheses
Security Institutions:	Given institutions as “constructed focal points” for negotiations and absolute gains from military transparency, reduced defense postures and burden sharing, in subregional security systems with general power parity ...	
Organizational Features	1. Institutions will be under resourced unless sponsored by United States, in which case their agendas will not stray significantly from U.S. interests. Issue linkage will complicate cooperation.	1. Institutions will be resourced by members. Agenda will be multilateral, focused on issues where absolute gains are evident. Linkages will enhance iteration and increase benefits of cooperation and costs of defection. U.S. influence varies by subregion.
Rule Creation	2. Rules will be less binding at the subregional level than the hemispheric level. 3. Verification mechanisms will be weaker at subregional than hemispheric level.	2. Rules will be more binding at the subregional level than the hemispheric level. 3. Verification mechanisms will be stronger at subregional than hemispheric level to ensure reciprocity.

Table 2- 6: Contending Hypotheses at the Subregional Level for Behavior

Dependent Variables	Realist Hypotheses	Institutionalist Hypotheses
Security Behavior:	Given institutions with the administrative capacity to carry out the functions of regime management (data collection, analysis and reporting) and rules promoting transparency, defense reductions and burden sharing	
Transparency, Defense Postures, Burden Sharing	4. Generally, transparency measures will not reveal information of value, but some information sharing is likely between states in a balancing entente. 5. Defense reductions are unlikely and in any case will reflect perceived threats. 6. Burden sharing is unlikely unless sponsored by the United States or resulting from balancing and/or bandwagoning. Security cooperation should reinforce ententes and sharpen rivalries. The presence of transnational security problems makes cooperation even less likely because of the added potential for relative gains.	4. Transparency will be considerable, providing relevant and reliable information, so that security cooperation can take place to reap absolute gains. 5. Defense reductions will take place where transparency and verification provide assurances of reciprocity. 6. Burden sharing will take place where transparency and verification provide assurances of reciprocity. The presence of transnational security problems makes cooperation more likely because of the added potential for absolute gains.

Operationalization

Careful consideration of the power and interests of the states in the system and comparison of those factors with the design of security institutions and content of security rules will illuminate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two theories. National

interests are developed primarily from official sources. Sources for U.S. interests include published data such as the U.S. National Strategy, National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and other informative sources. Latin American interests are revealed through official documents and debates in institutional forums, which often present well-developed national positions on a wide variety of security issues.

Regional military capabilities can be objectively determined through a number of open source conflict profiles and balance of power studies. Although precise measurement over time is difficult, rough profiles suffice to bring out balancing/bandwagoning proclivities. Presence of enduring border disputes offers evidence of aggressive intent. This mix of interests and capabilities provides one explanation for patterns of security cooperation.

Institutions provide another. Observable characteristics include (1) degree of administrative capacity to support multilateral decision-making and track compliance; (2) issue agenda, particularly as compared to U.S. security interests; and (3) issue linkages, especially nesting of security institutions within larger structures. The rules produced by security organizations can be examined as to their degree of bindingness and ease of verification. Sources for these factors derive from official reports and minutes of meetings in institutions of IASS. Substantial new material from the archives of the IADB, the OAS and the Defense Ministerials is introduced for this purpose. Staff reports from the IADB on exercises, security studies and defense plans are also key to tracing the evolution of institutions. Research monographs from senior Latin American officers assigned to the Inter-American Defense College also add new perspectives on that

subject. Careful reading of this material provides definitive information on the resources, agenda and rules of the security institutions studied. Table 2-7, below, summarizes this discussion.

Table 2-7: Principal Indicators and Sources for Cooperative Security Institutions

Dependent Variable	Factor	Indicators	Source
Organizations	Administrative Capacity	Forums for negotiation (conferences, working groups, commissions, committees, etc.); decision-making procedures; mechanisms to track compliance, evaluate results and report to members; enforcement mechanisms.	Documents from entities indicated
	Issue Agenda	Published agendas and work program	Documents from Summits, Ministerials, OAS and IADB meetings.
	Issue Linkages	Linkage in formal exposition of security rules; state bargaining positions	Documents from Summits, Ministerials, OAS and IADB meetings.
Rules	Bindingness	Language of agreement	Published agreements
	Verification	Specific mechanism (reciprocal visits, publication of data)	Documents from Summits, Ministerials, OAS and IADB meetings.

Regime effectiveness, as opposed to institutional evolution, is more amenable to quantitative approaches based on key indicators of security behavior. Table 2.8, "Principal Indicators and Sources for Cooperative Security Behavior," summarizes this approach.

Indicators of military transparency include participation in the OAS/IADB CSBM inventory and the UN arms and defense expenditure registries; publication of defense

"white papers" or other official documents outlining strategy (intent), doctrine (orientation), force structure (capability), and training/maintenance (readiness); advance notification of exercises; and exchanges/visits at military schools, installations and exercises; and weapons demonstrations.

None of these indicators is perfect. Measures reported to the OAS/IADB in the CSBM inventories are often difficult to verify. Common methodology for comparing defense expenditures has not been implemented in the region. The UN arms registries do not address arms production and in any case do not include categories for many small caliber weapons of importance to the region. Few defense white papers have been released, perhaps because of the difficulties of coordinating inter-agency positions in recently established democracies that are still institutionalizing new civil-military relations. Exercise notification is still spotty. Finally, exchange programs are often not designed to enhance transparency; they are frequently a tool for influence or deterrence. Furthermore, exchange officers are sometimes excluded from participating in sensitive defense matters.

Defense postures are somewhat easier to determine objectively. Good studies on military capabilities and arms production and transfers are available. Trends in defense postures during the 1990s can be established. But military readiness is more elusive; it relies on factors as disparate as a state's recruitment model, morale in the armed forces and national will. Data in these areas is incomplete or unavailable.

Indicators of burden sharing behavior suffer from some of these same problems. Not all of the measures listed in Table 2.8 can be effectively verified. Furthermore, subjective judgments must be made regarding the impact of some of the indicators on

actual security postures and their effectiveness in addressing common security risks. Such judgments can rarely be wholly objective.

Even where data is available, rigorous quantitative analysis may not be possible. In the case of the CSBM inventories, for example, while geographical and thematic patterns are readily discernable, quantitative comparisons between states may not be possible due to problems with the data as it has been compiled to date. The 1995 inventory of CSBMs, for instance, prepared by the IADB, suffers from a series of limitations that preclude any accurate quantitative analysis. In the first place, little more than half of the members of the IADB participated. Second, those that participated did not follow any standard format for categorization of CSBMs. Third, CSBMs were not standardized in terms of size or duration, leading to crippling aggregation problems. Fourth, the data reported was not verified, and bilateral events reported by one country were often not reflected in the partner country's submission. Due to lack of standardization, countries made their own decisions about what measures to report. These issues are slowly being address in the reporting formats, but the data submitted since 1995 do not reflect a marked improvement.

Despite these methodological problems, the cluster of indicators for transparency, burden sharing and defense postures combine to give weight to the analysis of security cooperation. A picture of security cooperation emerges which can evaluated against power and interests, on the one hand, and institutional rules on the other.

Table 2-8: Principal Indicators and Sources for Cooperative Security Behavior

Factor	Indicators	Source	Observation
Military Trans- parency	Participation in OAS and IADB inventories of declared CSBM data	IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	These inventories and registers were designed to be as non-intrusive as possible in order to make participation universal without the burden of verification. However, there is an informal verification mechanism in the sense that the uncoordinated individual submissions can be cross-checked after they are publicly disclosed, which provides a disincentive to cheating.
	Participation in UN Arms Transfer registries	UN Arms Transfer Registers (92-97)	
	Participation in UN Defense Expenditure Reporting	UNDCA annual reports of use of Standard Instrument for Reporting	
	Public release – to all countries – of "white papers" or other official documents outlining strategy (intent), doctrine (orientation), force structure (capability), and training/maintenance (readiness).	Published white papers (US, Brazil, Chile, Canada); national positions as presented in official statements at OAS, summits, and other conferences; support/nonsupport for cooperative measures proposed at the IADB/C and OAS.	
	Advance notification of exercises	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	Announcement of exercises in multilateral forum (IADB) or through unilateral procedures.
	Exchanges/visits at military schools, installations, exercises, and weapons demonstrations	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	Note that these are reciprocal, bilateral (occasionally multilateral) programs, but they are excellent indicators of willingness to be open, since capabilities, readiness and doctrinal training are all subjected to direct observation. Exchanges in operational units and doctrinal schools are serious business.

Table 2-8 -- continued

Factor	Indicator	Source	Observation
Defense Postures	Arms Production	Authoritative military analysis and arms control documents – Janes, SIPRI, IISS, UNCTAD, ACDA, etc.	
	Arms transfers		
	Arms control agreements entered into		
Burden Sharing	Coordination to solve technical problems – protocols for border situations	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	While coordination does not necessarily represent a strong commitment to cooperative security, the conduct of actual operations and training exercises between countries does, because of what those activities reveal about national doctrine, readiness and capabilities. Furthermore, such activity can promote interoperability – development of common doctrine, common equipment, training and logistics. In the final analysis, it can also lead to military specialization a division of labor that makes multilateral security operations more effective, but may leave countries much more vulnerable; Uruguay specializes in Peacekeeping Operations, for instance. Other examples include developing force structures based on light aircraft and riverine craft for counter-drug operations or focusing on humanitarian operations such as demining.
	Coordination to solve technical problems – protocols for safe transport by ground, air and sea	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	
	Bilateral and multilateral exercises	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	
	Bilateral and multilateral humanitarian operations	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	
	Bilateral and multilateral peacekeeping operations	As reported in IADB inventories (95,96,97), OAS inventories (96, 97, 98),	
	Utilization of common training centers (e.g.: School of the Americas, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Argentine Peacekeeping Operations Center, the Central American Police Academy)	Data from institutions involved.	

CHAPTER 3 ASYMMETRY AND SECURITY

Introduction

This chapter deals with the first of our case studies, which provides an example of the dynamics of institutional security politics at the hemispheric level. Security cooperation in the Americas begins in earnest with the onset of WWII, tracing a trajectory that rises during the war years to a highpoint in the 1950s. At its peak, U.S. military influence reached astounding proportions. U.S. bilateral military relations boasted basing rights, military assistance programs and logistics support agreements with key countries throughout the hemisphere. U.S.-led multilateral initiatives resulted in the creation of hemispheric security institutions, the adoption of common defense plans and the employment of an Inter-American Peace Force. This level of influence declined during the difficult 1960s to a turning point arguably at the Buenos Aires conference convened to reform the OAS Charter in 1967. Attempts to bring the Inter-American Defense Board under the Charter and create a permanent inter-American force were turned back. Security multilateralism would not be revived until the 1990s.

This was not simply the inevitable result of the institutional politics of security in an asymmetrical regional order. In the end, U.S. inattention, diversion of interest, and aversion to the authoritarianism taking root on the continent, coupled with the impact of economic development in Latin America, contributed more to the loss of U.S. influence

than institutional politics of hemispheric security. Still, institutional politics had an important impact that is well worth an investigation.

U.S. policy makers designing hemispheric defense plans during WWII were aware of the difficulties inherent in a multilateral security policy. But the options of purely bilateral and unilateral policies were expensive, and in a theater with few core interests, the United States was not prepared to muster the resources necessary for such a course of action. Making the case for multilateralism required convincing Latin American states that Axis countries posed a concrete threat to the entire region. Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor consensus on that point was not overwhelming. This is especially true of the Southern Cone countries, where German immigrants were an important presence. Nevertheless, over time the United States was able to win the interest of the other states of the region, working both bilaterally and multilaterally to establish a system of defense for the hemisphere.

However, from the outset, there was a reluctance to organize hemispheric security around a permanent military organization, such the IADB, which Latin American states assumed would be powerfully influenced by the United States. But institutional balancing lay dormant as long as mutual interests were served by the institution. That changed once the United States redefined the threat from external to internal. U.S. pressure on Latin American states in Caracas (1954) to make the presence of domestic communist movements a trigger for invoking the Rio Treaty stirred resentment – and prompted the institutional balancing that ultimately undid the post-WWII multilateral security system.

After the Cuban Revolution, the United States was able to proceed on a multilateral track only through increasing support to multilateralism (creation of new institutions) and by virtue of the well-intentioned Alliance for Progress and military assistance programs (providing side benefits). Hyper-sovereign Mexico, a newly recalcitrant Brazil (before 1964) and unpredictable Argentina were already challenging the U.S. Cold War security agenda. When the United States settled into a pattern of interventionism along its southern flank, the game was up. By that time, its influence had waned and restoration of the hemispheric security organizations it had largely created was probably out of reach.

But the dynamic of institutional politics is only one piece of security cooperation and conflict in the region. We need to begin with a look at the enduring rivalries that shape military balancing in the region. This chapter continues with a look at the Latin American balance of power system, then overlays the hemispheric system that the U.S. ushered in during the years leading up to WWII. The main purpose here is to establish the context for the study of cooperative security in the 1990s, which is taken up in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Role of Power in Hemispheric Relations

Early Patterns

In the Americas, as in other regions, power has been the ultimate arbiter of international relations. Alternatives have been hard to find. For instance, the role of international law in Latin American security affairs has been a curious one, more often honored in the breach than not. As Mares (1997) notes, "between 1826 and 1889 at least

fifty conventions among Latin American states pledged to resolve disputes amicably. Yet this was the period of the bloodiest Latin American wars" (pp. 203-4).

Attempts to outlaw the use of force have not worked any better in Latin America than in other regions. The Calvo Doctrine (principle of non-intervention) and the Drago Doctrine (principle of equal treatment of foreigners) provided the basis for Brazilian and Argentine arguments designed to limit the use of force to protect the property rights of foreign citizens. But these principles had no measurable effect on the foreign policies of those countries powerful enough to project military power (principally Great Britain and the United States).

Even the "no transfer" norm, based on the Monroe Doctrine and backed by U.S. power, was only indifferently enforced (Corrales and Feinberg 1999). Aside from the French-Spanish-British invasion of Mexico and Spanish reannexation of the Dominican Republic, which the United States may not have been able to prevent, the U.S. remained passive when it could have acted: the British invasion of the Falkland Islands (1833), the French blockade of Buenos Aires (in the 1840s) and the Spanish attack on Chile (1866). But beginning at the end of the last century, the establishment of a U.S. sphere of influence in the hemisphere ensured that no great-power concert of foreign powers would emerge in Latin America. This development ushered in the asymmetrical power relations that characterize the hemisphere. Analyzing this system requires use of both realist and institutionalist tools.

Realism has a relatively rich tradition that includes geopolitical and balance of power analyses,¹ in addition to neorealist approaches that characterize much Latin American conflict in the Cold War as a bi-product of U.S.-Soviet competition. Van Klaveren's (1996) description of power politics in Latin America encapsulates the basic tendencies of the approach. Latin America is viewed in terms of "regional competition in which countries such as Brazil and Argentina attempt to maintain a certain equilibrium in the Southern Atlantic area while Mexico and Venezuela compete for influence in Central America and the Caribbean and Chile seeks influence in the Southern Pacific area" (Van Klaveren, 1996, p. 41). The smaller states – Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador and the Central American countries – serve as buffers between their larger neighbors and occasional recipients of benefits from competing influence attempts.²

The classic study of the balance of power mechanism in South America was provided by Robert Burr (1955), in "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South

¹ Balance of power analysis is represented here primarily by Burr (1955), who sees states as striving to maintain a "balance of power within a group to prevent any nation from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others or threaten their independence" (Burr, 1955, p. 37). Geopolitical analysis is well represented by Kelly and Child (1988) who define geopolitics as the relationship between power politics and geographic features such as "locations between countries, distances between areas, and terrain, climate and resources within states" (p. 2). See also Kelly (1997). Geopolitics shares some of the attributes of classical realism, but accepts more readily the prospects of economic integration driven by resource exploitation and facilitated by transportation networks (Kelly, 1997; Cavedes, 1988).

² Buffer states have not fared well historically. "Shatterbelt," the term employed by Kelly (1997), is indeed descriptive of their experience. They have lost territory, been the site of wars and had their foreign policies manipulated (Kelly, 1997). Dominguez (1998) does note however that some larger South American countries made territorial concessions to smaller ones in exchange for economic benefits.

America: An Exploratory Essay.” Burr intended to use balance of power analysis to provide an “integrated pattern for the relations of Latin American nations” (Burr, 1955, p. 37). As we shall see, the pattern in Latin America does not conform to the classic, fluid balance of power mechanism, which requires that alliances form across any dyad. The system that emerged in Latin America was more static, since historically alignment choices have been constrained by border disputes and other “alliance handicaps.”³ Nevertheless, the balancing pattern that emerges is predictable, based on the elements of threat laid out by Walt. Threats increase to the extent that they are: (1) proximate; (2) exacerbated by border disputes (fueling perceptions of aggressive intent); (3) backed by relatively significant military capability; and (4) exist in a military-technical environment that favors offensive operations.

According to Burr (1955), once independence had matured to the point where sovereign states could exercise minimum control over their territory and communications were sufficient to develop awareness of the interrelated nature of security, a balance of power system began to emerge. The South American system began as two separate subsystems – one based on the Rio de la Plata and the other on the Pacific.

The Rio de la Plata system was centered on the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. That rivalry produced a war over the Banda Oriental, which ended with British mediation in 1828 and the establishment of the state of Uruguay. From then on, any attempt by one power to dominate Uruguay would be resisted by the other. Paraguay was

³ See Jervis (1985) for his discussion on great power concerts and the conditions behind a classic balance of power system.

too isolated to be part of the system initially. However, the emergence of military might in Paraguay under Francisco Solano Lopez affected the subregional balance of power and led to the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1865, uniting Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay to overthrow Lopez. Once defeated, Paraguay was not partitioned as some envisioned, but rather allowed to remain as an independent state – a buffer state between the larger contending powers, which quickly resumed their rivalry.

On the Pacific Coast, conflict between then New Granada and Peru over Guayaquil was partially resolved through the establishment of the state of Ecuador (1830) - its independence guaranteed by its two larger neighbors. Farther south, the formation of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation in 1835 led to war with Chile. Both Argentina and New Granada also opposed the new confederation. In 1838 the Confederation was defeated and a balance of power system on the Pacific Coast then began to take shape. Stable power relations between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were essential to maintaining peace between those states. The issue of Ecuadorian sovereignty continued to concern the larger powers, although increasingly rivalry between Chile and Peru dominated the system. By the 1870s, the growing economic interests of Chile in the Bolivian desert coast sparked Peruvian resistance to Chilean power.

As states developed more significant capability, the Rio de la Plata system and the Pacific system began to interact more frequently. Some of this was evidenced by the middle of the century; with the defeat of Juan Manuel de Rozas in Argentina, growing Brazilian influence in Uruguay and Chilean encroachment on Patagonia threatened the

balance of power in both systems.⁴ However, the fusion of the two systems was in reality completed only as a result of the Pacific War (1879-1883).⁵

The complex foreign policy maneuvering which preceded the war shows how the merger took effect. In 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a secret alliance against Chile. Peru sought aid from Argentina, which in turn was countered by growing détente between Chile and Brazil. Argentina was drawn to Peru and Bolivia, due to its developing rivalry with Chile in the Patagonia region, however the threat of a countervailing Brazilian-Chilean axis forestalled Argentine plans.⁶

Chile's victory in the Pacific War aroused resistance throughout the hemisphere. Peru demanded the return of territory lost in Tacna and Arica and Bolivia pressed for an

⁴ Burr (1955) and Caviedes (1988). As Argentina exerted control over the Rio de la Plata and began to populate its frontier, the country assumed the central position in the Southern Cone. This engendered a rivalry with Chile over control of the Patagonia region, the South Atlantic and Antarctica.

⁵ In addition to bringing about the merger of the two systems, the Pacific War was "system-transforming" in the sense that it changed the major players, eliminating Peru and Bolivia from the top ranks and solidifying Chile's position. It also had the effect of elevating Argentina, which shortly thereafter began an intensive modernization program to match Chile (Resende-Santos, 1996).

⁶ The entente between Brazil and Chile served as deterrent to Argentine aggression but never materialized in military terms. As Resende-Santos notes (1996) Brazil was Chile's natural ally during this period, but weak militarily, tending to free ride on Chilean power. Ultimately an increased threat from pro-Germany Argentina during the years leading up to World War I forced Brazil to launch its first major modernization program.

outlet to the Pacific.⁷ But the major problem facing Chile was an “expanding and prosperous Argentina” (Burr, 1955, p. 56). Argentina marshaled support from other countries, while Chile looked for potential allies in Ecuador and Colombia, who were at odds with Peru over the territory in the Amazon – suddenly of strategic interest due to the rubber boom.⁸

Aside from this military-diplomatic maneuvering, the Argentina-Chilean rivalry generated an expensive arms race. The heavy drain of resources ultimately convinced the two countries to enter into the *Pactos de Mayo* of 1902, solidifying the balance of power system in South America. At its heart lay rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, Argentina and Chile, and Chile and Peru. The independence of the smaller states of Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador were also fundamental features of the system.

What of the other regions of Latin America – Central America and the Caribbean Basin? Unfortunately, Burr did not address those rigorously, although he does claim that “the inter-relations of the Central American states provided a classic example of the operation of the balance of power principle” (Burr, 1955, p. 39). In Central America, this dynamic came into operation after resolution of the regional civil wars in 1906 and 1907,

⁷ Interestingly, it was in part Bolivia's land-locked status that encouraged it to initiate conflict with Paraguay in the Chaco, which might have provided access to the navigable river system to the Atlantic. True to the balancing pattern, Chile and Argentina, as an extension of their own security competition, manipulated action in both countries during that conflict (Kelly, 1997).

⁸ Chile sold outmoded arms and munitions to Ecuador, arranged for academic exchanges in Quito's military academy and sent a delegation to explore cooperation with Bogota. Chile also invited Paraguayan youths to enter Chilean military and naval academies (Burr, 1955). Also, Martz (1997) covers Chile's early influence with the Colombian military.

which were fought in response to attempts by some Central American leaders to recreate the United Provinces, dismantled by the civil wars of 1838-42.

Throughout most of the 19th century, offensive operations, although not impossible, were generally hampered by geographic barriers that favored defense. Variations in geographic endowments affected the nature of conflict, though not necessarily the balancing pattern. Resende-Santos (1996) makes the argument that Chile, as a defensively disadvantaged state with "compact and exposed national territory," developed an "aggressive national security policy," based on "highly mobile, offensively organized forces," with a "propensity to strike first" with preventative war and engage in "offensive action and warfare on the enemy's home turf" (Resende-Santos, 1996, pp. 217-219). In contrast, a defensively advantaged state like Brazil, with its large territory and dispersed population centers, tended to maintain "only a deterrent force" concentrating on "defensive positioning and fortifications." Nevertheless, both Brazil and Chile balanced against Argentina. Over time, the development of communications and transportation infrastructure has generally muted the defensive advantages provided by geographic boundaries.

Technologically advanced weapons also had an impact on the nature of conflict. The Triple Alliance War of 1865-1870 between Paraguay and the combined forces of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay employed repeating rifles, armored warships and an observation balloon – advanced systems that were only gradually introduced in the United States during its Civil War. Less than a decade later, the War of the Pacific between Chile and the Peru-Bolivian alliance featured use of breech-loading artillery and machine guns.

Even in times of relative peace, acquisition of advanced armaments continued apace. According to one authoritative study, the Brazilian Navy was equipped with Dreadnought battleships by 1910, before many major industrial powers – including Japan and Germany. Argentina responded by obtaining similar vessels. Argentina, in 1946, had more sophisticated aircraft in its inventory than the Soviet Union (English, 1985). Warships in that epoch were offensive weapons that would not be neutralized by defensive technology until the introduction of submarines. Like the advanced aircraft of today, deterrence (obtaining similar capability), not defense, was the rational response.

U.S. Power and Institutional Balancing

Power equations in the hemisphere changed dramatically at the end of the 19th century with the emergence of the United States as a great power. At various times since that point, the United States has participated in the development of hemispheric institutions to help manage interstate relations. Corrales and Feinberg (1999) describe three important periods of “hemispherism”: (1) 1889-1906, including the creation of the Pan American Union; (2) 1933-1954, including the war years and the creation of most of the current organizations of the IASS; and (3) 1989 to the present, the period under examination in this study. As Corrales and Feinberg note, these periods correspond with rising U.S. power in the region.

During the first period of “hemispherism,” the United States worked to create formal institutions to “facilitate common political, economic, and security objectives - the establishment of a hemispheric peacekeeping system, including arbitration of the settlement of disputes and the development of trade-enhancing rules” (Corrales and Feinberg, 1999, p. 5).

Institution building did not match U.S. expectations and the United States entered into a period of extensive use of power, beginning with the Spanish-American War (1898).⁹ U.S. interventions were focused on its immediate neighbors: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. That focus has not changed substantially over time.¹⁰

Use of power gave way to the second moment of hemispherism, with the advent of Roosevelt's good neighbor policy. The main focus of efforts related to security was the institutionalization of a system of peaceful resolution of conflict between states of the region. Although an "informal intermediary system" had taken hold over time¹¹ efforts

⁹ Mares (1997) organizes U.S. security relations in Latin America into three periods: (1) 1898-1933, extensive use of power; (2) 1933-1959, reliance on nonviolent means; (3) 1959 to present, renewed intervention.

¹⁰ Kelly (1997) notes that U.S. armed intervention has always been associated with instability on the U.S. southern frontier (Cuba: 1898, 1904-1925, 1962; Haiti: 1904-1934, 1994-1999; Mexico: 1846-1848, 1915-1917; Panama: 1904, 1990; Grenada: 1983; Nicaragua: 1904-1933; 1980s; and the Dominican Republic: 1920-1928).

¹¹ Dominguez (1983) reports that "from 1925 to 1942, there were ten instances when 35 countries acted as intermediaries to cool off or resolve border or territorial disputes. The United States did so seven times, European countries five times, South American countries 18 times, and Mexico and Central America and Caribbean countries five times" (Dominguez, 1983, p.139).

to institutionalize the system were not productive.¹² Ad hoc mediation often did not resolve conflicts and in fact sometimes prolonged them, as belligerents were manipulated by “guarantor nations” looking to advance their own interests. Mecham (1962) argues that this was the case with mediation efforts undertaken by Argentina and Chile to resolve the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay – efforts which spanned entire length of one of the bloodiest conflicts in the history of the region. Peace was concluded only after the belligerents were exhausted, and on the victor’s terms.

The advent of WWII dramatically altered the tone of inter-American cooperation. The United States worked to ensure the inclusion of Latin American countries in the war effort, both as staging areas for U.S. defense forces and as active partners providing combat units (e.g., the Brazilian Foreign Expeditionary Force). Before and during the war, military missions from the United States visited their Latin American counterparts to develop consensus approaches to defense, win basing rights for U.S. forces, administer rearmament programs and establish joint training programs, information exchange systems, and standardization agreements. Comprehensive pacts were concluded with

¹² The process was ultimately completed with the establishment of The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota) negotiated in 1948 to establish a mechanism for peaceful resolution of conflict. The Pact stands as the classic example in the region of institutional overreaching (Mecham, 1962). Representing the culmination of years of negotiations in successive meetings of the region’s foreign ministers, the treaty requires peaceful resolutions of all disputes and establishes a comprehensive mechanism for that purpose. In the event that the good offices of a mediator do not suffice to reach a peaceful resolution, disputes are to be forwarded to the International Court of Justice. Because of the features of compulsory referral and binding commitment, it has never been fully ratified. Perhaps more successful was the Inter-American Peace Committee, which took up a number of conflictual situations. But after it was reorganized during the 1967 OAS reform, not one case was brought before it (Baena Soares, 1994).

strategically important countries: Mexico, Cuba, Panama and Brazil. A "working basis was established for wartime security cooperation" (Mecham, 1962, p. 208).

It is in the context of this pattern of unilateral action and bilateral cooperation driven by U.S. power and interests that the "hemispherism" of WWII must be understood. The United States opted to support the creation and promotion of regional organizations (such as the Inter-American Defense Board), develop regional agreements on collective security,¹³ and support development of multilateral plans to ensure that the South American continent would not become a base for Axis aggression.

These decisions were not taken lightly. In advocating the creation of the IADB, for instance, the U.S. State Department overcame its own misgivings about multilateralizing U.S. foreign policy and the active resistance of the U.S. defense establishment, which preferred bilateral mechanisms for promoting hemispheric security (Conn and Fairchild, 1989). Consider the negative assessment by the U.S. services during WWII when the State Department initiative to create an IADB was first staffed:

It would be an excessively large body, too difficult to manage and direct for effective action; Latin American military affairs required immediate action and the establishment of the IADB would require too much time; it would not be possible to discuss secret plans in a body of that size; the members of the IADB would lack the authority to carry out the measures which it might adopt; the IADB would use up the time available to high level personnel who were urgently required for more pressing duties. (IADB, 1979, p. 6)

¹³ Mecham (1962) describes two "wings" of the IASS: 1) institutions for peaceful resolution of conflict and 2) institutions for collective security. Construction of the first wing was complete with the Pact of Bogota (1948), discussed earlier. The focus in this section is on collective security.

Nevertheless, the United States would find in the Board a convenient venue for expressing a commitment to multilateralism, which would become an important tool of assurance in the years immediately after the war.

Concerned that they had been shut out of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, Latin American states were anxious that the inter-American System be preserved in the coming post-war order (Baena Soares, 1994). There was broad acceptance of the system of consultation, developed as a result of U.S. prodding, as well as in other accomplishments.¹⁴ In return for Latin American support at the San Francisco conference, the United States agreed to preserve the regional system (Mecham, 1962). Gradually, the three important institutions of the IASS took form: the Inter American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance the Rio Treaty (1947), the OAS (1948) and the IADB (1942).

As work on a new collective security arrangement began, the United States intended to marginalize Argentina, now under Juan Peron's leadership, based on its limited contribution during the war. At the insistence of the other Latin American states, however, the United States made concessions that permitted Argentine participation

¹⁴ The American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (1936) called for such a system, which was approved at the 8th International Conference of American States in Lima (1938).

(Mecham, 1962). Once a full member of the new system, Argentina would become the first state to assume the mantle of institutional balancer.¹⁵

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in the Act of Chapultepec (1945) had affirmed the principle of collective responsibility for the security of the Western Hemisphere, as well as the collective use of force as one mechanism to preserve that security. The conference led directly to the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947. The Rio Treaty provides the machinery to maintain peace and security in the hemisphere, setting up a mechanism to bring the collective weight of its signatories to bear on a situation of aggression.

Some view the treaty as a classic collective security arrangement intended to redress acts of aggression between states. For the hemisphere, it is indeed a remarkable instrument, featuring automatic referral mechanisms, detailed voting procedures and binding obligations (Mecham, 1962). Under the provisions of the treaty, the United States can be obligated to “break off diplomatic relations and sever all economic relations with an aggressor state” when two-thirds of the members so decide (Council on Foreign Relations, 1962, p. 29).

U.S. acceptance of this provision was an important concession, an act of assurance that may have forestalled an Argentine effort to limit the Treaty’s definition of

¹⁵ This is the major thesis of Grossi (1997). President Juan Peron even attempted at one point in the 1950s to establish an Argentina-Brazil-Chile bloc that would project Argentine power in the aftermath of the U.S.-U.S.S.R war he saw as inevitable. The bloc failed, as did most other overt balancing attempts against the United States. Cuba would be the only country to form an opposing military alliance and that step would require a near-nuclear war (Mares, 1997).

aggression. Aggression is defined very broadly in the text and can be interpreted to include internal threats. At the Caracas conference (1954), the United States would push through a resolution – over Mexican and Argentina objections – which would include communist influence in government within the definition of aggression (Council on Foreign Relations, 1962).

In the view of others, the Rio Treaty was born flawed, since its call for mutual assistance is not binding. Neither does the treaty include a mechanism for the operation of collective forces, although the Advisory Defense Committee (part of the OAS structure) it created could presumably help manage such forces. Since the Committee has never met, that function has never been exercised. Hartlyn, et al. (1992), claim that through these omissions the Rio Treaty actually enshrines principle of non-intervention and is an example how weaker nations can use international institutions to their advantage (Hartlyn, et al., 1992, p. 11).

Ironically, the Treaty, intended as a pact to protect the hemisphere from external aggression, has only been invoked to deal with crises between American states. Treaty mechanisms have been used to address numerous conflictive situations, but only in the Caribbean and Central America and never for a major conflict. The Treaty was informally abandoned after Malvinas, when it could not invoke a collective hemispheric response in the face of what many states in the region viewed as external aggression (Vaky, 1993).

What of the OAS Charter, which established the organization in 1948?¹⁶ The Charter includes the principle of collective responsibility for hemispheric security and collective action in Chapter 5, Articles 24 and 25. In addition, many of the basic purposes of the OAS listed in the opening paragraphs of the Charter show a distinct security component, such as strengthening peace and security; preventing potential disputes and ensuring their peaceful settlement; and achieving an effective limitation of conventional weapons so that those resources can be devoted to economic and social development. All of these security components are qualified by "due respect for the principle of nonintervention."

The organs of the OAS meet annually with the foreign ministers of the region in General Assembly to consider resolutions developed by committees of the OAS Permanent Council and to establish new mandates for action. The resolutions and mandates are normally recommendatory in nature when directed to member countries and mandatory when directed at specific elements of the OAS.

Security cooperation through the OAS has included some cases of combined operations (a combined quarantine force against Cuba in 1962; combined patrols/observation posts on the Costa Rican-Nicaragua border in 1955; a combined naval patrol in Panama in 1959); one case of centralized action under a unified military

¹⁶ The Charter was subsequently amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires signed in 1967, which entered into force in February 1970; by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, signed in 1985, which entered into force in November 1988; and by the Protocol of Washington, signed in 1992, which entered into force in 1997. These protocols expanded the role of the OAS in economic and social development and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

command (the OAS assumed operational control over the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in 1965); and numerous verification commissions. But at no time has the inter-American system included a permanent, continuing military structure of an operational nature. All operations have been conducted on an ad hoc basis, with little direct institutional support.

Why were when no provisions were made for a permanent military organ within the OAS Charter in 1948? Certainly, the United States favored the creation of such an organization. Although no notes of the working sessions on this issue have been discovered, then Secretary-General Alberto Lleras Camargo expressed the opinion that to the delegations involved:

[I]t could have seemed unnecessary that a permanent defense organ should be continually engaged, even without any evident threat to peace, in defense preparations of an unforeseeable nature. It is true that the technical functions of defense are better served by means of a constant evaluation of all the situations in which it would have to operate. However, the fear on the part of the delegations that a permanent defense organ – if included in the Charter – would give to it the character of a military alliance prevailed ... [A]ll rejected as inadequate ... the idea that the Charter of the Organization and the supplementary treaties in the future would be under constant surveillance by a military organ which is in a permanent state of readiness. (IADB, 1979, p. 8.)

Opposition to the U.S. proposal was led by Mexico.

The sole permanent, military organization at the hemispheric level is the IADB, although it is complemented by a large number of ad hoc organizations and annual military conferences that have appeared on and off since its inception. These organizations have never been formally linked, although Board officers regularly attend the hemispheric-level conferences of the armed forces, which include specialized,

technical meetings, intelligence meetings, as well as gatherings of the military chiefs.¹⁷ Subregional military organizations, such as the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), have occasionally sent representatives to IADB meetings and reported on their activities.¹⁸

The IADB itself was established in 1942 by the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the initiate of the U.S. Department of State.¹⁹ The Board shows its parentage – its host country is the United States, the Chairman is always a U.S. general officer and the Secretary is a U.S. colonel.

The mission of the Board, until it was substantially altered in 1995, was to (1) plan for hemispheric defense; (2) prepare member states to act collectively; and (3) provide technical assistance in its area of competence. While the precise wording of the

¹⁷ The term "conferences of the armed forces" is a convenient shorthand. In fact, there are three separate conference "systems" for the three main armed services which exist independently of each other, all established between 1959 and 1961. In general they consist of an annual or biennial series of technical conferences which culminate in a Commander's Conference where agreements are collectively endorsed by the chiefs of the armed services. Membership largely overlaps that of the IADB, with some notable exceptions (Canada participates in the conferences but is not a member of the IADB).

¹⁸ A 1966 Board study offers a perspective on the maturing military system: "The creation of the Central American Defense Council, the periodical meetings of the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the Americas, and the holding of combined military exercises in the Americas demonstrate the concern of the Governments with the suitable preparation of collective aspects of the defense of the Continent" (IADB, 1966, p. 11).

¹⁹ See Spracher and Mason (1994) for a recent history of the IADB. The IADB yearbooks also provide good information.

mission statement has evolved over the years, these basic functions have not changed. They derive from the terms of reference established in formal resolutions of Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers and the General Assemblies of the American States.²⁰

The Board became a useful vehicle for validating the system already put in place by the United States (Mecham, 1962) and for disseminating U.S. doctrine, widely accepted in the aftermath of World War II. Early resolutions adopted by the Board dealt directly with the immediate threat, recommending steps to eliminate clandestine telecommunications, organize civil defense forces, improve coordination for transit of military aircraft and develop a convoy system.²¹ But the war turned shortly after the Board's creation, and with the likelihood of Axis aggression on the continent low, hemispheric planners turned to long range defense plans.

By 1945, the Board had recommended steps that if implemented would form a broad basis for cooperation: a system of naval and air bases; standardization of

²⁰ Resolution XXXIV of the 1942 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the third meeting of the security consultation system set up in 1936 as a U.S. initiative at the end of the Chaco war); Resolution VII and XXXIV of the Ninth International Conference of American States (which authored the OAS Charter) and Resolution III of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1951. The 1942 resolution established the Board as the organ for the planning and preparation of the defense of the Continent. The 1948 resolutions established a weak juridical link between the Board and the OAS and provided the Board with autonomy over its internal organization. The 1951 resolution, which identifies the IADB as the "only inter-American technical-military organ functioning," provided the Board a broad mandate to plan and prepare against international communism and to establish a coordinated system to exchange information on defense matters. Just as importantly, it urged American states to support the Board and act on its recommendations.

²¹ Mecham (1962) claims that only the convoy system can be credited to the Board, since the other measures were largely the result of U.S. sponsorship.

transportation, telecommunications systems, war materiel, military organization and training (including language instruction at defense academies); military exchanges; and multilateral meetings of the high commands of member services (Mecham, 1962). In fact, many of these steps were ultimately implemented with U.S. sponsorship.

Partly because of domestic pressure in many of the countries where U.S. bases had been established, the United States agreed to close them down after the war, even in the face of growing security competition with the Soviet Union. This measure offered an important display of reassurance to Latin American countries. The United States bolstered Latin American sovereignty and demonstrated a commitment to multilateralism. The Board, not the United States, would provide the basis for a future system of bases should it be called for.

U.S. influence remained high during the early years of the Cold War. In response to the Korean War, U.S. Military Assistance Programs (MAP) were implemented to build up regional military capacity for hemispheric defense. Military assistance agreements with key countries were accompanied with secret plans that pledged U.S. materiel support in exchange for complementary military operations (Grossi, 1997). Some countries in the region responded with extra-hemispheric assistance to U.S.-led efforts during the Cold War; worth special mention is the deployment of combat units from Colombia to the Korean Conflict (Martz, 1997). The United States enjoyed a "special relationship" with Brazil; in fact, some observers characterized Brazilian foreign policy in this epoch as "sub-imperialistic," a surrogate for U.S. power in the Southern Cone (Selcher, 1992; Kelly, 1997).

The Board also reached its heyday in the 1950s. Planning activity was spurred by the 4th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs on Inter-American Military Cooperation (1951), which addressed the threat of communist aggression in light of the Korean Conflict. Member states were urged to: (1) increase their resources and strengthen their armed forces to contribute to the common defense; (2) cooperate with each other in military matters in order to develop collective strength; and (3) support the planning for the common defense to be conducted in the IADB.

The heavily qualified preamble to the resolution made clear that these steps were voluntary, subject to the restrictions of the Rio Treaty, and not intended to prejudice the security of individual states. These provisos indicate once again the tension between collective security commitments and the priority of Latin American countries to maintain sovereignty over defense decisions. Nevertheless, as a result of these directives, the IADB initiated an ambitious program to develop defense plans to carry out its mission of continental defense. Its International Staff (created in 1949) was organized into an intelligence division, to carry out threat analysis and identify national capabilities that could be used in cooperative security activities, and a plans division, to formulate directives that would organize collective responses.

The Staff, under this organizational structure, produced plans for the defense of the American Continent with annexes and coordination instructions to facilitate communications, logistics, intelligence, transportation, and air and maritime defense.²²

²² Separate plans (actually broad frameworks for cooperation) were designed to address possible aggression from the Soviet Union, Cuba or international revolutionary movements.

The Board recommended troop organization and defense priorities appropriate to agreed-upon threats to hemispheric security. These plans and recommendations were remanded to member governments in the form of Board Resolutions and periodically updated as the strategic situation changed.²³ The United States followed the general format of these documents when crafting bilateral plans with partner states in Latin America, imbuing even these documents with a sense of multilateralism (Grossi, 1997, 110-11).

Increase in U.S. military activity in response to the Cuban Revolution was substantial and far reaching (Grossi, 1997). New institutions were created: the School of the Americas (1961), the Inter American Defense College (1962) and the system of annual or biennial conferences of the armed forces (1959-1961).²⁴ The U.S. Southern Command was established in Panama, along with a special forces group famous for training the Bolivian rangers who tracked down Che Guevara. Joint military exercises were conducted: Operations Solidarity, Fraternity, American, and Ayacucho. UNITAS, a multilateral naval exercise that circumnavigates South American began during this period. Finally, the United States assisted subregional organizations, such as

²³ These strategic estimates were based on a coordinated system for intelligence reporting established by the Board in the 1950s. Although it never functioned to the satisfaction of the staff officers required to develop plans, several of the major countries sent in periodic reports and many members made occasional presentations on specific security problems.

²⁴ These conferences, explicitly established to build cooperation against communist aggression, do not formally rely on U.S. assistance. Host countries incur significant expenses. For this reason, host countries have sometimes been difficult to find. In these instances, the United States has frequently stepped in to either host a conference or provide additional funding. For the Army conferences, the United States has hosted eight, including the first five consecutively. In addition, the United States funds some of the communications architecture used by the conferences.

CONDECA, which developed a subregional communications system and conducted combined operations with member countries.

The impact of the Cuban revolution on the Board was curious, since Cuba remained a member until January 31, 1962, when it was suspended from the OAS.²⁵ The United States called a special IADB session in 1961 and obtained a Council decision to deny Cuba access to secret materials; nevertheless planning efforts to deal with communism were undermined. Attempts to suspend Cuba from the Board were stoutly resisted by Mexico and other delegations up to the OAS decision. But beyond this episode, institutional balancing was not yet widespread, partly because of U.S. efforts to assure Latin American states of its commitment to multilateralism.

Many of the organizations mentioned above have a significant multilateral hue; the IADC provides a representative example. The United States pushed for establishment of the IADC under the Board, taking great pains to emphasize its multilateral nature. This step was not without controversy; Mexico objected to the creation of another security institution at the hemispheric level. But the establishment of an inter-American defense college had been a widely shared goal for many years and the U.S. plan prevailed.

The IADC is the only multinational institution in the region dedicated to the study and teaching of hemispheric security and it attracts distinguished guest speakers that have included presidents, ambassadors and ministers of government. Still, in many respects it

²⁵ As a result of the Final Act of the 8th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay.

is a U.S. institution. It is based on a U.S. military installation (Ft. McNair), its budget is supplemented by U.S. funding, and like the Board, its director is a U.S. general officer (since the early 1990s, the IADB chairman has been dual hatted as the IADC director).

The original curriculum was created at the time of the Alliance for Progress, when U.S. policy makers assumed that economic, political and social development would be necessary to combat what they saw as the main threat to the region – revolutionary upheaval. The College thus began with a program of studies that included non-military subjects, which would have seemed out of place in a Latin American war college at that time. The ground was laid for a broad view of security and the threats that might undermine it.²⁶

By the mid-1960s, a U.S.-led multilateral security system was in place.

As Grossi (1997) notes:

For the first time in the century, it could be said that the United States had succeeded in establishing a direct line of contact and cooperation between its armed forces and those of the Caribbean and the South American Republics. Maneuvers were being held regularly, exchanges of officers were routinely organized, military field schools were opened indicating a general consensus for the first time on security priorities of the entire Western Hemisphere. (p. 185)

²⁶ The first class, with 29 students representing 15 countries, received their diplomas on 20 March 1963 from then Vice President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, who gave the graduation address. In his address, he commended the multidisciplinary nature of the curriculum, which addressed all elements of national power – economic, military, political and cultural. See the 1967 IADB *Report on the III Special Inter-American Conference* (Buenos Aires, 15-26 February, 1967), especially pp. 10-18 for insights on the multidimensional thinking evolving in the field of security.

Although resistance to this level of U.S. control was already forming, widespread rejection would begin only in the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965).

The United States made efforts to multilateralize that action and was successful in galvanizing the OAS to organize an "Inter American Peace Force" to replace U.S. troops after the initial intervention. The Board quickly satisfied an OAS request to provide a plan to support the deployment of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to the Dominican Republic²⁷ and sent a senior military advisor to accompany the OAS Secretary-General. The IAPF was placed under Brazilian command and a number of Latin American countries provided troops, including a Central American battalion organized under CONDECA, with U.S. logistics support. The successful organization and deployment of the IAPF led some to consider the advisability of a permanent force of that nature.

But no act of assurance would be sufficient to convince Latin American states that their involvement was anything more than an attempt to redress what had been essentially a unilateral intervention on the part of the United States (Connell-Smith, 1968, pp. 80-82). Resentment of U.S. tactics to wrestle an anticommunism resolution from the OAS in Caracas in 1954 and its subsequent intervention in Guatemala boiled over after the Dominican Republic. Several countries refused to continue isolating Cuba diplomatically,

²⁷ Elements of the U.S. forces which had already intervened came under the Inter American Peace Force authorized by a resolution adopted on the Third Plenary Session held May 6, 1965 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to change current force to OAS force.

including Argentina, which had contributed two ships to the blockade in the early 1960s (Varas, 1985, 53). Two years after the Dominican intervention, at the 1967 OAS conference in Buenos Aires, fears that the establishment of a permanent force was seriously being considered led to the defeat of a U.S.-backed proposal to move the Board under the OAS Charter, which would have rationalized and centralized a system that until then had been piecemeal.²⁸

Writing shortly after these events, Jose (1970) saw the eventual creation of a permanent peace force as unlikely for three reasons: (1) a permanent, continuing military presence would offend the non-military nature of the regional system and inter-American relationships; (2) any effective instrument for collection action could violate the principle of non-intervention, the cornerstone of the Inter-American System; and (3) animosities, suspicions and jealousy between American States (especially but not exclusively between the United States and the Latin American countries) hamper concerted collective action in the security field (41-47). His observations can be applied to any permanent military organization of an operational nature.

The historical truth is that the hemispheric security system has resisted every previous attempt to make it more rational, systematic and ordered.²⁹ Attempts to

²⁸ In a diplomatic twist, the proposal was actually presented by Argentina, while the U.S. watched to see whether it would be accepted. When it was clear that opposition was strong, the U.S. withdrew its backing.

²⁹ The logic of efficiency is as ineffective as it is inescapable. Consider the Board's 1966 study, which accompanied the doomed resolution urging member countries to place the Board under the OAS Charter during the 1967 Buenos Aires Conference, pp. 10-11: "At this juncture, we can point out that the Inter-American System has three

eliminate the overlapping jurisdictions claimed by the various security organizations and subject them to centralized control have all failed. This issue has been guaranteed to spark institutional balancing.

After Buenos Aires, the Board began to lose relevance. Over time some military delegates at the Board became less connected to the formulation of defense strategy in their home countries, as civilian authorities increasingly assumed that responsibility. Budgets for defense activities, both at home and in international institutions, came under constant attack. While over its history the Board produced more than one hundred

distinct organs to deal with matters of a single nature, with the objective of consolidating the peace and security of the Continent: 1. The Advisory Defense Committee, created by the IX International Conference of American States in 1948, within the organization itself. To date it has never been convoked. 2. The Inter-American Defense Board, created in 1942 by Resolution XXXIX of the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with a direct relationship with the American Governments and with no organizational ties with the Organization of American States, and which to this date has produced many studies and recommendation for consideration by the Governments; and 3. The Special Consultative Committee on Security, created by Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, in January 1962, responsible to the Council of the Organization, which has produced reports for the consideration of that organ ... There exists a duplication of organizations that are not linked to each other in dealing with the topics of continental defense, which makes difficult the accomplishment of their objectives. Moreover, in this way, defense matters are not incorporated with the economic, social, and political problems that are the concern of the Organization of American States, and whose co-relationship is essential because they bear on the essence of the principles and objectives of the Organization ... As a consequence of the foregoing, the Second Special Inter-American Conference, in the first point of the "Act of Rio de Janeiro" states that it is necessary to endow the Inter-American System with new dynamism and to avoid duplications and conflict of jurisdiction among its organs... In the second point, it defines the need to modify the functional structure of the organization of the States, as defined in the existing Charter" (IADB, 1966).

separate resolutions, remanding specific security recommendations to member governments, none has even been considered since 1984.³⁰

Continued cooperation after 1965 might have been possible for a time had the United States offered bilateral benefits or significant outlets for potential balancers. But U.S. leverage waned for a variety of reasons: a diversion of U.S. interests (Vietnam), failure of the Alliance for Progress (1961) to deliver on economic assistance in return for what amounted to a regional defense pact (Villagrán de León, 1993), and the attraction of the nonaligned movement. These elements, combined with other factors that made U.S. assistance less desirable (shifts in assistance programs to counterinsurgency training, a policy that favored sales over aid, and increasing Congressional controls), led Latin American countries to search elsewhere for military assistance.³¹ The restrictive policies imposed by of President Jimmy Carter accelerated this trend: Brazil broke off military-to-military relations (as did Argentina and Chile), ending both bilateral arms and training

³⁰ The last resolution considered at the Board – Proposed Resolution CXV, dated 13 December 1984 – recommended that the Board support the Contadora initiatives with verification and assistance missions to Central America. The Council voted to postpone consideration of the resolution. It was never reconsidered. The frequency of resolutions had already fallen off sharply in the mid 1960s, for some of the same reasons.

³¹ U.S. refusal to sell F-5 fighters to Peru in 1968 led to its decision to purchase French fighters and British bombers. This example was followed by Argentine, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela (Varas, 1985).

programs.³² As a result, a generation of Chilean and Brazilian military leaders would have no direct exposure to U.S. military doctrine.

A much debated topic is the extent of the decline of U.S. influence from its peak in the 1950s, when the United States, equal in population to Latin America, out-produced its neighbors seven-fold while attracting half of their exports and providing much of their foreign investment (Lowenthal, 1992). This economic hegemony appeared to have a political dimension as well, with Latin American countries generally accepting U.S. leadership in hemispheric security initiatives as well as U.S. positions in the UN General Assembly.

While economic asymmetry survived longer in Latin America than in other regions of the world, by the late 1970s it had eroded significantly. The larger Latin American economies developed and diversified, with per capita growth rates the exceeded the United States.³³ In the 1980s, the debt crisis, aggressive policies on the part of the Reagan administration and a reinvigorated U.S. economy combined to restore the influence of the United States (Muñoz, 1996a; Poitras, 1990; Sanderson, 1992; Van Klaveren, 1992), although probably not to prior levels. Attempts to engage the large South American countries were largely rebuffed and U.S. security activity was focused

³² See Varas (44, 102). It is important to note that human rights was not the only issue that prompted the Carter administration to restrict arms transfers. The U.S. viewed Brazil's nuclear program with alarm and had interrupted commercial sales of fuel to its reactors in 1974 (Skidmore, 1988).

³³ See van Klaveren (1992). Also, Corrales and Feinberg (1999) who remind us that during this period Venezuela helped found OPEC, Brazil developed ties to Lusophone Africa, Argentina increased trade with the Soviet Union and Peru purchased Soviet arms.

closer to home, as the U.S. interventions in Grenada (1983), the Central American Civil Wars (1981-1986) and Panama (1989) clearly demonstrate.³⁴

Balancing at the Subregional Level

Even during periods of extensive U.S. influence, the distribution of power among the other states of the hemisphere remains key to understanding regional security patterns. U.S. military assistance during WWII and Cold War "had its major impact only when it could be used to reinforce national interests" (Mares, 1997, p. 200).³⁵ Patterns of security competition and cooperation continue to match the "checkerboard" of informal ententes and traditional rivalries laid out in the previous century (Kelly, 1997).

As tensions during the centennial of the War of the Pacific demonstrated, the desert north of Chile remains one of the most geopolitical sensitive regions on the continent, despite the Treaty of Ancón (1929), which settled the territorial dispute between Peru and Chile. According to the provisions of the treaty, Chile requires Peru's approval to grant Bolivia an outlet to the sea through formerly Peruvian territory. Despite Peru's endorsement of the Ayacucho Declaration (1974), which pledged to give "fullest understanding to the land-locked position of Bolivia" (Rengger and Campbell, 1995, p. 315), Peru exercised its veto in 1976 when Chile offered Bolivia a corridor that included

³⁴ Although even here, balancing was evident: Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela provided support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s (Mares 1997) – support that was in part countered by assistance to the Contras from the United States and Argentina.

³⁵ Mares (1997) supports this assertion by noting that "when the United States provided Brazil with equipment and supplies to defend its 'bulge' on the Atlantic, the Brazilians preferred to focus resources on their southwestern border with Argentina" (Mares, 1997, p. 200).

a portion of Arica (Kelly, 1997). In fact, the seriousness of the negotiations between Chile and Bolivia prompted Peru to increase its armament levels (Varas, 1985).

The increase in military capacity violated the spirit of the Ayacucho Declaration, which included a general statement on arms limitations, although consensus on specific weapons systems was never achieved. Country negotiating positions on arms limitations reflected their national interests, with two camps emerging: Colombia, Chile and Ecuador on the one hand, and Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela on the other (Varas, 1985). Once again, the balancing pattern of cooperation and conflict appears.

The conflict between Peru and Ecuador seems to have ended for the present. But since Peru lost its war with Colombia in Leticia (1932), it has engaged in 34 militarized disputes with Ecuador over the question of Ecuador's access to the Amazon.³⁶ The most dramatic incursion took place in 1941, when a Peruvian blitzkrieg forced Ecuador to cede the disputed Marañón Valley and thus its access to the Amazon River.³⁷ But the Peru-Ecuador War of 1995, the most recent conflict in this "enduring rivalry," also provided high drama, triggering a general mobilization in Peru and a reserve call-up in Ecuador. During the war, traditional balancing patterns appeared again, with Chile and Colombia backing Ecuador and Argentina backing Peru (Kelly, 1997). Mares claims that Chile even provided Ecuador with intelligence and communications experts (Mares, 1996/7).

³⁶ See (Mares, 1996/7) for an excellent summary of this "enduring rivalry."

³⁷ Kelly (1997) points at that Brazil is interested arranging a land corridor to the Pacific in this region.

During Falklands War, Venezuela extended diplomatic support and Peru provided military aid to Argentina (Varas, 1985), while Brazil equivocated and Chile offered the British use of communications facilities (Kelly, 1997). Chile also refused to support Argentina in the OAS,³⁸ unsurprising given the war scare a few years earlier over the disputed Beagle Channel islands of Picton, Lennox and Nueva.

In Central America, a "shatterbelt" in the 1980s for Soviet and U.S. competition, the role of U.S. power has been more apparent (Kelly, 1997). But even in this subregion local rivalries count. Non-ideological conflict has been frequent between Honduras and El Salvador and between Nicaragua and her neighbors to the north and south. When Nicaragua began its arms build-up under President Anastacio Somoza, the neighboring countries of El Salvador and Honduras increased expenditures, although a more distant Guatemala did not.³⁹

As in the previous century, the elements of threat continued to drive balancing patterns. Changes in technologies that favor offensive operations since the 1980s have undoubtedly exacerbated conflict. Certainly, Argentina's experience of the Falklands

³⁸ Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States also abstained from voting on the 1982 OAS resolution recognizing Argentine sovereignty over the islands and calling for a cessation of British actions (Rengger and Campbell, 292).

³⁹ Varas (1985, 83) does not believe, however, that perception of threat adequately explains arms build-ups in Central America. He believes the principal cause is internal conflict. Varas (1985) does find, however, that patterns of arms trade in South America follow traditional ententes. Brazil exports arms to Chile but not to Argentina; Argentina exports to neither, but does sell to Bolivia and Peru; and Chile has exported arms to Ecuador (55). Resende-Santos (1996, 224-242) finds a balancing dynamic behind patterns of modernization. Gupta (1997, 146), however, claims that Brazilian modernization at the end of the military regime (1964-1985) occurred in a low threat environment, notwithstanding the impact of the Falklands.

showed that even a strong defensive position (occupation of the islands) offered little advantage against technologically superior forces.

Gupta's (1997) account of Brazil's reaction to the war is worth citing in detail:

The post-Falklands land threat was seen as being a surprise attack by the enemy to grab as much territory as possible and to then negotiate a settlement. It was decided that Brazilian Armored Cavalry should be moved out of Rio to the south of the country bordering Argentina. A mechanized cavalry unit was to be moved along the border with Uruguay. Further, the impact of the Falklands War was also felt in military planning. It became necessary to plan for deterring an external power from projecting military force onto the Latin American mainland. It also became apparent that the Brazilian armed forces, for so long hampered by small budgets and used to countering an internal threat, were outclassed in the event of a future conflict with technologically advanced states. All three branches, therefore, came up with plans for modernizing their arsenals." (p. 146)

This interpretation is supported by Varas (1985).

The most recent open conflict in the region, the Peru-Ecuador war of 1995, featured the use of advanced fighters for the first time in the history of intra-Latin American conflict (Mares, 1996/7). If we have indeed entered an offense-dominated world, then security cooperation should be even more difficult for the region.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Since the relative decline of U.S. influence in the hemisphere and a rise in regional tensions seem to correlate, some have argued for causality. According to Mares (1997), military capability and informal ententes between Argentina-Bolivia-Peru and Brazil-Chile were stable elements in the defense-dominated world that existed in Latin American until the late 1970s" (Mares, 1997, p. 210). At that point U.S. "unilateral arms control policy via military assistance programs faltered. In the 1970s, Latin American countries turned to international market to purchase tanks, aircraft and missile systems and developed indigenous arms industries" (Mares, 1997, p. 212). This period saw a rapid doubling in military expenditures (Varas, 1985).

Conclusion

In this reading of balance of power and geopolitical analysis, the realist tradition has produced the most enduring explanatory model for conflict in the hemisphere – “power restraining power.”⁴¹ As Mares notes, “the system has essentially been dominated by balance-of-power mechanisms, with the United States and some Latin American states imposing their will on weaker members” (Mares, 1997, p. 197). Security cooperation has traditionally worked to reinforce balance of power mechanisms, not overcome them.

The politics of hemispheric security, during this epoch of general U.S. dominance, reflect in large measure a pattern of “institutional bandwagoning” in response to U.S. demonstrations of assurance – support for multilateralism on the one hand and payment of side benefits (offering outlets, preferential logistics agreements) to potential balancers. It is evident that over the period reviewed U.S. sponsorship has been key to the success of hemispheric security organizations, which the United States used to help multilateralize and institutionalize its own initiatives.⁴²

But clear examples of institutional balancing are also present and provide a good indication of the complicated security politics that would reemerge in the 1990s. That

⁴¹ Caviades (1988) notes that geopolitical thinking can be consistent with integration, with a focus on the economic value of cooperating to mutually exploit resources and develop a strong economic nexus along critical lines of communication. But the promise of integration is susceptible to relative gains problems.

⁴² Although subregional cooperation independent of the United States was also possible: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay organized tripartite patrols in the Atlantic in 1940 and Chile and Peru met to discuss joint defense (Mecham, 1962).

balancing, combined with a lower level of interest from the United States, helped contribute to the decay of the hemispheric security institutions. This dynamic is clearly encapsulated by the struggle over the position of the IADB within the inter-American system.

From the beginning the Board has never been fully embraced by the main political organs of the IASS, principally the OAS. After the end of World War II, the Board lost its focus and entered into a period of questioning. The Board doggedly sought permanent status. In 1946, the Board submitted a proposal for a permanent military organ under the OAS Charter to the conferences that led to the adoption of the Charter. In 1959 the Board approved a resolution which would have replaced the Advisory Defense Committee of the OAS with the IADB. In 1966, the Board submitted a resolution to member governments that would have included the Board in the Charter revised in Buenos Aires in 1967. None of these initiatives succeeded.⁴³

At every historical juncture where the structure of the inter-American security system has been debated, the United States has supported proposals for the establishment of a permanent military organ within the OAS.⁴⁴ Those proposals have never been accepted. Several countries, especially Mexico, contended that a permanent military

⁴³ For a different perspective, see the OAS (1978) study, which argues that the Board is an entity created by competent organs of the OAS and is an integral part of the OAS. According to this argument, the Board's prerogative to communicate directly with the governments of the American states is simply an "operational modality" (OAS, 1978, pp. 34-35).

⁴⁴ The United States promoted the establishment of a permanent security organ in 1948 (creation of OAS Charter) and 1967 (revision of Charter and creation of the modern OAS), as well as in 1994 (the most recent proposal).

organization, which would doubtless serve the interests of the United States, had no place in the inter-American system. As a compromise, the Board was allowed to exist with the implicit agreement that the OAS would not be militarized.⁴⁵

For the United States then, the Board, at least since the end of WWII, has been a "second-best" option. It is also a "second-best" option for the countries (principally but not exclusively Mexico) that would prefer a minimalist approach – nothing more than a mechanism that would convoke an ad hoc council when crises required, such as the Advisory Defense Committee contained in the OAS Charter.

Between these two positions, the Board survived in 1948 as a "temporary" compromise solution. As a compromise it frustrates both the proponents and opponents of a permanent military organ in the hemispheric security system. Those who judge the Board against the imagined efficiency of a permanent military staff within the Charter are frustrated by what they see as lost potential at the Board; while those who compare the Board to an ad hoc crisis committee convened for a specific, temporary purpose are alarmed by its autonomous activity.⁴⁶

The Board continued working to enhance interoperability through its own standardization efforts in the area of military terminology, search and rescue, disaster

⁴⁵ See Council on Foreign Relations (1962).

⁴⁶ The compromise is enlivened by a paradox: the Board has survived precisely because it lies outside of the OAS Charter, yet receives financial support from the OAS.

remediation and demining and peacekeeping operations.⁴⁷ But it became locked in a "military ghetto," unable to infuse its recommendations and studies with political relevance. It was reduced to providing a forum to military officers and its tradition of closed proceedings and concern with protection of its documents limited its contribution beyond the immediate circle of its delegates.

Latin American countries have accepted the benefits of cooperative security while at the same time resisting attempts to centralize security relations and supporting the principle of non-interference in domestic matters. Both Mexico and Argentina have played the balancer and the spoiler to U.S. initiatives. In the 1970s, Brazil began to play that role as well, although by that time the system had already begun a process of decay. Brazil's role in the 1990s would be far more important in terms of the eventual make-up of hemispheric security relations. But thwarting "hemispherism" is not the same as preventing the United States from realizing its own objectives, which it often accomplished through unilateral action or bilateral measures.

Reflecting on this period, both Dominguez (1983) and Mares (1997) note that national interests, not institutions, have been the key determinant in security behavior in the Western Hemisphere. They conclude that despite sporadic attempts to establish

⁴⁷ The IADB (1996) lists the principal documents produced by the Staff: Basic Strategic Plans; IADB Planning Manual; Civil Defense Against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare; Planning for Collective Air Defense of the Continent; Dictionary of Military Terms; Coordination Plan for Defense of Inter-American Maritime Traffic; Military Civic Action; Feasibility Study of Interoperability of Arms and Communications Systems Among the Member Countries of the IADB; Periodic Intelligence Analyses. This work contributed to the interoperability necessary for efficient cooperative security activities.

institutions that move beyond power politics, countries in the region are not ready to trust national interests to such mechanisms. The institutions were built on the fault line that separates the U.S. security agenda from Latin American concerns of sovereignty and non-intervention. All of the security institutions of this period reflected this tension, leaving them largely incapable of ushering in a new era based on military transparency and security cooperation. They would have to be transformed. Consideration of this possibility is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4 HEMISPHERIC COOPERATIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

Comparison of cooperative security institutions at the hemispheric level in the 1990s with those of the Cold War reveals the similarities and differences expected by our hypotheses. On the one hand, we see many of the same behaviors exhibited: the (now) familiar strategies of the United States (assurance; provision of outlets; offer of side payments); the practices of institutional balancing and institutional balancing (the formation of a diplomatic line of resistance). On the other hand, U.S. influence attempts are far less successful in the 1990s than in prior periods. Institutional balancing is easier due to the processes of globalization discussed in Chapter 1. The results of this complicated process of institutional politics is a hemispheric security agenda that diverges from U.S. interests in significant ways.

To demonstrate this process, we ask three questions. How have the organizations that make up the inter-American security system (IASS) changed during the 1990s? Does the evolution of already established organizations and the creation of new ones simply reflect the dynamics of assurance and institutional balancing? Is the fault line of U.S. versus regional priorities still evident in institutional design?

Second, how have the rules for cooperative security evolved? In general terms, are rules binding or voluntary? Are they produced through an inclusive decision-making

process? Are verification mechanisms sufficient to overcome the cooperative dilemmas of cheating, uncertainty and relative gains? More specifically, does the pattern of rule making in the areas of transparency, defense posture and burden sharing reflect institutional politics or an effort to capture absolute gains which otherwise might be unattainable due to dilemmas of cooperation? Finally, are security rules linked to other issue areas in ways that strengthen their prescriptions for behavior or in ways that simply exacerbate institutional politics?

Third, what pattern of cooperative security behavior emerges from the evidence? Is the pattern power-based or rule-based? Does cooperative behavior respond to the promise of absolute gains in the area of security or simply reflect the interest on the part of individual states to maximize relative gains? Is information reported via transparency measures significant? Do defense postures reflect the impact of regime rules? Is burden sharing taking place, especially in the area of transnational security threats?

In this chapter, as we shall see, a hemispheric security regime does emerge from the analysis, but it is incomplete, deeply divided especially in the areas of burden sharing and defensive military postures, and not likely a direct source of cooperative behavior. The regime is not simply a reflection of power, rather it is a child of institutional politics. Liberal institutionalism offers an explanatory model that adds to analysis derived solely from realism.

The cooperative security behavior present in the hemisphere corresponds completely neither with the pattern expected by power considerations, nor with rule based behavior. The evidence points to important variations in geographic subregions. Differences in the degree of transparency primarily, but also in terms of defense postures

and burden sharing, appear across the subregions, inviting a closer look. Those cases are taken up in Chapter 5.

Institutional Evolution

Organizations

This section first examines organizations, both old and new, tracing their evolution towards a new security regime. The analysis begins with the “old” organizations: the OAS, the IADB and the conferences of the armed forces. Next, “new” organizations are considered, specifically the two presidential summits (1994 and 1998) and the three meetings of the defense ministers (1995, 1996 and 1998). The evidence shows substantial evolution in most of the organizations mentioned. Following the analysis of organizational evolution, the focus turns to the rules embedded in the hemispheric security institution. These rules are examined according to the behavior clusters established for a cooperative security regime: transparency/verification, defensive military postures and burden sharing.

Existing organizations

The most important change within the OAS with regard to security cooperation is the creation of an OAS Hemispheric Security Committee. This committee has its origins in the twenty-first regular session of the OAS General Assembly, held in Santiago in 1991. Canada, in its second year of membership, had placed security cooperation on the agenda, specifically the theme of military transparency explicitly linked to reductions in defense expenditures and increased social spending. These ideas had already been discussed in the Contadora Group and were seen to have much relevance to the situation in Central America. Canada – with strong U.S. support – would be joined by Chile,

Argentina and the Central American states as the principal proponents of a transparency regime.

The Committee formed first as a working group, with instructions from the General Assembly to the Permanent Council, in the form of Resolution 1123, “to study and make recommendations on the various aspects of cooperation for hemispheric security.” That report was approved by the Permanent Council during the course of the year.

One of the report’s recommendations was the creation of a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, a step the Permanent Council accomplished in 1992, thus further institutionalizing the study of cooperative security. Although ultimately the Special Committee would gain permanent status,¹ this was not an easy process. The same reluctance to “militarize” the OAS, evident in discussions about the future of the Board in the post-war years, divided the OAS between those anxious to see more military cooperation and those who feared that such cooperation would hand the United States a tool for intervention. Mexico, as in 1945, led opposition to increased hemispheric security cooperation and remained committed to steering the Committee away from developing forms of security cooperation that involve use of the armed forces.

Nowhere is this division more evident than in the discussion and reaction excited by the first attempts to codify cooperative security measures. In 1992, the General

¹In 1995, Permanent Council Resolution 653 approved article 24 to the rules and Procedures of the Permanent Council, which established a Committee on Hemispheric Security “to study and make recommendations to the Permanent Council on any matters relating to hemispheric security that may be entrusted to it ... with a view to promoting cooperation in the field.”

Assembly, in its Resolution 1179, recognized “the opportunity and the need for increased dialogue on and cooperation in security matters, among the nations of the hemisphere, in light of the new international situation.” This spirit led directly to a “Meeting of Experts” on CSBMs (actually mandated by Resolution 1237 in 1993), which was held in Buenos Aires late in 1994. The meeting ultimately produced a draft proposal of measures for possible adoption in the hemisphere.

The project to hold a meeting of experts was undertaken by the Special Committee. The debates that ensued during formulation of an agenda are very instructive. Canada, based on its peacekeeping experiences, suggested focusing on “frameworks, mechanisms, and instruments for guiding and managing relations between states” as a basis for cooperative security. The Mexican contribution clearly objects to the overall enterprise:

... we have as a starting point for our work an undefined and practically nonexistent “new concept of hemispheric security.” Although reference has been made to some “new threats,” by no means agreed upon by all, these threats are not military in nature or origin. The delegation of Mexico has some problems with the Meeting’s approach to its topic, because it is proceeding to draw up a list, or catalog, of military confidence-building measures without having previously identified the military threats that must be reduced or neutralized. (OAS, 1993a)

This tension over what threats should be considered as hemispheric in nature and what cooperative military action those threats should invoke is a consistent theme of the 1990s.

The Committee sponsored numerous specialized conferences, addressing a wide variety of security themes such as terrorism, civil-military relations, small island security (dealing primarily with transnational threats in the Caribbean) and “education for peace”. The conferences dealing with small island security are worth mentioning here, because

they encompassed a broad view of security that goes well beyond traditional concerns of external aggression. Because their small size and enclave economies, the island states of the Caribbean see their security threatened by transnational phenomena such as drug trafficking and the crime and corruption that activity brings with it, natural disasters such as tropical storms which can destroy agricultural products and disrupt the tourist industry, and a globalized economy that can drive rapid changes in relative prices that negatively impact economic development. Such an ample view of security is not shared by the majority of OAS member countries, including the United States, but nevertheless lays out one vision of what security means in the post Cold War environment. Linkage to economic development is also used as a negotiating asset by smaller states.

The most important specialized conferences specifically addressed CSBMs. The Committee organized the First Regional Conference on CSBMs, held in Santiago, which produced the 1995 Santiago Declaration. The Santiago Declaration, the founding document for CSBMs in the hemisphere, contains a list of eleven specific CSBM categories recommended for implementation by member states. Some of these measures urged member state participation in international mechanisms already established.² Other measures bear marked similarity to CSBMs employed in Europe. Still others drew on experiences in the hemisphere, such as the Central American peace process and the CSBMs employed between Argentina and Great Britain after the war in the Falklands/Malvinas.

² For instance, the Declaration urges states to participate in the UN Standard Instrument for Reporting on Military Expenditures, established in 1980, and the UN Registry of Arms Transfers, established in 1993.

A follow-up regional conference on CSBMs took place in 1998 in San Salvador. The declaration from that conference also produced a list of CSBM categories, deepening and expanding the original measures. The specific nature of both of these declarations will be considered in the discussion of the evolution of security rules, following this review of organizations evolution.

The OAS also took a heightened interest in the IADB, financially dependent on the OAS although not included in the Charter. In fact, the relationship between the OAS and the Board consumed the Hemispheric Security Commission during the early years of its existence. In 1992, Resolution 1181, the “Inter-American Defense Board,” tasked the Committee to define the legal-institutional relationship between the Board and the OAS.

After numerous studies, conducted both at the Board and the OAS, no consensus could be reached. The United States supported the Argentine position that the Board be designated as an entity of the OAS.³ But other delegations were leery of introducing such a substantial military element into the OAS. Brazil argued for rechartering the Board as a special organization.⁴ But special organizations only include countries willing to support their operating costs and hence do not offer an appropriate institutional design for a hemispheric organization. Mexico preferred the status quo, meaning the Board would remain outside the OAS Charter. In the end, the status quo was essentially accepted, with

³ What entity status would mean for the IADB is unknown, since the General Assembly would have to provide a charter for the entity in the form of a resolution. The Argentine proposal would have the Board rewrite its regulations and submit them to the Permanent Council for approval.

⁴ The Inter-American Commission of Women is an example.

the important provisos that the status be considered temporary and that the Board not have an operational military function.

This decision was expressed in the 1993 OAS General Assembly Resolution 1240, which stated that:

Provisionally, and until [a] definition is established, the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Council may, based on the criteria of and proper follow-up by those political bodies of the Organization, require from the Inter-American Defense Board advice and the delivery of consultancy services of a technical-military character which in no case may have an operational nature. Such requirements shall be made by the member states directly concerned and be within the framework of the Charter.

This resolution represents yet another compromise that puts limits on military cooperation within hemispheric organizations. Follow-up resolutions have continued to call for a definition of the "legal-institutional linkage," but no additional progress has been made to date.

In 1994, the United States again attempted to bring the Inter-American Defense Board under the OAS, in the form of an "Office of the Military Advisor" within the Secretariat of the OAS. Under the provisions of the draft, the Office would provide military-technical assistance to the OAS, with the Committee likely assuming oversight

of the Inter-American Defense College.⁵ This scheme was basically consistent with a recommendation prepared by the Board staff that same year.⁶

The United States presented its draft resolution on the Board in the context of discussions that eventually led to permanent status for the Committee on Hemispheric Security, thereby creating a permanent defense-related organ under the OAS Charter, something long sought by the United States. But the future of the Board was left unresolved; ultimately the General Assembly adopted language that simply urged continued study on the matter.⁷

Since most of the elements of this debate are over fifty years old, it is not surprising that the Committee was unable to resolve the issue in 1994 or in the years that

⁵ The resolution did not abolish the Board outright, but laid the basis for such a step. The resolution was drafted in the context of discussions about the future of the Inter-American Defense Board, which took place in May 1994 in the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Later, the draft was sent to the Permanent Council (OAS, 1994).

⁶ See the 1994 report by the IADB Staff, *Study of Possible Alternatives to Determine the OAS/IADB Link* (IADB, 1994). The recommendations would have established a military staff in the OAS. No provisions were made for the College. The Council allowed distribution of the document to the College but apparently never forwarded it to the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Nevertheless, dialogue between the two organizations was considerable throughout the 1993-1995 period: Board representatives attended Committee meetings convened on the subject of the Board and the general topic of hemispheric security; Ambassador Patiño Mayer addressed the Board on 12 May 1994 on his Committee's work on the juridical link; the Board submitted answers to a questionnaire developed by the Committee; and the IADB Chairman spoke to the Committee in 1995. There was a generous exchange of ideas on the issue.

⁷ General Assembly Resolution 1285 called for additional studies on the linkage. They were never conducted.

have elapsed since then.⁸ There is no lack of technical studies that address the question of the Board and its position in the Inter-American System. This question is basically one of organizational design: what is the best mechanism for providing military advice/expertise on shared security concerns to OAS member states? Is some sort of a permanent military body with links to the OAS warranted or are ad hoc defense organizations similar to those envisioned by the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty sufficient?

But technical, institutional fixes have always come up short. This is because the issue is primarily a political one that lies along the fault-line of U.S.-LA security policy: how best to institutionalize security cooperation without degrading the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention? This is an issue that invariably attracts institutional balancing.

The end of the Cold War and the consolidation of democracy in the hemisphere brought new considerations to bear on the question. Critics pointed out that the Board, never intended as a permanent organization in any case, had lost its primary mission, the planning and preparation for collective defense of the Continent. Furthermore, the Board had only a weakly institutionalized legal relationship with the OAS and hence little political oversight; it offered a poor model of democratic civil-military relations for a region in the process of consolidating democracy. Finally, the Board, unable to keep

⁸ The 1995 *Report of the Chairman of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security Concerning Cooperation for Hemispheric Security* (OAS, 1995) explains that the question of the Board was dropped in 1995, in order for the Committee to move on and implement the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1240 to access the Board's technical competence.

pace with growing OAS membership in the 1990s, represented little more than half of the 34 states in the inter-American system (the number excludes Cuba).⁹ In an era of constrained budgets, non-member states questioned why the Board was supported from the OAS regular fund instead of through contributions from its members (as is the case with specialized agencies of the OAS). In counterpoint, some delegations recognized that the Board was responsible for important functions that would go unperformed in its absence unless other hemispheric organizations could be redesigned.¹⁰

In this context, the Board, prompted by the United States, took important steps towards forging a new relationship with the OAS. In the first place, the Board membership has been expanded. At the time of the Board's creation, its membership included every independent American republic (with the exception of Canada). That membership matched the list of signatories to the Rio Treaty, which was later adopted as a membership requirement. As former dependencies became sovereign states, the Board ceased to be representative of the Americas. In 1991, the Board dropped the Rio Treaty

⁹ At the time of these debates (1993-1994) the Board would have had 21 members, of which 17 were active.

¹⁰ Notes from the 3 May 1994 Committee Meeting lay out national positions in some detail. Most of the discussion dealt with alternative institutional designs for the Board that would bring it within the Charter of the OAS. Argentina proposed that the Board be designated as an Entity, with support from Antigua and Barbuda, Chile, Peru and the United States (although two days later the U.S. draft proposal mentioned above was presented). Brazil proposed that the Board be a Special Organization, with support from Ecuador and Mexico (although Mexico preferred to maintain the status quo while awaiting studies of the other hemispheric security institutions). These positions roughly correspond to those reported by Board delegations in 1993. A detailed analysis of these alternatives and others was presented by the Board (IADB, 1993; IADB, 1994).

as a requirement¹¹ and in the next five years four Caribbean states joined: Trinidad and Tobago (already a Rio Treaty signatory), Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Guyana.¹² Surinam's application for membership was accepted but the government never installed a Chief of Delegation. Recently, the return of representatives from the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua has given the Board even broader coverage.¹³ This is not a bad

¹¹ The arguments for dropping the requirements, presented by the Peruvian delegation, offer an early glimpse of the pressure that some delegations felt to make the Board relevant in the post Cold War period. With seventeen countries in the OAS outside of the Rio Treaty, the Peruvian delegation argued that the Board in reality only represented half the Inter-American System. Peru favored opening up admission in order to "transform the IADB, to give it new agility, so that no one can say we serve no purpose. We have been the driving force behind the change to ensure that we do not lose our present effect, and we said, on more than one occasion, that if we do not change, we will be running the risk of dying." See *IADB Minutes to Session 991 (5 July, 1991)*, doc. C-2730 (pp. 15-17).

¹² But the inclusion of Caribbean states continues to be resisted by some of the original members of the Board, albeit indirectly. In 1998, the Council refused to modify its mission statement by changing the word "continent" to "hemisphere", a change which had been requested by the senior Caribbean delegate present. Chile, and others, argued that the term "continent" included the surrounding waters and islands of the American mainland. The resistance to the Caribbean states goes beyond semantics – it may stem from an unwillingness on the part of some to identify the Board with the broad range of security issues promoted by the Caribbean members.

¹³ Nicaraguan representation lapsed from 1989-1999. In 1989, its representative left the Board in the aftermath of Council deliberations over whether or not to characterize Nicaragua as a "threat" to the inter-American system. Dominican representation lapsed from 1990 to 1997 for reasons that are not clear.

record, considering the fairly recent nature of OAS expansion and the natural limits to expansion by the Board.¹⁴

Second, the Board approved a dramatic change in its mission statement – an explicit acknowledgement of its political subordination to the OAS. Resolution 1240 systematized the ways in which the OAS and its member states could request "advice and consultancy services" from the Board and stipulated that such assistance not be of an "operational" nature.¹⁵ But it did not restrict the Board's activities directly. It was the Board's 1995 mission revision that, by adopting Resolution 1240 as its terms of reference, limited the Board's scope of action.¹⁶ This step was strengthened further by the 1998 revision of Board regulations, which added a new Article 2 restricting the scope of the Board's mission to resolutions of the General Assembly and the Meetings of

¹⁴ At this point, all countries with fully consisted defense forces are members of the Board, with the exception of Canada, Belize and Jamaica. Canada sends students to the College and has periodically considered joining the Board. Indications now are that Canada will await the results of the current review of hemispheric security and institutions.

¹⁵ Demining is a possible exception. Supervision is conducted under an operating headquarters in Central America. But this function enjoys broad legitimacy and has not been seriously challenged.

¹⁶ The current mission statement, approved in 1995, reads: "The IADB advises the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Council of the OAS by means of its proposal and works in matters of a military natures; acts as an organ of planning and preparation for the defense of the American Continent; and performs advisory functions within its competence with a view towards contributing to the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent." This mission statement breaks significantly with previous versions in only one important measure -- for the first time, the Board's mission statement links it directly to the OAS instead of directly to its member states.

Consultation. For all intents and purposes, the Board is now under the "civilian" control of the OAS.¹⁷

Third, the Board has adopted a post Cold War security agenda. This focus emerged naturally and not as a result of the OAS reexamination of hemispheric security. The long anticipated end of the Cold War sparked Board studies dating back to the 1980s on subjects as disparate as terrorism, drug trafficking, peacekeeping and corruption. But the formal acknowledgement of the end of the Board's Cold War mission came in 1992. That year's strategic estimate rejected as implausible any external threat to the hemisphere and instead focused on new, "transnational" threats. In early 1993, in light of the absence of a clear external threat, the standing defense plans of the Board were abrogated by the Council of Delegates. In the revised mission statement, the phrase "collective defense" has been dropped.

The Council's focus then shifted to "non-traditional threats" ranging from terrorism, to drug trafficking, to natural disasters – topics that had already been under study in the Staff for some time. But formal inclusion of "non-traditional threats" on the Board's agenda came only after much dissension, primarily but not exclusively centered on the Mexican delegation, and was later removed. The United States, in an effort to move forward collectively to address these areas, initiated a broad review of the Board's mission and activities. In the context of the review, the phrase "non-traditional threat"

¹⁷ There are those who would trap the Board in a paradox -- any move by the Board to subordinate itself to the OAS is in fact evidence of autonomy. Theoretically, the Board could reverse field by changing its mission and its regulations again -- but such action would require a two-thirds approval of all member states, who would certainly be acting on instructions from their governments on these important issues.

was eliminated, to the delight of the Mexican delegation. The U.S. intent had been to develop new goals and objectives that move the Board more aggressively into the areas of peacekeeping, natural disaster relief, humanitarian operations, drug interdiction – in short, into areas of high priority to the U.S. government.

With the exception of humanitarian demining, all of these U.S. initiatives have been resisted by balancers. U.S. led efforts at the 1999 OAS General Assembly to include the Board on a new OAS committee on natural disasters were defeated by Mexico, which threatened at one point to recommend the inclusion of a Caribbean natural disaster organization chaired by a Cuban representative.¹⁸ A U.S. initiative to update the Board's peacekeeping manual, standardize training and establish the IADB as node for sharing peacekeeping experiences was defeated without debate in the Council by the Brazilian delegation, despite that country's deep commitment to UN peacekeeping operations and training programs and exercises related to those operations.¹⁹ And a

¹⁸ The Board was also asked by the United Nations in 1994 to assume responsibilities as regional coordinator for the use of military assets in support of disaster relief operations. However, the OAS never clarified the Board's role in this area under the terms of reference of Resolution 1240 and this request still lies dormant. Within the Board, efforts to widen participation in an inventory of military assets for disaster relief operations went unheeded (only five countries participate -- Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Mexico and Peru -- and the level of participation did not change as a result of the committee's work).

¹⁹ Debate also ensued over Board participation in U.S. sponsored peacekeeping exercises in 1998 when the U.S. Southern Command changed its policy of inviting Board officials to participate in the role of outside observers. The new policy required Board observers to actually participate in the exercise, either as role players or members of the exercise staff. Brazil, along with other delegations, objected vehemently to this change which some believed to imply an "operational" role for the Board in peacekeeping. Ultimately, however, the Board moved forward in both of these programs.

vigorous debate over the extent of Board involvement in counterdrug activities prompted by Mexico limited activity to attending conferences and conducting studies. By contrast, the Board has been very involved with the demining effort in Central America, in close collaboration with the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD).²⁰ Part of the reason for the success is undoubtedly because this operation is not hemispheric in nature – it is limited to a particular geographic region and the countries that provide demining supervisors.²¹ Another reason may be the clear subordination of this effort to the OAS.

Fourth, the Board has become more responsive to the OAS, under the terms of Resolution 1240.²² Work has been productive in areas that the OAS acknowledges an important military component: demining and confidence and security building measures. Based on a 1995 request of assistance from the OAS Permanent Council, the Board compiled an inventory of CSBMs adopted in the hemisphere from submissions by some member countries. This has evolved into an annual service the Board provides to the

²⁰ The UPD was established on October 15, 1990, to support democratic development by helping member countries strengthen their political institutions and democratic procedures.

²¹ The IADB supports the UPD demining program by providing military supervisors from throughout the Americas to monitor operations conducted by host nation militaries in the countries of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The headquarters for the IADB supervisors, based for most of the 1990s in Danli, Honduras, is known by its Spanish acronym MARMINCA (Assistance Mission for the Removal of Mines in Central America).

²² Even prior to Resolution 1240, the Board tried to demonstrate its relevance to the OAS. In the 1990s, Board officers verified missile holdings in Nicaragua in conjunction with CIAV and conducted an in-country evaluation of disaster preparedness in Grenada. The verification mission was taken without the approval of the Board's Council of Delegates, which certainly would have blocked it.

OAS Security Committee (Mexico submits its declared data on CSBMs directly to the OAS). In fact, the work of the Staff has gradually begun to merge with the Committee's work plan.²³ Clearly, much more activity would be possible if broader requests were drafted and approved by the Permanent Council. But because of the consensual nature of decision-making at the OAS, it is unlikely that the volume or scope of requests for assistance will increase.

Fifth, the Board has taken measures to bring its operating costs within the restricted budget provided by the OAS.²⁴ Because the IADB must justify actual and planned expenditures each year to the OAS Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Matters, it is vulnerable to attacks on its budget. Mexico has led the charge, with the United States organizing a defense for the Board's budget with other delegations at the OAS.

Sixth, the College curriculum and class composition have evolved in ways consistent with new thinking on security. More emphasis is placed on positive civil-military relations. The College is collaborating with the OAS "Education for Peace" program (Board involvement was blocked by Mexico). An important exercise simulation has been included which trains students on the intricacies of developing inter-agency and

²³ Although, the Board still occasionally acts on direct requests by its member states. In 1999, the Staff developed a study on natural disaster remediation in response to a motion by the Honduran delegation.

²⁴ For instance, the civilian staff today consists of one-fourth the number of the personnel employed at the Board ten years ago. Through a combination of outsourcing, automation and use of military personnel (with salaries paid by member countries), the Board has maintained minimum administrative and logistic support to the Staff and College.

international solutions to multidimensional security problems (this was questioned by both Brazil and Mexico). Finally, more civilians and more representatives of non-military security agencies are attending the College.

Taken together, these trends mark a significant transformation in the Board. But despite an aggressive campaign to bring the Board in line with the OAS,²⁵ its legal basis is still challenged, its limited budget questioned and its mandates restricted and it has become a major battlefield for the institutional politics that mark U.S.-Latin American relations in the security field.

New institutional structures

The 1990s have seen a number of new institutions that address aspects of hemispheric security in ways that are consistent with the trend seen in the evolution of the older organizations. These new institutions include the presidential summit and defense ministerial processes, both put into motion by the United States.

While security has never been the focus of the presidential summits, security issues are nonetheless discussed. The Miami Summit plan of action specifically addressed the need to develop cooperative approaches to fight narcotrafficking and terrorism. There was also explicit support in the plan of action for an evolving regime of CSBMs and for the first CSBM conference held in Santiago. For all of these items, the 1994 summit referred action to the OAS.

²⁵ The goal of maintaining a positive relationship with the OAS and with individual OAS delegations was formally adopted by the Board as a key institutional objective in 1996. For several years, the Board has been on a campaign to demonstrate its relevance. It is worth noting that an organization that has to argue for its relevance has probably already lost it.

The 1998 Santiago Summit addressed CSBMs more directly, singling out transparency measures, particularly those that might lead to reduction and control of military expenditures. Importantly, the action plan also gave support to several items that fall within the burden-sharing category: peacekeeping operations, demining, search and rescue and cooperative programs to deal with natural disasters. It also deepened the degree of hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism and narcotrafficking with a long list of specific requirements.

The meetings of the Defense Ministers of the Americas (DMA) were initiated in 1995 by the United States to provide an opportunity to discuss defense issues at the ministerial level. To date, there have been three DMAs, each reviewed briefly below.²⁶ Mexico, virtually alone in the hemisphere this time, has not elected to join the DMA process. A representative from the Mexican foreign ministry attends in observer status.

In general, there are four themes that consistently appear in the DMAs: military transparency, civil-military affairs, burden sharing against transnational threats and strengthening hemispheric security institutions. Every DMA has touched on these themes. The lead theme and the precise topics vary, although the focus of any of the DMAs is sometimes only obvious with hindsight. Each successive DMA, however, has been less successful in developing consensus on hemispheric security.

The 1995 Declaration of Williamsburg presented a list of principles addressing the role of the armed forces in democratic polities. The Williamsburg principles establish the preservation of democracy as the basis for ensuring mutual security, support

²⁶ The fourth DMA is slated for Brasilia in the year 2000.

the critical role of the armed forces in defense matters, affirm the norm of civilian control of the military, advocate increased transparency of defense matters, adopt confidence and security building measures, and promote greater defense cooperation in peacekeeping operations and the fight against narcoterrorism.²⁷

In the working groups these themes were developed in detail. Several observations stand out. Transparency measures specifically addressed included the UN arms transfer registry, communication in border areas and prior announcement of bilateral and multilateral exercises. Burden sharing themes specifically addressed included peacekeeping, demining, natural disasters and the fight against narcotrafficking – although the extent of military involvement in the drug fight was the subject of debate and disagreement. Reductions in defense postures was not a popular theme – in fact the common sentiment expressed was the necessity to maintain defense establishments to ensure national security – but the generalized reductions that had been ongoing for several years were recognized, and explicitly connected to progress in achieving military transparency.

U.S. involvement was critical to this initiative and lent special support in the area of transparency. The U.S. major policy initiative was the presentation of its defense “white paper” – the annual Defense Department report to Congress. By 1999, five other countries in the hemisphere had published white papers (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile

²⁷ A term which clearly denotes a link between the drug trade and guerrilla movements – a position that still excites heated debate among some, but is increasingly accepted.

and El Salvador). Many others had made comprehensive policy statements at conferences sponsored by the hemispheric institutions we are reviewing.

The Bariloche and Cartagena DMAs were less comprehensive. The Bariloche DMA took place in Argentina in 1996. The Bariloche Declaration expresses support for consolidation of democracy, the need to cooperate in security matters, continued support for CSBMs and an endorsement of peacekeeping operations. Transparency measures singled out for mention included expanded military-to-military contacts, support for the UN arms transfer registry and exchange of information in the conferences of the armed forces.

But the major focus was the issue of civilian empowerment, training civilians to be responsible stewards of their armed forces. The Inter-American Defense College and the U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) were cited as vehicles to help train civilians in defense-related matters. The CHDS, now into its second year of classes, has growing participation from throughout the hemisphere. However, it was initially viewed with skepticism by many countries. Some observations at the DMA and later at the IADB contained little veiled critiques of U.S. attempts to advance its security agenda through yet another security institution, hemispheric in mission, if not in organizational character. Initial plans in the United States to eventually multilateralize the organization have apparently been dropped.

The third DMA took place in Cartagena in November 1998. Although no major multilateral agreements were reached at the meeting, the region's defense ministers did agree to continue working towards military transparency and cooperation. The defense ministers heard from many of the subregions of the Americas where security transparency

and cooperation have taken root. Countries in these regions made joint presentations – the Guatemalan representative covered security institution building in Central America; the Venezuelan representative presented on the growing border cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela; and the Chilean representative made a similar presentation on Chilean-Argentine cooperation. The fact that these were joint presentations and that they offered concrete examples of security cooperation is significant. This offered a hint of the degree to which security cooperation was now present in the hemisphere, as well as an indication that cooperation “clumps” in specific geographic subregions. These trends will be further developed when we discuss regime effectiveness.

In spite of these important presentations, the DMA made only incremental progress towards advancing burden sharing in the hemisphere, a theme that was the logical next step for the DMA process, given the advances at Williamsburg and Bariloche in transparency and civil-military relations. The United States made a presentation on terrorism and Peru presented on narcotrafficking and both of these threats were included in the final declaration, along with the problem of small arms, natural disasters and landmines. However, the declaration and working group papers endorse no concrete steps to enhance security. Ironically, given the setting of the DMA, mention of the threat of drugs was absent in the final draft of the declaration considered at the closing session. The Colombian defense ministers, presiding over the proceeding, added a general reference to the declaration at the closing bell.

U.S. support for the Cartagena DMA was considerable and included heavy involvement in preparation of the agenda. The U.S. delegation and support team in Cartagena, numbering over one hundred, dwarfed representation from other countries.

The final declaration mentions support for a convention requiring notification of major arms transfers within 90 days of entry into inventory, a transparency initiative sponsored by the United States that would be finalized in 1999. But the only concrete new measure that emerged was a U.S. offer, cosponsored by Chile, to hold a special working meeting on the preparation of defense white papers.

The last "new" institution to be considered here is the Group of Rio, a permanent mechanism for "political consultation and consensus" among Latin American and Caribbean countries that grew out of the Contadora Group in the 1980s.²⁸ It is interesting to review some of the recent work of the Rio Group, since that organization does not include the United States.

The original purpose of the Group was to promote peace and stability in Central America, by "avoiding any further internationalization of the regional civil wars" and "preventing unilateral U.S. military intervention in the region" (Rojas, 1994, p. 183). Over the course of time, the security agenda expanded at each annual meeting. By 1998, the agenda included most of the security themes addressed by the OAS. In this forum, however, security issues tended to be more overtly linked to economic development (Rojas, 1994). While no concrete actions have been implemented as a result of the work of the Rio Group, positions developed there help strengthen bargaining leverage in the OAS, especially with the United States.

²⁸ Created in 1986, the Rio Group originally consisted of the four Contadora countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) and the four members of the support group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Chile). By 1998, the Group had added Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and two rotating members which represent Central America and the Caribbean.

Summary

The consistent fault line that divides the hemisphere – the U.S. security agenda vs. concerns of sovereignty from other countries of the region – means that security institutions rest on a shaky foundation. Under these conditions, realism expects that Latin American states will under-invest in hemispheric institutions and hemispheric security institutions are unlikely to function unless sponsored by the United States and subservient to U.S. security interests.

What has emerged from our study of the evolution of security institutions? First, that an expanding network of new and remade organizations is remarkably active in the security field. For the most part, they overlap membership and are mutual reinforcing. The renewal process at the OAS led to the creation of a Committee on Hemispheric Security, built along the same fault line that the Board has had to straddle for its entire existence. The challenges encountered by the Committee seem familiar. But the Committee overcame its critics and became an active focal point in the OAS for security issues. The Board evolved away from its planning mission to assume a supporting role to the Committee. Creation of new organizations outside of the OAS for the most part furthered collaborative approaches. It is difficult to describe this process of institution creation as “under-investment.”

The second conclusion is that while almost all of the organizations relied on substantial US support, their evolution did not always reflect U.S. preferences. Institutional balancing prevented the full incorporation of the IADB under the OAS. Furthermore, the security priorities that emerged did not always match U.S. concerns;

this is most apparent in the resistance to organize military responses to meet transnational threats. We will address this theme in more detail in the following section.

On balance, then, the evidence casts doubt on the realist hypotheses. There is simply too much strength to this overlapping set of institutions (although not unified) and too much resilience in its resistance to adopting a strong burden sharing dimension. With that, let us proceed on to the next task, examining the evolution of regime rules.

Regime Rules

Introduction

The purpose of this section is to complete our construction of the hemispheric security regime by specifying the rules that govern behavior in the areas of military transparency and verification, burden sharing, and defense postures. As we consider the evolution of these rules, produced by their associated institutions, we will look to see if they simply reflect the processes of institutional bargaining or in fact are designed to facilitate cooperative behavior. We will also look to see if they require binding commitments from states and involve substantive areas. Finally, we will be alert the degree of linkage to other issue areas.

As we shall see, the rules regarding transparency and verification include sharing information on arms transfers, defense budgets and strategy, prior notification of exercises, programs of visits and exchanges at military bases and other installations, and CSBM conferences in a variety of settings. Rules regarding burden sharing are less well developed, but include use of military assets to respond to natural disasters, coordination to avoid and react to transportation accidents and incidents, border contacts, small island

security issues and support for humanitarian operations such as demining. Rules on defense postures include strong support for civilian control of the military, encouragement to maintain defense structures at the lowest level consistent with national security, elimination of weapons of mass destruction from Latin America, and removing and banning the production, use and stockpiling of landmines. The rules, associated norms and procedures are presented in Table 4-4, at the end of this section, as a reference while we consider each of these areas in turn.

Transparency/verification

Concern in the OAS over measures designed to promote military transparency began in 1991. At the General Assembly in Santiago that year, member states approved Resolution 1123, "Cooperation for Security in the Hemisphere," which called for the "adoption of measures to ensure hemispheric security" and advocated "mechanisms of mutual consultation and an exchange of regional information."

This commitment was reiterated a year later at the General Assembly in Managua. The Declaration of Managua includes a commitment to continuing and expanding the dialogue on hemispheric security among the member states. Resolution 1179, "Cooperation for Security and Development in the Hemisphere," called for timely communication and exchange of information, prior notification of exercises, and support of member nation participation in the UN arms transfer and defense expenditures registries.

In a follow-up resolution in 1993, member states added a new transparency measure: exchange of information on defense strategies (white papers). That year's General Assembly also included a specific resolution on the UN registries (Resolution

1238, "Information on Defense Spending and Register of Conventional Arms") which urged compliance with the UN registries and identified the purpose of the register to promote reductions in conventional arms. In 1994, a follow-on resolution added the provision that the information provided in the UN registries and contained in documents on defense strategies be exchanged at the OAS and discussed among member states.

The year 1994 also saw the first General Assembly resolution entitled "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Region." The resolution recommended adoption of CSBMs "at the appropriate level" and charged the Permanent Council with compiling a CSBM inventory – a task that was later handed to the IADB.

A long series of declarations, reports, and resolutions from various commissions, committees, and conferences of the OAS, the IADB, the Presidential Summits and the DMAs has encouraged participation in CSBMs by member states. Just as importantly, the effort has produced a set of standard CSBMs, developed report formats, established a reporting calendar and identified a group of experts in the hemisphere for consultation on CSBM issues.

The most important conference during this period of institutionalization was the First Regional Conference of CSBMs, which took place in Santiago de Chile, in 1995. The Santiago Declaration prioritized the need to identify the "risks, threats and challenges facing the Americas on the threshold of the next millennium" and the need to promote an international climate of confidence, trust and peace based on cooperation.

More importantly, the Declaration contained a list of eleven specific CSBM categories recommended for implementation by member states, building on the work

accomplished in the CSBM Meeting of Experts the previous year. The Santiago Declaration marks the first effort to fully codify CSBMs and categorize them by type.

The Santiago measures are listed in Table 4-1. Although the CSBMs identified in this document and developed over time include rules addressing burden sharing and defense posture, the major impact at the hemispheric level has been to promote transparency and search for means to verify that transparency.

Table 4-1: CSBMs in the Declaration of Santiago

- a) Gradual adoption of agreements for the advance notice of military exercises.
- b) Exchange of information and participation of all member states in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Standardized Instrument for Reporting of Military Expenditures.
- c) Promotion of the development and exchange of information concerning defense policies and doctrines.
- d) Consideration of a consultation process with a view to proceeding towards limitation and control of conventional weapons.
- e) Agreements on invitation of observers to military exercises, visits to military installations, arrangements for observing routine operations and exchange of civilian and military personnel for regular and advanced training.
- f) Meetings and activities to prevent incidents and increase security for transport by land, sea, and air.
- g) Cooperation programs in the event of natural disasters or to prevent such disasters, based on the request and authorization of the affected states.
- h) Development and establishment of communications among civilian or military authorities of neighboring countries in accordance with their border situation.
- i) Holding of seminars and courses, and studies on mutual confidence and security building measures and policies to promote confidence involving the participation of civilians and military personnel, and on the special security concerns of small island states.
- j) High-level meetings on the special security concerns of small island states.
- k) Education programs for peace.

Transparency measures include advance notification on military exercises, which aims to reduce uncertainty by alerting neighbors to maneuvers near border regions. But no thresholds or specifications are established for size, duration, location or type of exercise to be reported. No mechanism is identified for this purpose at the hemispheric level, although the Board could serve as an appropriate venue for exercise

announcements. The details are left to countries to work out among themselves. As we shall see in Chapter 5, some subregions have developed institutionalized mechanisms that specify detail and reporting procedures.

The UN registries, long a favorite in CSBM discussions in the OAS, are singled out for special mention. Those registries are well established, with specific reporting procedures and calendars. Work is underway in the OAS to refine the registry formats to make them more compatible to levels of spending and types of arms transfers common in Latin America, but those refinements have yet to be completed. Since the adoption of the Santiago measures, an additional transparency measure has evolved in the OAS that enhances the UN arms registry. That new measure, endorsed at the 1999 General Assembly, requires notification of arms transfers within 90 days of entry into inventory.

In some subregions, this effort has proceeded farther. Argentina and Chile, for instance, have commissioned a study to harmonize their reporting mechanisms to enhance mutual transparency. The Central American countries have moved on to adopt more specific weapons registries. Once again, we see evidence emerging that demonstrates the progress possible at the subregional level.

Exchange of defense policies and doctrines, the subject of "white" papers, is the third measure. While efforts to standardize the format for this measure are ongoing, no standard has yet emerged. As noted earlier, the United States and Chile pledged at the third DMA to hold a workshop on this issue.

Leaving the fourth measure aside for a moment, which deals with defense postures, the fifth measure promotes personnel exchanges. These programs encourage transparency. Perhaps more critically, they provide a decentralized network of

verification between participating countries. In fact, this is the only measure that contains a verification mechanism of any kind. Together, these four measures make up the heart of rule making in the transparency and verification.

Although we will address burden sharing and defense postures in separate sections, for the sake of continuity measures for those sectors listed in the Santiago Declaration are considered now. The first burden sharing measure cited relates to prevention of transportation incidents. In air and sea maneuvers, this measure has a long history of interoperability and coordination. A body of international agreements and standing operating procedures govern military cooperation in these areas. However, there is little to no experience or established regulatory procedures for ground transportation.

Another burden sharing measure listed in the Santiago Declaration includes the only "transnational" threat that merits specific mention as a CSBM category: natural disasters. There are no specific provisions mentioned for cooperative programs to address this threat, although, as we shall see, some subregions have developed such provisions. The CSBM urging consideration of the security concerns of small island states rightly belongs to burden sharing, since almost all of those security concerns are transnational in nature – smuggling of drugs and armaments, organized crime, and natural phenomena.

The last measure that can be considered belonging to the burden-sharing category is development and establishment of communications systems along the border. This measure is a mechanism that potentially supports both transparency and burden sharing.

Since, as we shall later see, most of the communications involve sharing intelligence about border security activities, I have included it in the burden-sharing sector.

The only measure that directly addresses defense postures is a weak endorsement to develop arms control measures. There is no specificity regarding types of weapons systems or types of control measures. The other measures that affect defense postures deal primarily with civilian control over the armed forces – CSBM conferences involving military and civilians and the education for peace program.

Education for Peace is a wide-ranging program of civic education to promote the peaceful resolution of differences within and between groups in both government and civil society. Approaches range from basic instruction in matters such as negotiation techniques and crisis management, to longer-term programs aimed at fostering cooperative attitudes through primary education and other media. Since the goal is to replace military power as an instrument to resolve differences, I have included this security cooperation rule under the rubric of defense postures.

In any case, there is still no consensus on what an OAS Education for Peace program would look like. Predictably, much of the disagreement centers on the extent that military organizations might be involved. Clearly, promotion of positive civil-military relations falls under the umbrella of education for peace, but there is great reluctance to ask any of the hemispheric military organizations to participate.

The Committee on Hemispheric Security was charged to develop a resolution on Education for Peace for the 1998 General Assembly, leading to a Meeting of Experts on the topic to be held in 1999. Several delegations – including the United States,

Nicaragua, and Argentina – wanted to include a call to the IADB to make contributions to the effort. The refusal of Mexico to accept such a statement led the Venezuelan delegation to suggest a compromise, which was ultimately accepted, to omit mention of the Board and limit the request to the Inter-American Defense College.

In the course of the debate, the Mexican delegation reaffirmed its position that the Inter-American Defense Board not be considered part of the hemispheric security system. Mexico termed the inclusion of a reference to the College, after all a subordinate organization of the Board, a "constructive ambiguity" which allowed member countries to read what they wanted into the phrase and thereby support the declaration by consensus.

The Second Regional Conference on CSBMs took place in 1998 in San Salvador. The declaration from that conference also produced a list of CSBM categories. Table 4-2 lists those measures. Most of the measures deepened CSBMs already in place, adding rigor and specificity. There are some measures that are basically new, although they do not introduce new themes into the regime; involvement of legislators in CSBMs and cooperation to deal with problems of sea transport of nuclear waste are two examples.

Other items of interest in the San Salvador Declaration include recognition of the value of the conferences of the armed forces and the meetings of the defense ministers (thus formally linking these sets of institutions with the OAS), a recommendation that the Hemispheric Security Committee complete a program on Education for Peace, and a request that the Santiago Presidential Summit task the OAS to hold a meeting on hemispheric security and the architecture of the IASS (which it did, as we saw earlier).

The 1998 CSBM resolution reiterated the call for member states to adopt measures in both the Santiago and San Salvador Declarations and continued to add

specificity to mechanisms for reporting. The calendar for submissions of declared data, first established by the General Assembly in 1996, has now grown crowded, but wherever possible submission dates have been standardized with other reporting requirements that countries may have, both at the OAS and the UN.

Table 4-2: CSBMs in the Declaration of San Salvador

- a) Encourage contact and cooperation among legislators on confidence building measures and on matters of peace and hemispheric security, including conferences, the exchange of visits, and a meeting of parliamentarians, in order to strengthen its process;
- b) Extend to diplomatic training institutes, military academies, research centers, and universities the seminars, courses, and studies envisioned in the Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador on confidence and security building measures, disarmament, and other issues related to peace and hemispheric security, with participation in those activities by government, civilian and military officials and by civil society;
- c) Identify and carry out activities promoting cooperation among neighboring countries along their border regions;
- d) Promote the exchange of information, inter alia, through the publication of books on defense or official documents, as appropriate, permitting greater transparency with respect to the defense policies of each country, and on the organization, structure, size, and composition of the armed forces;
- e) In order to promote transparency, and with technical support from the appropriate international economic agencies, encourage the carrying out of studies for establishing a common methodology in order to facilitate the comparison of military expenditures in the region, taking into account, inter alia, the United Nations Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures;
- f) Develop a cooperation program to address the concerns raised by maritime transport of nuclear and other waste, and to cooperate and coordinate in the relevant international fora to strengthen standards governing such transport and its safety;
- g) Continue supporting the efforts of the small island states to address their special security concerns, including those of an economic, financial and environmental nature, taking into consideration their vulnerability and level of development;
- h) Improve and broaden the information submitted by the member states to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, so as to enhance the hemisphere's contribution to pursuing the aims of that register, in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly; and
- i) Continue consultations and the exchange of ideas within the Hemisphere to advance the limitation and control of conventional weapons in the region.

It is important to note what was left out of the San Salvador Declaration. Early drafts of the Declaration included calls to evaluate the effectiveness of CSBMs in place;

add new verification measures, such as demonstrations of newly acquired weapons and a program of visits to military bases; develop a detailed plan of action for implementation of the CSBMs in force; and address more forms of burden sharing, including peacekeeping. All of these innovations, drafted by the Salvadorans with input from other delegations, were ultimately rejected. Since many of the items rejected aimed to strengthen reporting and verification procedures, it is fair to conclude that there are limits to the degree of intrusiveness that states will tolerate from an international regime – especially one that includes the United States with its well-publicized (and dramatized) verification technologies.

Other hemispheric organizations have echoed the call for more transparency, as was noted in the review of the Presidential Summits and the DMAs. The overlapping and mutually reinforcing nature of the organizations helps strengthen the system. A good example of how this procedure develops can be seen by comparing the Declarations of San Salvador and Santiago, point by point. As Table 4-3 shows, many of the San Salvador measures deepen or further develop those of Santiago.

Table 4-3: Comparison of the Santiago and San Salvador Declarations

Sector	Santiago – 1995	San Salvador - 1998	Observations
Trans- parency	Prior notification of military exercises.		No new developments.
	Exchange of information regarding arms transfers and military expenditures.	Stimulate studies to establish a common methodology to compare defense expenditures in the hemisphere. Request that information be provided to the OAS.	Beginning process to refine UN registries.
	Exchange of information regarding defense doctrine and policy.	Adds detail to the documents: information on organization, structure, size and composition of armed forces.	Adds specificity.
Veri- fication	Exchanges of observers/students and visits to military exercises and installations.		No new developments.
Burden Sharing	Activities to prevent incidents and increase security for transport by land, sea and air.	Develop a program of cooperation to deal with sea transport of nuclear waste.	Adds new dimension
	Cooperative programs for disaster relief prevention and remediation.		No new developments.
	Improved communications in situations involving border problems.	Identify and develop activities that promote cooperation between neighboring countries in their border regions.	Add cooperation to injunction to develop communications systems.
	High-level meetings on the special concerns of small island states.	Support small island state security, including economic, financial and environmental concerns.	Adds new dimensions.

Table 4-3 -- continued

Sector	Santiago – 1995	San Salvador - 1998	Observations
Defense Posture	Hold talks to develop procedures to limit/control conventional weapons.	Continue discussions to advance conventional arms control in the region.	No new developments.
	Education programs for peace.	Stimulate contacts and cooperation between legislators about CSBMs.	Adds another governmental sector.
	Seminars/courses on CSBMs, especially involving military and civilian personnel.	Hold seminars, course and studies in diplomatic institutes, military academies, research centers and universities on CSBMs, security, and disarmament, with participation of civilian and military officials and civil society.	Lists specific venues where CSBMs discussions are to take place. Broadens participation to include elements of civil society.

In sum, then, the transparency regime is well developed. It is not binding and does not include strong measures for verification, despite OAS experience in that area.²⁹ Nevertheless, the verification mechanism that does exist – a network of reciprocal exchanges between neighboring states – is operable. As we shall see, it is more effective at the subregional than the hemispheric level.

²⁹ The OAS Commission on Inspection and Verification (CIAV) in Central America was created to verify the demobilization and disarming pursuant to the UN peacekeeping missions that helped implement the peace agreement in Central America in the early 1990s. Specific tasks included the physical verification of the destruction of arms caches and reductions in the sizes of military forces, both state and guerrilla.

Defense Postures

The rules guiding defense postures are less institutionalized at the hemispheric level than those in the area of transparency. Here, we will consider the regional nuclear weapons regime and efforts at conventional arms control.

The international nuclear regime contains one instrument that is based in Latin America – the Treaty of Tlatelolco, formally known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which began to evolve after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The following year, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador began negotiations to prevent the prospect of a nuclear confrontation in Latin America. From this emerged the Treaty of Tlatelolco, opened for signature in 1967, which prohibits the testing, production, possession or acquisition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Aside from the many binding articles that apply to the regional parties, the Treaty of Tlatelolco also contains two protocols that bind consenting extra-regional states. Protocol I obligates all states with territorial interests in the region to keep Latin America a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Protocol II requires all nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty “not to use or threaten to use” nuclear weapons against the contracting parties to the protocol. The Treaty of Tlatelolco also includes an explicit provision for “challenge inspections” (in addition to the safeguards of the IAEA) to verify compliance with the treaty.

Numerous OAS resolutions have given the Treaty considerable support. At the 1992 General Assembly, the heads of delegation approved Resolution 1179, which pledged member states to “prevent all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” A series of resolutions on “Consolidating the Regime Established by the

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean”

counted down the number of states still outside of the treaty.³⁰ As mentioned in Chapter 1, until 1994 the Treaty did not include the four countries in Latin America most likely to proliferate in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. Membership has now grown to include all of Latin American and the Caribbean, including Cuba, making this treaty the broadest security treaty in the region.

Success in the area of conventional arms control has been far less successful, despite the hemispheric consensus on the principle of limiting arms holdings. The vast majority of resolutions relating to hemispheric security include reference to the desire to reduce arms holdings and expenditures, based on the belief that reductions would “enhance the security of states” thus “reducing the risk of regional conflicts” and hence allow more funding of economic development. Transparency is almost invariably linked conventional arms control and there is some evidence to suggest that it does create a climate which makes reductions possible.³¹

Numerous resolutions address conventional arms control directly, beginning in 1992 with Resolution 1179, which contained several important pledges:

1. “avoid excessive or destabilizing accumulations and transfers of conventional arms”
2. maintain only sufficient military capabilities for self-defense and fulfillment of international commitments

³⁰ OAS Resolutions 1239 (1995), 1355 (1996), 1414 (1998), and 1571 (1999).

³¹ Burden sharing, although it should lead to reduced defense expenditures by using regional security resources more efficiently, has not yet had this effect. This is because countries that use militaries to address transnational threats in cooperation with neighbors and the United States have frequently had to first modernize their forces.

3. practice restraint in arms transfers to prevent excessive and destabilizing build-ups
4. prevent transfers of arms to groups seeking to destabilize governments and such groups safe haven

This resolution includes an important qualifier that recognizes the need to take into account "the specific characteristics of the each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments." In recognition of the regional context that affects arms build-ups, there are no specific provisions in these resolutions. However, within subregions, there is strong evidence that arms control can work through hemispheric institutions.

In 1996, General Assembly Resolution 1415, "Cooperation for Hemispheric Security" again called on member states to initiate a process of consultation to limit and control conventional weapons. At the hemispheric level, however, only one weapons system has provided a near consensus target for reduction: anti-personnel landmines. This is in spite of, and perhaps in part because of, opposition of the United States to the landmine ban.

At the initiative of Canada, the General Assembly began in 1994 a series of resolutions on eliminating landmines. Resolution 1411 in 1996 called for the creation of a landmine free zone in the Western Hemisphere, which was reiterated in 1997 with Resolution 1496. Of course this effort was part of the global campaign, which culminated in Ottawa in 1997 with the adoption of a convention to prohibit the use, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. All members of the OAS, with the exception of the United States, are signatories to the Ottawa convention.

This set of resolutions was matched by resolutions commending the progress made in the Central American Demining Program. Since that program is related to security cooperation, will be considered in the next section. However, the removal of landmines on the borders of Nicaragua with Honduras and Costa Rica should also be considered a substantial change in the defense postures of those countries.

Aside from a commitment to maintain “reasonable” balances and efforts to remove and ban the use, production and stockpiling of landmines, there has been little rule-making activity that impacts conventional arms control. For comparative purposes, we will quickly review progress in a related area – control of the illicit trade in small arms, championed by Mexico. This effort culminated in the adoption in 1997 of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Matters.

The purpose of the convention is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illegal small arms, ammunition and explosives trade. It establishes a binding agreement with a hemispheric consultative committee, structured with a secretary and a network of national experts. Binding rules for domestic policy include: punishment for offenses and recognition of the extraditable nature of the offenses; strengthening security of arms and mechanisms for detecting and confiscating illegally obtained arms; and requirements for marking legally manufactured weapons, establishing export/import licensing and strengthening customs procedures. Cooperative measures between states include exchange of information, experiences and appropriate technologies, cooperation with trace requests, and training programs. Also countries are required to identify a central national office for coordination purposes.

Nowhere in the convention is the armed forces mentioned, neither as a principal in the effort to control arms production, nor as an agent to detect and confiscate illegal arms. It is instructive to note the high level of cooperation possible when a security issue can be considered as a technical problem, abstracted from the contentious debate over the military's proper role or the design of hemispheric security institutions.

In sum, military stockpiles have been left unscathed by hemispheric rules on defense postures, with the high, strategic exception of nuclear weapons and the low, tactical exception of land mines. Nothing in between is regulated at the hemispheric level.

Where does the United States stand on this? The United States possesses nuclear weapons, but those holdings are not subject to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Limitations on nuclear transport are a potential problem for the United States and its European allies, but no specific hemispheric measures have yet been endorsed in this issue area. Elimination of anti-personnel mines offers a clear challenge for the United States, but the hemispheric security regime did not overcome U.S. reluctance – that required the collective weight of virtually the entire world.

At any rate, it is the great, uncharted middle between nuclear weapons and landmines that deserves attention. Why have no agreements been possible here, given the repeated exhortation to maintain “reasonable balances”? This could be because of a relative gains problem between producer states and consumer states. Since some of the largest countries export arms – Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States – they may have been successful in restraining rule making in this area. But there is no evidence that this was ever an issue.

The lack of rules and procedures for conventional arms at the hemispheric level is probably because “reasonable balances” already exist in most subregions and because further reductions can only be negotiated in subregional contexts – hence the recommendation for states to engage their neighbors directly on this issue. Here again, the evidence points to the importance of the subregional context.

Another important component of defense postures encompasses the rules prescribing appropriate roles for the armed forces under democratic governments. In point of fact, these rules emanated not directly from the security regime, but rather from what might be considered a “democracy regime.”

Of all the others areas of institution building and rule making in the hemisphere that might be suitable for regime analysis, support for democracy in the hemisphere comes closest to security cooperation in terms of the depth and breadth of the institutions and rules involved. This effort is much more complete than those associated with economic integration, sustainable development, or any of the other areas of potential cooperation considered in the inter-American system. In many ways, the effort to support democracy is stronger than the cooperative security regime described above. While there exists no over-arching, binding commitment to foster security cooperation between states, the democracy regime has such an instrument – the 1993 Washington Protocol to the OAS. This protocol requires that states whose democratic process is interrupted to be considered for expulsion from the OAS. In addition, the human rights component of the democracy regime includes a Court with broad verification

responsibilities. Finally, the norm of democracy is shared by all member states of the OAS.³²

For the United States, support to democracy has been the cornerstone of its Latin American policy under the Clinton administration. The Haiti intervention, while dramatic, is not emblematic of that policy, even if it demonstrates one possible outcome. The U.S. had redesigned a large number of its security instruments in an attempt to inculcate respect for human rights in the region's militaries, most visibly in its bilateral training programs (Cope, 1995), end-use monitoring provisions in Colombia and the thematic focus of exercises sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command (with a change from force-on-force war games to peacekeeping training). The United States also promotes "new thinking" through multilateral institutions, particularly the Inter-American Defense College. Buchanan (1998) offers an excellent review of these trends. Despite some grumbling by the militaries of the region, this policy is broadly accepted by the democratic governments of Latin America.

All in all, the democracy regime represents an excellent case of institutional bandwagoning. Since the focus of this study is not on democracy, but rather on security cooperation, it may appear to lack proper emphasis on this important aspect of U.S. policy. If this study highlights U.S. efforts to forge cooperative action in other areas – building capacity for drug trafficking and peacekeeping intervention for example – that is because these represent important interests that directly relate to the use of the military in

³² Cuba, of course, is the exception to this trend in the hemisphere.

cooperative security, not its "non-use" in domestic affairs, which is one focus of the democracy regime.

The organizations and rules that support democracy provide an undercurrent for much of the effort in institutionalizing a regime of security cooperation, sometimes reinforcing that regime, other times constraining it. This is because the two regimes overlap in a number of important areas. Transparency, for instance, while principally aimed at inter-American security relations, has a domestic component as well. A prior step to empowering civilians to control military establishments is access to information. Thus it is hardly surprising to see transparency measures adopted more easily than measures which address burden sharing and defense postures.

Changes in defense postures are taken to be important indicators of the effectiveness of the security regime. To the extent that democratic governments attempt to reign in their militaries by reducing support, there is some evidence of overlap here. But nothing in the democracy regime facilitates this activity. Some democratic governments have reduced budgets and removed military privileges; others have not. Some have ended conscription; some have not. Naturally, the process of democratization in individual countries has led to reform of their military establishments. It could hardly be otherwise. But the process is inherently a domestic one, linked to a hemispheric regimes in ways that are not fully understood.

There is some overlap in the area of burden sharing, although the overlap crosscuts the two regimes as much as it reinforces them. Peacekeeping operations, for instance, have become an instrument for establishing democracy in regions torn apart by

internecine warfare. Thus support for these operations, in the framework of the United Nations, is considerable.³³

But the main impact of democratization appears as a strong prohibition to military involvement in internal affairs and strong lashing of military activity to democratically conceived foreign and domestic policies. Transnational threats with a domestic security component are particularly implicated. An important component of the democracy regime is its support to strengthening democratic institutions that deal with domestic security, principally the criminal justice system. In some countries, some areas of domestic security are the responsibility of the armed forces. Cooperation between states to address transnational threats may require interaction between police forces or armed forces or both.

If the area of potential security cooperation includes a past history of abused on the part of the military, the democracy regime works to limit the involvement of the armed forces and may prevent some forms of military burden sharing from being adopted in the hemispheric security regime. This tension lies at the heart of discussions of appropriate roles and mission for the military under democratic systems and the importance of civilian control of the military.³⁴

³³ See Farer (1996) for a critical view of the OAS response to the Haitian crisis and other instances of breakdowns or near breakdowns of democracy in this decade.

³⁴ The democracy regime should prevent security cooperation in areas that are not consistent with democratic practice (intelligence gathering, etc.), thus impeding military cooperation in some transnational threats – drugs, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, crime, immigration, etc.

The regimes share a component of civil-military relations. Arguably, elements of this – the education for peace program and the DMAs – lie closer to democracy than to security. The effort to assert civilian control over militaries is fundamental to the preservation of democracy. It may or may not be essential to the preservation of peace – the hemisphere has seen more than one instance that probably violates the precept that democracies never go to war with each other (Mares, 1997).

In any case, the well-worn theme of civilian control by military establishments is broadly accepted. The message of appropriate roles and the limits on “non-traditional” activities has been received and understood by all. There are pockets of resistance and the potential for backsliding still exists, but the hemisphere survived recent scares in Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), Ecuador (1995) and Paraguay (1996). Venezuela under President Hugo Chavez may provide an interesting test case.

This discussion will be taken up again in Chapter 5 and in the conclusion of this study. It appears that the impact of institutions and rules promoting democracy can affect the pattern of institution building, rule making and perhaps compliance in the hemispheric security regime. But since the major focus of this study is guided by the competing hypotheses of realism and institutionalism, we will leave the discussion dormant for the time being.

Burden Sharing

Enshrined in the Rio Treaty and the resolutions and missions of the IADB is the traditional burden sharing activity of the Americas: the provision of military forces to contribute to the collective defense of the continent. But, the Rio Treaty has fallen into disuse. It is not viewed as an appropriate instrument for the 1990s and has suffered

frequent calls for revision or abandonment. The prevalent belief is that its collective security provisions do not work and that in any case a concept of security that rests on preventing interstate aggression is no longer sufficient.

Consistent with the institutional decay of the Rio Treaty, the IADB has dropped the word "collective" (as in "collective defense") from its mission statement and abandoned plans developed in the 1950s to organize collective military response. Consequently, there is no current planning effort to coordinate collective security operations at the hemispheric level.

While there are still efforts to improve interoperability in the conferences of the armed forces, there is no agreement on the purposes that such interoperability might serve, other than to improve transparency. In short, in the absence of an agreed military threat to the Americas, there is no operating burden sharing agreement at the hemispheric level to defend the region against aggression.

Efforts to arrive at a consensus to identify new threats and develop rules to guide military burden sharing have been problematic and largely unsuccessful. There are two important aspects to consider. First, there is little hemispheric consensus on what constitutes a threat requiring cooperative action. Second, there is even less consensus regarding the use of the military in those areas. We have already seen these factors affect the battle over a definition of hemispheric security, the formation of the OAS Hemispheric Security Committee and the designation of tasks for the IADB.

These problems certainly arise from the reluctance of some Latin American countries to provide a mandate to an international organization, outside of the United Nations, to foster military cooperation to address security threats. The old fears of

intervention by the United States prevent consensus on the matter. Some countries suspect that such a regime would provide cover for U.S. intervention. Most assume that the United States would not feel obligated to respect commitments established by such a regime.

As indicated by the discussion on CSBMs above, some measures relating to burden sharing do enjoy consensus. This is the case with natural disasters and operating procedures for air, land and sea transport, to include accident avoidance and search and rescue. In the case of natural disasters, specific resolutions included this threat to security early on (Resolution 1179 in 1992 and Resolution 1236 in 1993). There are no operating mechanisms that coordinate this activity at the hemispheric level, however, and none that mention the role of the military. Cooperation on transportation procedures, on the other hand, is well developed, but not new. As reviewed earlier, the technical aspects of this kind of coordination have been shared for many years, through the conferences of the armed forces, the IADB and other international forums.

Demining is an area of burden sharing that, although not listed as a specific CSBM, has become deeply institutionalized. Numerous resolutions have addressed the demining program in Central America, ongoing since 1993. Demining is an area of substantive cooperation between the IADB and the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Specific roles and responsibilities for each organization have been developed and approved by both the OAS and the IADB. The jointly administered program has a detailed set of operating procedures. Although the program is now limited to Central America, there have been suggestions that it could be expanded into other areas, such as the border between Peru and Ecuador.

Although military burden sharing in humanitarian areas (demining and natural disasters) has been accepted, efforts to include burden sharing measures in other areas have been much more conflicted. For instance, peacekeeping has been kept out of OAS resolutions because of the contention of some countries that this issue belongs to the United Nations and not with a hemispheric security regime. This is the oft stated position of the Mexican delegation at the OAS – a point made when an OAS peacekeeping force was considered for Haiti and Guatemala. The memories of the U.S.-led intervention in the Dominican Republic still shape the debate in the OAS.

Peacekeeping operations by member nations have been encouraged in other forums. Both presidential summits and the first two DMAs include discussions of peacekeeping. The general trend in these discussions, however, leaves it clear that a limited supporting role is envisioned for hemispheric security organizations – providing a venue for exchanges of information and "lessons learned." There is no support for an institution that might mirror the work of the United Nations at the hemispheric level..

Thus, there is no specific set of rules at the hemispheric level that coordinates peacekeeping operations to facilitate burden sharing between countries of the region. All that exists is vague support for peacekeeping operations within the UN framework. This lack of specificity clashes with the long tradition of involvement by many countries in the region.

If at times the debate over hemispheric rules in the area of peacekeeping has been strident, counterdrug operations have proven to be even more conflictive. Numerous OAS resolutions have identified illegal drugs as a threat to hemispheric security and have called for cooperation in the fight against drugs. In fact, a full-blown counterdrug regime

has emerged under the purview of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).³⁵ In addition, the topic has been a consistent theme in many other institutions, especially the first Presidential Summit and the third DMA.

But there is absolutely no hemispheric consensus on the use of the military in this area. For illustrative purposes, we will quickly review the “Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere,” developed in 1996 and now adopted by all members of the OAS (IADC, 1998).

The purpose of the Anti-Drug Strategy is to frame guidelines, “of a recommendatory nature,” for cooperative to implement a set of measures and actions to strengthen national efforts to combat the trade in illicit drugs. These measures are said to be consistent with existing international conventions, at the UN and elsewhere.

The strategy and its plan of action aim to improve national measures of both demand reduction (law enforcement, treatment, and education) and supply reduction (dismantling criminal organizations; controlling precursors; detecting, tracking and confiscating illegal shipments of drugs; strengthening border controls; and pursuing alternative development). Cooperative measures between nations include sharing of information and intelligence and harmonizing national laws. CICAD, as the executive agent for the strategy, is tasked with developing mechanisms to compile and disseminate statistics, model legislation and detect production.

Nowhere in the strategy or its plan of action is the military mentioned.

³⁵ CICAD was established by the OAS in 1986 to promote and facilitate multilateral cooperation among the member countries in the control of drug trafficking, production and use.

Some countries do employ the armed forces in the fight against drugs, most clearly in the Andean and Caribbean subregions. The United States has extensive bilateral programs to assist militaries involved in this area, although the threat of decertification has sometimes undermined those programs. The annual certification process has resonated loudly in international institutions. Many countries have condemned the process and there is a move afoot now for CICAD to develop a multilateral evaluation mechanism (MEM) – one that would certainly closely examine U.S. efforts to control demand for drugs within its borders. The MEM will be a key agenda item at the next presidential summit, to be held in the year 2000 in Canada. While the United States has agreed to participate in the development of a multilateral process, it will doubtless retain some sort of unilateral mechanism.

In addition, the United States has promoted the establishment of a multi-national operations center to coordinate drug interdiction activities. That center has not yet been formed, due to objections by countries in the region. The objections raised by Panama, where at one time the center was to be based, crystallize the debate. Panama does not want military operations to fall under the purview of such a center, fearing that they would lead to interventions in what the United States perceives to be “narco-states.” Panama, of course, was a recent target of just such an intervention. But other countries – Colombia, Mexico and Brazil – are also reluctant to see a multinational security organization take on an operational role. There is some doubt, however, that the United States was ever seeking a truly operational center, concerned instead with maintaining access to a major airfield in the old Canal Zone – Howard Air Force Base, the proposed center for the new organization. At the DMA in Cartagena, the United States requested

that other countries consider basing agreements in support of the counterdrug effort. Recently, Ecuador has agreed to house U.S. aircraft involved in this effort at an airfield in Manta, on the Pacific coast.

Attempts to organize military cooperation to combat terrorism have met a similar fate. As in the case of illegal drugs, terrorism was recognized early in the 1990s as a security threat. In 1996, OAS member nations adopted the Declaration of Lima to "Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism and Plan of Action." The purpose of the Declaration was to intensify regional cooperation and urge adoption of concerted and effective measures to respond to threats of terrorism.

Cooperation promoted by the Declaration includes: establishing acts of terrorism as serious crimes, providing mutual legal assistance in investigations and extradition, refusing to make concessions to terrorists who hold hostages, exchanging information and intelligence on terrorist groups, strengthening border security, and denying support to terrorist groups. In 1999, OAS member states agreed to formulate a new convention based on this declaration.

Again, there is no mention of the use of the military in this area, although several countries of the regime – most notably in Peru and Colombia – have employed the armed forces to attack terrorist organizations. The United States supports use of the military when it can be effectively used against terrorism. At the third DMA, for instance, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen made a major presentation, which suggested that the armed forces could be an important tool to use against terrorist organizations.

Below the hemispheric level, however, agreements are easier to work. The measure addressing small island security offers a glimpse of this dynamic. Although the

hemispheric “rule” simply urges that countries participate in small island security conferences (a political bargaining chip played by Caribbean states), the conferences themselves focus on a very wide range of security issues (including economic development) and have developed subregional agreements to cooperate against transnational threats in the Caribbean – drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal immigration and of course natural disasters.

Likewise, the measure urging improved border communications has wide implications when stepped down a level to the regional context. Some of the border contacts legitimized by this measure should be considered transparency and verification measures. But many more are really border control measures to address transnational phenomena, especially smuggling of contraband, which includes counterdrug operations. This evidence points up the importance of the subregional level of analysis. In general it is fair to say that the hemispheric security regime is much narrower for burden sharing than for transparency and verification.

Analysis

So what is new in the hemispheric security institution? In the first place, the frank institutionalist spirit that undergirds it. An evolutionary process has created a regime of strong, overlapping institutions with expanding membership and resources. Some of those institutions are new, others have been substantially remade, shedding their old skin.

In the second place, those institutions have produced mutually supportive rules. The IADB and the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security have worked hand-in-glove to institutionalize CSBMs and conduct demining operations. The Summits and OAS General Assemblies have held their own dialogue on hemispheric security. Both the

DMAs and the CSBM Declarations have lent support to the conferences of the armed forces, an important venue for enhancing interoperability.

Third, rules for transparency are significantly more dense and concrete than in the areas of burden sharing and defense postures. In fact, transparency rules are far more intrusive than the information exchange systems associated with collective security. The rules reach into domestic organizations, aiming to restructure relationships between the militaries of the hemisphere, and between military and civilian sectors of society. We will return to this observation in the concluding chapter.

Fourth, there is ample evidence to point to a complicated environment of overlapping regimes that provides a wide umbrella for security issues. Security issues are clearly linked to efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, for instance, as well as respect for human rights. A complicating factor, however, is the numerically large presence of Caribbean states eager to link security issues with economic development. One of their main vulnerabilities, they argue, is an undiversified economic base. This attempted linkage has probably weakened attempts to bring more security concerns under the purview of hemispheric institutions. No explicit links between security and economic issues have been endorsed – all attempts to include economic development as a part of the security regime have been stymied, principally but not exclusively by the United States.

What has not changed? First, the “fault-line” of U.S. versus Latin American interests has not disappeared. The tension that derives from the power asymmetry in the region is certainly still operative – forcing institutional compromises and constraining rule making, especially in the area of military burden sharing where the United States has

not succeeded in winning endorsement of its concerns regarding transnational threats. Second, the strong presence of the United States is evident in almost all hemispheric institutions.

In sum, the indicators for organizational features developed in Chapter 2 show more support for institutionalism than realism. There are ample organizational forums to serve as focal points for negotiation of security rules. It is important to note, however, that the structure is still rife by the failure to bring the IADB fully under the OAS. The issue agenda is multilateral, reflecting opportunities for smaller countries to voice preferences. Institutional balancing is evident in Mexican and Brazilian behavior. Linkages and nesting tend to reinforce regime rules, with the exception of the area of burden sharing.

What of the rules that those institutions establish? First, the rules are not comprehensive in scope. There appears to be an inherent contradiction in attempts to make rules both inclusive and comprehensive – the divisive politics driven by power asymmetries is one cause. Latin American countries are hesitant to include a wide panoply of security mechanisms under the purview of multilateral organizations that include a strong U.S. presence.

Second, the rules are not binding. Participation and reporting remain voluntary, reporting formats are variable, thresholds for reporting are not established and no mechanism exists for independent verification. For purposes of comparison, it is worth noting that more rigor in all of these areas was necessary in Europe before states became confident that CSBMs were providing true transparency and mutual understanding –

factors that allowed the negotiation of arms limitations and, later, the development of military cooperation that has led to coalition operations out of theater.

Third, there are few formal mechanisms for verification and hence little sign that reciprocity is functioning. These three points cast doubt on the institutional explanation.

Let us review each behavior cluster in more detail. There is a sort of happy coincidence between the countries of the hemisphere in the area of military transparency and not surprisingly a dense network of rules has been created. Verification mechanisms are not impressive however. There are no binding measures outside of the third party verification schemes present in nuclear accords and in some peacekeeping activities. Both of these are special cases. There is little evidence at the hemispheric level that verification operates effectively to overcome cooperative dilemmas in other cases.

Does this mean that verification is impossible? Not necessarily. Some declared data – such as arms transfers and CSBM reports – can be cross-checked. In other cases, comparison with open sources is possible – as with arms transfers and defense expenditures.³⁶ Alternatively, the network of personnel exchanges, invitations to observe exercises and visits to installations can offer reasonably strong, bilateral verification of defense capabilities. Although this network is not yet organized in such a way as to provide a comprehensive view of compliance, it does provide a set of snapshots of military activity, routinely reported back to participating states. But these exchanges are not new; they were originally promoted by the United States during the Cold War

³⁶ See Laurance (p. 350) for discussion on self-verification and comparison to public data. Also, Anthony (p.121-122).

era. Their purpose was not verification, but rather promotion of the interoperability necessary for coalition operations.

With regard to burden sharing arrangements, there is little consensus on which threats are truly hemispheric security concerns, nor which of those should be met by military means. Mexico has repeatedly criticized any effort to develop cooperative security arrangements in these areas, as have other countries, fearing that cooperative security may be a pretext for "multilateral" interventions. The only areas of military burden sharing that do enjoy wide support are humanitarian in nature – demining, disaster relief, and search and rescue operations. In other areas, institutional balancing has forestalled U.S. efforts.

The critical transnational threats – trafficking in drugs, small arms and terrorist activities – enjoy varying levels of institutionalization. But military involvement has not been endorsed at the hemispheric level. There is some consensus on these issues at the subregional level, where countries share common approaches and have been cooperating for years. This will become clear when we begin to sort through the actual activities that countries are reporting.

Progress in formulating rules to reduce defense postures has been even less successful. The two major accomplishments in this area were the products of regimes outside of the IAS. Proscription on nuclear weapons and limitations on delivery systems are major accomplishments in the hemisphere, but not directly related to the institutions we have discussed. The anti-personnel landmine ban, another important measure, is also not an IAS initiative. It is questionable in any case whether a ban on an inexpensive, defensive weapon makes sense for a cooperative security regime. OAS support for this

campaign is best explained as an act of institutional balancing, not thoughtful promotion of peaceful interstate relations. Otherwise, rules in this area have been remarkable for their lack of specificity. There is explicit recognition that defensive postures must be addressed at the subregional level, where the dynamics of security competition take place.

On the other hand, there is strong overlap with the “democracy regime” in terms of appropriate roles for militaries under democratic regimes. The net effect of this phenomenon is to bolster transparency while undercutting efforts to involve the armed forces of the region in some burden sharing activities – particularly to address transnational threats which may involve illegal groups operating within countries. Strong proscriptions on military involvement in policing and collecting intelligence on these groups limits the armed forces to supporting roles to other domestic organizations.

Table 4-4 presents a summary of the key rules of the hemispheric security institution, adopting the standard categories developed by regime theorists. This is presented as a convenient way to compare the hemispheric security regime in the Americas with other regimes in other regions and in other issue areas.

Table 4-4: Hemispheric Cooperative Security Regime for Use of Armed Forces

Principle	Norm	Rules	Procedures
Transparency in military matters will reduce uncertainty and worst case analysis by demonstrating peaceful intent of neighbor, thus promoting peaceful resolution of conflict should differences arise.	Be open	Announce exercises in advance	No specific mechanism
		Submit declared data on defense expenditures. Exchange data at OAS. Develop common methodology for region.	UN Instrument for Reporting MILEX
		Submit declared data on arms transfers. Exchange data at OAS. Improve and broaden information.	UN Arms Transfer Register.
		Submit white papers and other official pronouncements of doctrine and strategy, including information on organization, structure, size and composition.	No specific mechanism. U.S. and Chile to sponsor workshop.
	Accept observers and exchange officers	Conduct exchanges in training programs and issue invitations to observer exercises.	By invitation to IADB. By arrangement.
Military burden sharing resorts to use of force as ultimate sanction and can contribute to hemispheric security through humanitarian operations.	Exhaust all efforts to resolve disputes before use of force	Ranges from mediation to censure to exclusion	Bogota Pact "Good Offices"
	Respond collectively to aggression	No operating rule for inter-America defense, since RioTreaty is regarded as obsolete	Some standardization for operations.
	Remove landmines	CA demining program	Established by OAS and IADB
	Enhance border contacts	Develop communications systems. Develop cooperative activities.	Binational communication systems. Some standardization.
	Prevent incidents; increase security to avoid accidents or incidents in transportation.	Hold meetings and activities. Develop cooperative program on transportation of nuclear waste.	International protocols.
	Respond to some transnational threats: natural disasters, small island security threats.	Little hemispheric consensus – subregional problem which requires subregional solution.	International and regional disaster relief procedures.

Table 4-4 -- continued

Principle	Norm	Rules	Procedures
Reductions in defense postures will make use of force less likely and thus promote peace	No proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, nuclear) in Latin America	Treaties/conventions of Tlatelolco, Mendoza, Cartagena	Established in treaties/conventions
	Develop conventional arms control programs	Hold talks; enter into conventions	Varies according to sponsoring organization.
	Continue the dialogue on CSBMs	Hold conferences to develop new procedures. Include legislators and other members of civil society.	Hold in organizations of IASS. Hold in diplomatic training institutes, military academies, research centers, universities.
	No use, production or stockpiling of landmines	Enter into convention	Ottawa Convention
		Submit inventories on landmines.	CHS inventory format.
	Mines on border should be eliminated	CA demining program	Established by OAS UPD and IADB
	Civilian control of military	Establish education for peace programs.	Still under review. OAS held meeting of experts in 1999.

The U.S. Agenda

What of U.S. security interests – is its agenda the driving force for the rules, imperfect though they might be? Here the answer is mixed.

In the area of transparency, the United States has supported measures in hemispheric security organizations as a way to reduce tension, support democracy, and create the minimal working conditions for cooperative security activities. More importantly, the United States has offered examples of how to comply with transparency measures and presented instruction on preparation of defense white papers.

Defense reductions and burden sharing show a markedly different trend. With regard to conventional arms, the United States has shown little interest in restricting supply of those arms to the region. There is no indication that this is an important U.S. goal, as evidenced by the recent policy reversal on sales of high-technology arms to the region. Yet despite the ambivalent U.S. attitude towards arms control, the agenda at the OAS has escaped U.S. control, as evidenced by the signing of recent conventions banning mines.

U.S. suggestions that military cooperation is required to combat “new” transnational threats have been met with serious disagreement. The expectations of the United States are frequently frustrated. The difficulties experienced with the establishment of a multinational counterdrug operation center offer one example. A clearer example of institutional balancing however, was the OAS response to U.S. decertification – the establishment of a multilateral process that will evaluate U.S.

performance as well.³⁷ In short, the findings for defense reductions and burden sharing show both movement outside of U.S. interests and resistance to U.S. priorities.

Regime Effectiveness

Introduction

The chapter now turns to the task of examining the effectiveness of the hemispheric security regime in the 1990s. Do security rules have any real effect on behavior? Do institutions encourage security cooperation in measurable ways? Is cooperation more than a mere reflection of the U.S. security agenda? These research questions, posed in the introduction to this chapter, provide the focus of our investigation of regime effectiveness. In this section, the two theories compete for the best explanation of patterns of cooperative security behavior.

Using the CSBM reports and other data that emanate from countries and security institutions, we establish a pattern of compliance that can be analyzed for regime effectiveness. As we shall see, compliance varies across time, across the principal rule-making areas – transparency/verification, burden sharing and defensive orientation – and across geographic regions. That geographic variation will be the focus of Chapter 5, when the subregional case studies are considered.

The analysis in this section is based principally on the 1995, 1996 and 1997 inventories of CSBMs compiled by the Inter-American Defense Board, as well as some early submissions for the year 1998. These inventories provide an overview of the

³⁷ I do not suggest that CICAD developed this with such a strategy in mind. But it was proposed at the OAS General Assembly (1997) by Belize, a victim of decertification, precisely to highlight the unilateral nature of U.S. counterdrug policy.

activity taking place in the region, as reported by participating countries. The data was reported using formats developed in OAS Meeting of Experts in 1995 and the CSBMs categories established in the Santiago Declaration. Note that only partial data is available on the new measures established by the San Salvador Declaration.

The measures reported include a description of the event, its duration, its geographic scope, and the branch of service and partner countries involved. Some submissions contain additional information as well, such as initiation and completion dates. Some measures are well known, easily verified and researched. Others are more mysterious. Taken together, the inventories contain close to 2000 individual measures. They range from the activities of permanent standing bodies, such as the Regional Security System in the Caribbean, to exchanges of cadets between the military academies of neighboring countries. Each measure is intended to contribute in some way to the promotion of confidence and security.

As laid out in Table 4-4, each of the categories used by the reports corresponds to one of the three sectors studied under the regime. The method employed here is to look at overall data patterns by variation over time, over type of measure and sector reported and over geographic area. The data does not support more detailed statistical analysis for many reasons. First, it is dangerous to aggregate the data within categories, since there is no standard threshold for reporting. For instance, the United States reported all of its academic exchanges in one statement, while smaller countries reported each exchange of individual officers. Second, it is difficult to compare the data across measures and sectors, since the events that belong to each category are so different. Finally, the comprehensiveness of the reporting, voluntary in any case, varies widely by country.

Added to the methodological difficulties already mentioned is the problem working the data as a time series, since reporting procedures changed during the period in question. The 1995 report was more of a modal nature – reports on types of CSBMs that had been employed since the early 1990s – while the 1996 and 1997 reports were more specific in nature. Still, close examination of the individual measures confirms the basic trends submitted below.

General trends are relatively easy to spot. These general trends will be supported with detailed analysis of the principal measures themselves.

There is a marked predominance of bilateral and subregional measures over hemispheric measures; only 8 percent of the measures were hemispheric in nature, compared to 64% bilateral and 28% subregional. Most of the hemispheric measures relate to participation in institutions, treaties, meetings and conferences we have already discussed, although there are some new items. Examples of subregional measures include participation in subregional organizations and conferences; demining operations; exercises, especially for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; and disaster relief training. Examples of bilateral measures include participation in bilateral institutions such as intelligence sharing arrangements, security working groups and periodic staff meetings; cooperation along borders; reciprocal notification of exercises; exchanges of military units, officers, student and technical experts; visits to installations; observers at exercises; and cultural exchanges, including athletic events.

As might be expected, judging from the varying strength of regime rules across sectors, there are far more transparency and verification measures evident in the data than measures for either burden sharing or defense postures. This finding is consistent with

the thematic pattern expected by both realism and institutionalism. But before discussing this pattern further, let us look at how reporting has varied over time.

Pattern Over Time

Comparisons of the 1997 and 1995 data reflect a 15% increase in the number of countries reporting. Of the 34 member countries of the OAS, 17 submitted inventories in 1995 (14 of them with delegates at the IADB and 3 without), amounting to a 50% participation. In 1997, 22 countries submitted inventories (17 represented at the IADB and 5 not), reflecting a 65% response rate. It is obvious that participation, although growing, is still partial. However, since all major countries did submit some kind of report, it is unlikely that more participation would skew the data significantly.

Comparison from 1995 to 1997 also shows an 87% increase in the number of CSBMs reported.³⁸ This most likely reflects deeper participation in the CSBM regime, since the increase in the number of countries reporting since 1995 is not remarkable, while there is a significant increase in the number of reported CSBMs. These figures may be subject to minor modifications depending on the criteria used to identify them, since the information contained in the inventory sometimes gives rise to different interpretations.

³⁸ A quantitative tabulation shows that 516 measures were implemented in 1995 and 982 in 1997, reflecting a significant increase of close to 87%.

Pattern Across Sectors

Transparency/verification

As noted, transparency and verification measures are the most frequently reported. In fact, almost 90% of the total measures reported were from this sector. Within the sector, about 30% were strictly transparency measures, while 59% consisted of personnel exchanges that can be taken as a substitute for “hard” verification. These are the measures contained in Santiago category “E.” The charts below show the detailed distribution.




Figure 4-1: Distribution of CSBMs (1997)

A closer look at categories B and C, totaling 23% of measures reported, shows mixed compliance across the hemisphere. Participation in the United Nations Registry of Arms Transfers was reported by Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. UN sources show that others have participated as well during this period (Chile, Peru and Nicaragua), but their reports were not included in the declared data submitted to the OAS and IADB.

Participation in the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting on Military Expenditures was reported by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, United States, Uruguay, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela. Other sources indicate that El Salvador has also participated, although that information was not made available through the CSBM reports.³⁹

Defense “white papers” have been published by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, El Salvador and the United States. While this level of participation is quite low, most other countries have made some sort of comprehensive report of their defense strategies at the numerous conferences reported in the data.

As noted, verification measures (category “E”) make up the majority of the measures reported. Most of the measures reported reflect increased personal interaction between military members of neighboring states. In particular, the data shows that almost 50% of the measures reported were visits and exchanges of observers and students. Most

³⁹ There are several sources for information on participation in UN registries. In addition to official UN publications, see volumes of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

of the increase in measures reported since 1995 has been in this area. Furthermore, almost two-thirds of the measures are bilateral – most often between neighboring countries, indicating the growth of transparency within the Americas at the subregional level.

There are some transparency measures reported that can be considered hemispheric in nature. Participation in the IADB allows civilians and military officials to conduct visits to installations arranged by the Board. This includes frequent visits to U.S. installations. In addition, both the Board and College have a five-year plan of visits that takes officials to each member country over the course of the entire cycle. Such visits normally involved tours of military installations.

In recent years, the Board's program of visits has been disrupted. A programmed visit in 1996 to Central America was cancelled because Honduras could not accommodate the visit. A visit to some of the Southern Cone countries was cancelled in 1997 because of U.S. and Brazilian concerns that the trip might be wrongly interpreted in Paraguay, during that country's most recent political crisis concerning retired General Lino Oviedo.

Exercises are occasionally announced at the Board in advance, but normally only if the Chairman or staff officers are invited to participate. In those cases, a trip report is presented to the full Council of Delegates. Many of these exercises are U.S. sponsored events. Distinguished visitors to the Board and College, usually senior diplomatic or military representatives, make presentations to the delegates and the students. The College provides direct exposure to defense doctrines and policies of member countries through its speakers program. Students present detailed analyses of the elements of power of their countries and prepare monographs on specific security issues. Finally,

CSBM instruction - one of the transparency measures – is a basic part of the College curriculum, presented to military and civilian personnel.

Some of this same sort of activity goes on in other hemispheric organizations, particularly the specialized conferences of the armed forces. Subregionally that sort of activity is more significant, because the information exchanged can be more closely scrutinized. This is even truer at the bilateral level. In fact, most hemispheric and subregional institutions offer opportunities for bilateral contact that results in information and intelligence exchanges.

What is the direct impact of the United States in terms of the transparency pattern? The United States promotes transparency measures in part through its own example – distribution of its defense white paper at the first DMA is evidence of this. Five countries have followed suit since the United States disseminated its report. Likewise, many of the hemispheric institutions mentioned above function with considerable U.S. support.

But there is little reason to believe that the overall trend is due to the U.S. security agenda. While it is true that the United States has exchange programs with many countries and supports programs of visits to its installations and exercises, these programs were significantly underreported by the United States. Other forms of support, such as the “open skies initiative” have been offered but have yet to gain wide acceptance in the hemisphere.

Defense postures

Regime rules that affect defense postures include arms control agreements and participation in education for peace. There is little that can be said about regime

compliance in this area, since the regime itself is so weak. The dramatic successes in the area of nuclear weapons and anti-personnel mines were not directly related to hemispheric institutions.

Consistent with this low density of rule making, reported CSBMs in this area make up only 4% of the total. Few arms control agreements have been reported and only seven countries have submitted anti-personnel mines inventories to the OAS as required to ensure that reductions are transparent and reciprocal.

However, there was significant progress in arms agreements reported in Central America – most of which is directly related to the work of the OAS CIAV, and the UN missions before it, as those organizations undertook their mission of enforcing demobilization. As an important part of the peace negotiations that ended the armed internal conflict in El Salvador and Nicaragua, those countries dramatically reduced the size of their armed forces. El Salvador reduced its budget by 50% and its armed forces from over 60,000 to 20,000 troops. Nicaragua made similarly drastic cuts.

In addition, all countries of Central America supported a declaration on “the abstention from the acquisition of high-cost and high-technology strategic weaponry and weapons of mass destruction” and have committed themselves to maintain “reasonable balances.” Another graphic example of the positive results of CSBMs in this region is the success of the demining program along the Nicaraguan borders with Honduras and Costa Rica.

There is not much other activity to report in this area. Hemispheric trends for military expenditures and arms transfers show that after hitting a post-cold war “bottom” military establishments began to modernize. Re-equipping and re-organization is moving

forward in many regions, principally the Southern Cone. Some analysts have suggested, however, that the downward spike in the hemispheric trend line at the beginning of the decade was principally due to the loss of Soviet sponsorship in Cuba. Thus, there may be less variation in actual expenditures than indicated by hemispheric data. One point remains unchanged in all of this however – Latin American is still the least militarized major region in the world.

What of the move towards civilian control empowerment contained within the newly emerging OAS Education for Peace program? This factor is probably more marked in Central American than in other regions. Representatives from Central American militaries have participated in two subregional forums on the topic and the conference themes are reflected in some restructuring – the adoption of a volunteer force and a civilian defense minister in Honduras, for example. But representatives from all countries of the region have participated in similar training – human rights, appropriate roles for militaries under democratic control, etc. It is difficult, if not impossible, to link those programs to arms reductions.

In sum, there is not much that can be made of low response to weak rules. But comparison to burden sharing is interesting, because while that sector also has weak rules, there appears to be more activity. It is possible that the presence of the United States in burden sharing, versus its low profile in the promotion of arms control, may explain the difference. Let us turn to that behavior cluster now.

Burden sharing

Seven percent of the measures reported were related to burden sharing. Most of those are standard cooperation measures such as border contacts and coordinated efforts

to prevent transportation incidents. Of the remainder, most were humanitarian operations – especially disaster relief and demining operations. Peacekeeping and counterdrug operations and exercises were also reported. Small island security concerns, which often involve security cooperation to address transnational threats such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking, made up slightly less than 0.5% of the measures reported.

Very few measures reported contained significant hemispheric burden sharing. However, there are some exercises that are hemispheric in nature, the best known of which is perhaps UNITAS, a naval exercise sponsored by the United States that circumnavigates South America in a period of five months. As the exercise fleet passes participating countries, their vessels join the operation while off the coast of their national territory. Operations include gunnery, maneuvers and search and rescue. In 1996, reported participation included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, the United States and Venezuela.

UNITAS originated in 1959 under the auspices of the U.S. Navy and is now the longest running exercise in that service. In its early form, the exercise was conducted bilaterally, between the United States and each participating country. But in recent years the exercise has expanded to become a joint/combined warfare exercise with participation of the Marines, Coast Guards and Air Forces, as well as Navies of the hemisphere. There is considerable overlap in participation by countries now and normally at least three countries are involved at any given phase of the exercise. Here again, an old tool has been revamped to build multinational coordination.

Most countries of the hemisphere with fully constituted defense forces (Cuba excepted) participate in the various “conferences of the armed forces,” which are

dedicated to developing interoperability between countries in support of combined operations. Conference systems exist for each of the armed services: the Inter-American Naval Conference (CNI); the Conference of American Armies (CAA) and the System of Cooperation for the Air Forces of the Americas (SICOFA). The conferences encompass an extended cycle of technical meetings. These meetings are held all across the hemisphere and conclude with a conference of service chiefs held on an annual or biannual basis.⁴⁰

Each of the conference cycles is organized around a common theme, announced by member states at the conclusion of the previous cycle. The service chiefs debate that theme at the capstone conference and vote on the adoption of related agreements developed at the technical meetings. While some of the agreements are administrative and internal to the organizations, most are attempts to enhance interoperability by standardizing training, equipment and doctrine.

It is instructive to note how the focus of mandatory themes has changed over time. Established at the initiative of the United States at the end of the 1950s, the conferences initially focused on the threat of communism. Themes during the 1990s now deal with the importance of civilian control of the armed forces, appropriate roles for the military and support for democratic institutions. This agenda often looks closer to that of the democracy regime than one supporting burden sharing.

⁴⁰ See Kresho (1987) for a history of the Conference of American Armies. The Naval and Air Force conferences are similar, although perhaps more technical in nature.

Most countries also reported participation in subregional organizations that help coordinate burden sharing activities. Examples include the Regional Security System (RSS), signed by the countries of Eastern Caribbean,⁴¹ the Central American Integration System, and the Southern Cone Strategy Symposiums. Most Central American countries reported participation in the Framework Treaty for Democratic Security in Central America, signed in 1995, which represents the culmination of years of effort in confidence-building in that sub-region. Its many commitments to cooperation reflect the large number of cooperative security measures already in place. The countries of that subregion, at least those with militaries, appear to be adopting a common approach to security.

Also significant are the many reports of military cooperation in areas that might be considered police functions, including recovery and return of stolen vehicles, patrols in inland waterways and along the coast, and prevention of smuggling. In addition, agreements to combat illicit trafficking in drugs were reported. These observations indicate that the military is involved in these areas, despite the lack of hemispheric consensus on the use of the military to address these transnational threats.

The most vivid example of a humanitarian operation is the demining program in Central America. Thousands of landmines have been removed from that region. Unprecedented cooperation is taking place among civilian and military authorities, both within the affected countries and the international community. Active operations include

⁴¹ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala and El Salvador provide supervisors to the program, under the direction of the IADB, and the United States provides considerable logistics support and training.

The effects of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 delayed operations for a period, but demining is now proceeding after the massive hemispheric support moved to the region to help in disaster relief operations. Argentina, Canada, Panama, Mexico, Uruguay and the United States all deployed military assets to assist in the effort.

Peacekeeping and natural disaster training exercises are also reported in the CSBM submissions. These are generally, but not always, sponsored or cosponsored by the United States. Separately from the United States, the countries of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay participate jointly in the largest exercise in South America – Southern Cross – which is a peacekeeping exercise involving thousands of troops. Likewise, Central American countries now have their own disaster relief training exercise, modeled on but independent of the U.S. sponsored exercises in the region.

Each of the guarantor states of the Rio Protocol reported participation in the Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE). Military personnel from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States worked together in a joint command (under Brazilian leadership in 1998) to carry out observer missions on the border. MOMEPE required substantial U.S. logistics support initially, but with the passage of time other countries assumed those missions. Brazil took on the aviation support requirements in 1997.

Countries of Central America and the Caribbean have also participated in peacekeeping operations, most significantly in Haiti. Honduras, Guatemala and a “CARICOM Contingent” rotated battalion-sized units under U.S. sponsorship to take part in the Haitian peacekeeping effort. Because each follow-on rotational unit assumed duties in the same sector, these countries were required to cooperate among themselves for turnover procedures. Clearly, they also cooperated closely with the United States.

Statistically, burden sharing activities make up a small percentage of the CSBMs reported, but their significance is considerable, as demonstrated by the detailed descriptions above. This level of activity cannot be explained by the hemispheric security regime, which is relatively weak, except in the areas of border contacts, transportation coordination and humanitarian operations. Some of those priorities emerge, but other activity cannot be effectively unexplained by the presence of a hemispheric regime.

The presence of the United States is palpable in many of the “hemispheric” activities and some of the subregional ones. Support from the U.S. Southern Command is vital to the Central American demining program, MOMEF, and many of the subregional exercises which address natural disaster relief, peacekeeping and counterdrug operations. Since these exercises are now largely multinational, they carry great weight in the reporting. Consequently, it is not surprising to see the priorities of the United States in this area show up in the data.

But, there is significant activity taking place both outside of U.S. programs and outside of the hemispheric security regime. Much of it is subregional in nature, reflecting a willingness of neighboring countries to work together to solve common security problems. We will examine this puzzle more closely in Chapter 5.

Geographical Patterns

Comparing the data according to individual countries is problematic, since countries adopted their own threshold for reporting. Close inspection of the data reveals that many measures reported by countries are not reflected in their partner's submissions. The incidence of overlap is substantially less than 100%, which would reflect perfect standardization. Since reporting is voluntary, the number of submissions by country may tell us more about a given country's enthusiasm for the CSBM inventory project than provide an indication of actual cooperative security behavior.

These caveats in mind, let us move ahead to see what emerges in terms of geographic patterns. The table below includes measures from 1997 and some measures from 1996, for member countries of the IADB only.

Table 4-5: CSBM Distribution by Country -- 1997

Declaring Country	CSBM Reported by Country		
	Bilateral	Multilateral	Total
Antigua & Barbuda	0	10	10
Argentina	216	19	235
Bolivia	13	7	20
Brazil	88	69	157
Canada	23	21	44
Chile	57	14	72
Colombia	26	3	29
Ecuador	17	0	17
El Salvador	6	32	38
Guatemala	2	27	29
Honduras	1	28	29
Mexico	52	16	68
Peru	53	0	53
Trinidad & Tobago	0	7	7
United States	16	37	53
Uruguay	88	25	113
Venezuela	6	2	8
TOTALS	664	318	982

As can be seen from the data, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay emerge as the leaders in numbers of CSBMs reported. A second tier emerges which includes the countries of North America, Chile and Peru. The rest of the Andean countries plus most of Central America make up a third tier.

However a more sophisticated approach is possible that provides a clearer picture of the geographic pattern. Participation by dyads can be calculated regardless of whether a given measure is bilateral or multilateral. This approach is useful because it overcomes some of the problems with lack of thresholds in the reporting format. For instance, the inventories contain numerous measures with the United States that do not appear in the U.S. report. U.S. partners report a total of 186 CSBMs with the United States, while the total number of measures reported by the United States is only 53. The United States is the only country that underreports in this manner.

When dyads are built from the raw data, we can portray them graphically on a map of the region. Figure 4-2 does just that. It is clear from this portrayal of the information that the three countries of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are indeed very active players. But the United States is the principal partner of all three of those countries. Furthermore, clear “CSBM” communities emerge from the data: the Southern Cone, Central America (excluding Costa Rica) and the Eastern Caribbean states. There is also a somewhat disjointed community among the Andean countries, centered on Peru and Colombia. But the Peru-Ecuador dyad should be considered as a separate case. All of the CSBMs reported there dealt with attempts to maintain a cease-fire in the Cenapa region. When that dyad is extracted, a weak “Andean Community” centers on Colombia.




Figure 4-2: Most Significant Bilateral CSBM Dyads by Number of Measures Reported

Not all measures can be captured this way. Pure transparency measures – reporting defense expenditures and arms transfers, presenting white papers and submitting anti-personnel landmine inventories – cannot be expressed in dyads. But patterns do emerge from the data, by simply counting actual compliance for these measures over the period under consideration. Table 4.6 presents this information.

Table 4-6: Distribution of Transparency

Declaring Country	Transparency "Score"
Argentina	12
Brazil	12
United States	12
Chile	11
Peru	8
El Salvador	7
Ecuador	6
Colombia	5
Uruguay	4
Venezuela	4
Guatemala	3
Honduras	2
Nicaragua	1
Bolivia	0

Note that only countries that were partners in one of the top twenty dyads are considered here. The Caribbean countries all showed zero or close to zero participation in the hemispheric transparency regime and are not included.

The transparency pattern shows large differences between the CSBM communities. The Southern Cone and the United States make up the first tier, followed by the Andean countries and then Central America. This variation may be due in part to differences in the bureaucratic capacity necessary to comply with the somewhat burdensome measures aggregated in the table. On the other hand, the clumping may

indicate that subregional institutions are bolstering regime effectiveness in some areas. But interesting intraregional patterns emerge as well that cannot be readily explained by this factor. El Salvador, in particular, emerges as an outlier when compared to other countries in its region.

The most important finding in all of this analysis is the geographic “clumping” of CSBMs. We have now seen evidence that CSBMs as a whole vary by region, as does each sector – transparency/verification, burden sharing and defense posture. The principal subregions are the Southern Cone, the Andean region and Central America. Each of those regions will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 5.

Conclusions

The cooperative security behavior present in the hemisphere does not completely correspond with either regime rules or with U.S. interests. Neither liberal institutionalism nor realism can fully explain the pattern, even within the narrowed range of cooperation and conflict that is bounded by the constraints of large power asymmetry.

Hemispheric security institutions does appear to guide some behaviors. Transparency CSBMs in the hemisphere have grown from occasional contact at conferences and institutions to a complex network of personnel exchanges that reaches into sensitive areas, making up almost 60% of the measures reported. Where other measures of the transparency regime have been less prolific, the regime has looked for ways to facilitate compliance; the upcoming workshop on white papers is an example. Institutions can foster security cooperation in measurable ways. By contrast, in defense postures we are faced with a null set; a low density of rules corresponds with marginal reductions in military forces.

In burden sharing, the rough correspondence of regime and behavior breaks down. There may not be as much cooperation to address transnational threats as the United States would like to see, but there is certainly more activity than regime rules establish. Cooperation in this area responds more closely to the U.S. security agenda than to the cooperative security regime.

These mixed results cannot be said to offer definitive support for either theoretical approach. The clearly visible trend of subregionalization offers a clue of where to go next. Perhaps by unlocking the CSBM communities identified earlier, we can see what makes security cooperation tick in the hemisphere. At the subregional level, we can better control for the impact of the United States and allow intra-regional rivalries to emerge. We can also find more common ground on which to build cooperation or conflict. In short, we can escape a number of frustrations that have made it difficult to fully understand the patterns visible at the hemispheric level.

CHAPTER 5 SUBREGIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

This chapter takes our investigation of the explanatory power of realism and institutionalism to the subregional level. The predictions of the two theories will be compared against the evidence presented by the three subregions studied here: the Southern Cone, Central America and the Andean Ridge. As laid out in Chapter 2, realism and institutionalism offer sharply different predictions at the subregional level regarding the evolution of security institutions, rule-making activity and patterns of cooperative security behavior.

Realism expects to see a low presence of security institutions at subregional levels, unless supported by the United States. Organizations and rules that do emerge, regardless of origin, should be ineffective in overcoming relative gains problems, especially under conditions of high threat exacerbated by a conflictive history and recent declines in relative power by a member of the subregional system. Rules will not be binding. Cooperation may ensue, but will not be rule-based. Rather it will conform to the same balancing dynamics we observed in Chapter 3 when reviewing subregional rivalries. Under only very limited situations will the member states of a subregion be able to cooperate to realize the absolute gains inherent in transparency, reduced defense postures and burden sharing. Links to other issue areas will not be helpful, but rather introduce another element of competition to the subregion.

Institutionalism expects to see a different pattern. Subregional institutions that supplement the hemispheric regime will strengthen mechanisms in areas that will yield significant absolute gains. If these subregional institutions are properly resourced, strong, binding rules will be negotiated, especially in areas where relative gains dilemmas may make realization of absolute gains difficult. Where linkages are available, they will add iteration and assist in reaching agreements. Finally, if strong transparency mechanisms are present and reciprocation is facilitated, rule-based cooperative behavior will be evident.

The case studies provide an excellent proving ground for the theories and should give us greater confidence in the robustness of the conclusions. We will also have an opportunity to employ the comparative method to see in what ways the variables of U.S. presence, type of security problems, and degree of regime nesting affect the evolution and effectiveness of subregional security regimes.

As hypothesized at the end of Chapter 2, the Southern Cone should show more autonomy, vis-à-vis the United States, than either Central American and the Andean Ridge. With regard to security problems, we will see that the Southern Cone is characterized primarily by the traditional security dilemma that leads to state-directed militarized disputes and arms races, while security in the Andean Ridge and Central America is affected by transnational security problems as well as interstate rivalry. There is linkage or regime nesting present in both the Southern Cone (principally linkage with Mercosur) and Central America (principally with democratization). Little regime nesting is evident in the Andean Ridge.

With this approach, we expect to explain the significant differences in cooperative security behavior that emerged in these subregions from the analysis in the previous chapter. If puzzles still persist, we will turn to alternative explanations in the conclusion of this study.

Southern Cone "Subregional Integration"

Introduction

This section begins with an analysis of the context of security competition and cooperation to establish a baseline for analysis. Following that examination, we address the organizations and rules and related behavior in the areas of transparency/verification, burden sharing and defense posture.

The historical pattern of security competition and cooperation in the subregion was comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 3. Competition between Argentina and Brazil over the Río de la Plata; between Argentina and Chile over Patagonia, Antarctica and the South Atlantic sea lanes; and between Chile and Peru over the Arica desert area stand out as the major dynamics driving security behavior in the Southern Cone. The subregional balance of power that emerged in the 19th century has been sustained for most of this century by threats and counter-threats between the principal antagonists and by informal ententes between Brazil and Chile and between Argentina and Peru.

Historically, this subregion offers a clear case of the power-constraining-power mode of conflict management, marked by distrust and lack of cooperation outside of strategic balancing. The major security risk in such an environment is the threat of militarized disputes and arms escalation. Another concern is the threat that one of the

major powers might achieve a position of hegemonic influence over one of the buffer states – Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.

Changes in military technology that favor offensive systems should exacerbate security concerns. The Malvinas experience made the advantages of modern technology and superior organization abundantly clear. We have already seen evidence that the outcome of that war led Brazil to accelerate its arms modernization, in the event it was challenged by a world-class military. Its indigenous arms industry developed aircraft, battle tanks and sophisticated missile systems.¹ Chile, which had backed Great Britain in the conflict, also increased arms expenditures.

In contrast, Argentina entered a period of prolonged decline in terms of relative military strength after the Falklands/Malvinas war. Under President Raul Alfonsín, levels were lowered only to pre-Malvinas levels, but President Carlos Menem introduced drastic reductions in force, which continued through the early 1990s and culminated with the elimination of compulsory service in 1994. According to Escudé and Fontana (1998), Argentina has gone "beyond the point of no return" (pp. 63-65). Brazil and Chile reacted to this trend by maintaining relatively flat arms inventories through the early 1990s.

It is in this context that the dramatic about face in Argentine foreign policy should be understood. Argentina reached out to its principal competitors – Brazil and Chile – to clear the agenda of potential security problems that its military might no longer be capable of addressing. For instance, Argentina and Brazil put to rest competition over the

¹ See Brigagão (1985), Dagnin (1985) and Franko-Jones (1998) for detailed studies of the Brazilian arms industry.

resources of the Paraná river network with a 1979 agreement (Hirst, 1998). The two countries also ended their dangerous nuclear competition.² And Argentina and Chile resolved some two dozen border disputes, beginning in 1984 with the signature of the Peace and Friendship Treaty (Dominguez, 1998; Hirst, 1998).

Argentina also launched a diplomatic offensive with Great Britain, signing the Declaration of Madrid in 1989, which created a working group to promote confidence and security and developed a system of reciprocal information and consultation. One of the measures adopted requires advance notification of air and naval maneuvers near the disputed areas with more than 1,000 troops or 20 aircraft sorties (Cuevas and Nakata, 1997). Combined search and rescue exercises have been conducted. These measures, which accompanied a steady improvement in relations between the two countries, may well have established an important model for the region in the area of CSBMs.

Other developments helped push back the prospect of conflict in this subregion. By 1990, with the exception of Bolivia and Chile, most border disputes had disappeared as potential triggers for conflict. The Rio De La Plata Treaty (1973), the Amazon Treaty (1978), the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1984), and the renewal of the Antarctica Treaty helped stabilize borders that still may have been unsettled. The 1986 UN

² There has been a steady process of détente between Brazil and Argentina in the area of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The 1985 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy pledged both countries to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes only. This declaration was followed in 1990 by the Foz de Iguazu Declaration, which established bilateral inspection mechanisms under the auspices of the ABACC. The next year, in 1991, Argentina and Brazil entered into a trilateral agreement with the IAEA. Also that year, Chile joined Argentina and Brazil in the Joint Declaration for the Total Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, thus completing an arms control regime that covered all non-conventional weapons. See Krepon (1995).

declaration of the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation laid the basis for cooperation in the control and access of sea-lanes.

Most dramatically, the economic integration that began with the 1979 Argentine-Brazilian Itaipú-Corpus accord has now blossomed into a common market – MERCOSUR. Despite concerns that Brazil would dominate the arrangement, due to Argentina's relatively inefficient industrial sector (Selcher, 1992), integration has continued to expand. Serious consideration has been given to adopting a common MERCOSUR currency and passport for citizens of member states (Castro, 1998).

Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, with high levels of transparency and no significant sign of aggressive intent, the Southern Cone saw its threat levels pushed back significantly. Importantly, all countries of the region, with the possible exception of Bolivia, were prepared to accept the status quo.³ But the strategic balance had not been restored. A weakened Argentina faced a relatively strong Brazil and Chile. Brazil in fact, found itself in a position to establish subregional hegemony. Paraguay, by virtue of its close ties with Brazil in the energy sector, had become a near client state (Selcher, 1992).

From a realist perspective, we would expect resistance in the subregion to coalesce against Brazilian power, through weapons modernization, redeployments, and new ententes among the other powers. Balancing against Brazil might also lead to an increase in cooperation between the other large powers – strategic balancing. In addition,

³ There has been some movement to reconcile remaining disputes between Chile and Peru. The Lima Conference (1993) made progress on Peruvian access to shipping facilities in Tacna (Rojas, 1998). But the Bolivian "path to the sea" remains as an unresolved dispute.

Argentina, Chile and Peru might work together to wean the buffer states away from Brazil. Such a competitive dynamic would feature cooperative security arrangements between larger powers and the smaller states. This level of cooperation is consistent with realism. In fact, if realism is a valid guide to state behavior, some combination of these patterns should be readily observable, although conceivably a policy of reassurance on the part of Brazil might forestall such a reaction.

Argentina offers an interesting case within the larger context of the Southern Cone. How would Argentina react to its condition of relative weakness? Under realist interpretations, Argentina would have to either redress this situation with its own resources (internal balancing) or through alliances (external balancing). In any case, realists would not expect Argentina to embrace an institutional option and trust in a network of cooperative security arrangements with Brazil to compensate for its relative weakness. In this sense, Argentine behavior in the 1990s offers a good test for the explanatory power of our contending theories.

Given the distribution of power and the historical alignments, what absolute gains are operative in the subregion in the areas of transparency and verification, defense postures and burden sharing? Do subregional institutions arise that facilitate the capture of these absolute gains?

Excellent conditions for the success of transparency measures prevailed in the Southern Cone in the early 1990s. All were democracies with civil-military relations generally evolving in ways that pulled security issues into the public discourse. While progress in this area varied widely, there is little doubt that it had proceeded farthest and fastest in Argentina— the one large country which may have felt a need to conceal the

condition of its armed forces. Furthermore, disclosure of military expenditures by the central government was frequently a requirement of stabilization programs supervised by entities of the World Bank – this was certainly the case with Argentina. For all of these reasons, it is clear that Argentina would have little to risk by endorsing a transparency regime in the Southern Cone. Argentina's endorsement was important, because it removed the most serious potential relative gains problem in the area of transparency.

But would the other countries of the subregion reciprocate? Would they work together through institutions to enhance transparency? Would specific rules evolve to structure available information in meaningful ways? Would strong verification mechanisms be employed?

With regard to defense postures, conditions were also generally positive at the outset of the decade. The need to downsize and reprioritize central government resources affected all the major countries, meaning that the absolute gains to defense reductions were considerable. The end to nuclear competition by the early 1990s removed that negative dynamic from the subregion. But the twin problems of Brazilian strength and Argentine weakness meant that any move to freeze levels could engender serious relative gains problems. A regime that addressed defense postures successfully would have to tackle these relative gains problems.

Burden sharing seems to offer relatively fewer absolute gains from cooperation. Traditional security issues – arms races, border control and sea patrols – presented some possibilities, but the lack of a common external threat complicates coordination in these areas. In addition, few transnational security issues are present in the subregion, other than contraband flows in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and the

drug trade flowing generally northward from Bolivia to Peru. Would cooperation emerge in these areas? Or would cooperative arrangements follow a balancing dynamic to compensate in some degree the problems of Brazilian strength and Argentine weakness?

There are a series of important research questions derived from the discussion of the context of security competition and cooperation earlier. First, are there any subregional security organizations? If so, do they help reap significant absolute gains – especially in the areas of increasing transparency among Argentina's principal competitors, Brazil and Chile; in the area of reduced defense expenditures; and in the area of the limited transnational threats mentioned above?

Second, are the rules within these organizations comprehensive, inclusive and binding? Are verification mechanisms employed to “lock-in” the absolute gains of transparency and defense expenditures? Are agreements to address transnational threats enduring? Do they require changes in national security priorities that may divert resources to address regional concerns instead of national ones?

Third, is the actual behavior pattern rule-based or power-based? With regard to transparency and verification, are the information flows stronger along balancing axes or across them? Does substantial and effective military transparency ensue or are information flows restricted and verification simply symbolic? Are defense postures being reduced or is modernization and re-equipping ongoing? If a pattern of reductions is evident, is it related to regime rules? Lastly, are countries devoting resources to share the burden of addressing common threats?

A final consideration: What is the impact of the United States? In this subregion, we do not expect to see the United States assume a role as a security manager, bolstering

institutions and influencing their rule making. But U.S. power might be present as a balancing force. How do the countries in the subregion react to that possibility? Do they strengthen institutions to exclude the exercise of U.S. power? Or does the United States form part of the power calculus of the Southern Cone?

These research questions drive our analysis in this case study. They are designed to illuminate the differences between the realist and institutionalist approaches. Wherever possible, we will attempt to answer them clearly, so that a confident judgement about the predictive power of the theories can be reached.

Institutionalization: Organizations and Rules

The organizations of the IASS are well supported by the major Southern Cone countries. Argentina, Chile and Brazil have hosted or will host important hemispheric conferences relating to security. Argentina was the site of the CSBM Meeting of Experts (1994), the second DMA and a major counter-terrorism conference (1999). Chile hosted the first regional CSBM conference (1995) and the second presidential summit (1998). Brazil's involvement has been more limited, although that country will be the site of the fourth DMA to be held in the year 2000.

In addition, these countries have the best record of participation in the UN registries. As reviewed in Chapter 4, the Southern Cone is the most active region in terms of CSBMs declared to the IADB and the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security. Most of that reporting has come from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Finally, all countries in the Southern Cone are parties to the major security instruments and institutions reviewed in Chapter 4.

At present there is no subregional analog to the Rio Treaty or the hemispheric military organizations and security commissions. Instead, there are numerous, partial organizations with overlapping membership and jurisdiction, ranging from bilateral meetings for the exchange of information to multilateral institutions that manage burden sharing commitments.

Bilateral contacts have been enhanced through meetings at various levels with different components of the armed forces. It is likely that these contacts were initially spurred by the hemispheric conferences of the armed forces. Both the Commanders Conference and the Intelligence Conference, one of the specialized conferences within the Army system, have facilitated side meetings between the military chiefs since the 1960s.

Brazil and Argentina completed their twenty-second annual meeting of commanders in 1995 (Argentina 1995 CSBM Submission). Brazil and Uruguay have had similar conferences each year, dating back to the 1980s (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission). Similar meetings have taken place between Argentina and Uruguay (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). These meetings are clearly not new phenomena.

But contacts since the 1990s have moved well beyond sidebar, bilateral meetings between commanders convened at hemispheric conferences. In 1995, Argentina institutionalized high-level consultation mechanisms with Brazil and Chile, followed by similar agreements with Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay (Villagra, 1998).

Contacts at lower levels, which complement meetings of the high commands in the region, are a hallmark of the 1990s in the Southern Cone. Argentina has an extensive network of such meetings with Brazil and Uruguay. Argentina and Brazil began meetings between the heads of their respective navies in 1995, with discussions that

delved deeply into the prospects of cooperation across a wide variety of areas (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). Contacts of this nature will be addressed in the following pages in more detail.

More importantly, perhaps, is the emergence of a multilateral forum that developed from this network – the Southern Cone Strategy Symposium, which has been ongoing since 1987 between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). With the emergence of Mercosur, the symposium adopted a new name—the Mercosur Joint Staffs and Defense Strategic Studies Symposium. Bolivia and Ecuador joined the group as observers in 1998, for full integration in 1999 (“Creation of regional defense,” 1998).

This annual meeting, which derives from meetings between the military commands of Argentina and Brazil following the 1986 Declaration of Iguazu, has increasingly served as a forum to discuss the prospects for military integration in the region. For instance, the 10th Symposium, held in Montevideo in 1997, featured analysis on Mercosur and “subcontinental security” (“Military leaders,” 1997). The 11th meeting, held in 1998 in Buenos Aires, focused on the possibility of creating a South American military bloc. Delegates from each country exchanged views on a proposal to establish a permanent mechanism for the planning and coordination of security and defense issues.

The oldest multilateral security institution in the region is CAMAS (Control of the Maritime Area in the Southern Atlantic), a regional organization which remotes from the 1960s and is charged with the responsibility to maintain communications between its

members for the exchange of operational information regarding ship traffic, with links to the Inter-American Naval Conference.⁴

Members include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The seat of this regional organization rotates among all member countries, with the exception of Paraguay (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). Related to this institution is a Brazilian course for organizing maritime traffic, which has included participants from several countries in the region (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission).

A newly created operational organization with a growing role in regional security is the Tripartite Border Command, which rotates responsibility for policing the common border areas of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay every six months among the members. This command, while primarily dedicated to police, intelligence and customs operations, does include the military ("Justice Minister," 1997). Related agreements on border operations have been extended to Chile and Bolivia.

Of symbolic importance is the 1998 Declaration of Mercosur as a Zone of Peace (Argentina and Chile, 1998). This declaration is remarkable because it includes Bolivia and Chile, which have had no significant military contacts in the area of security coordination. This agreement includes measures for binding arbitration.

The Zone of Peace declaration also includes a clause that would make the Southern Cone a mine-free area – a contentious issue between Chile and Bolivia given

⁴ CAMAS was part of a larger system, established by the IADB plan for the defense of maritime traffic produced during the Cold War. Representatives from the Interamerican Naval Conference examined the plan in the early 1990s with the intent to update it. But the plan was too outmoded to provide a useful basis for cooperation. Still CAMAS continues to exist as a coordinating entity.

the presence of mines along the border, emplaced by the Chilean military. Chile's willingness to enter into a declaration that indirectly addresses the mine problem is significant. Demining is a slow, arduous, expensive task, although in this case the mines may be able to be removed by mechanical methods, due to good record keeping on the part of the Chilean military and the open terrain. Although no concrete progress has been made in this area, the apparent willingness of Chile and Bolivia to submit long-standing border disputes to third-party arbitration, and to abide by those independent decisions, demonstrates an important commitment to peaceful relations.

Worthy of special note is the gradual institutionalization of contacts between Argentina and Chile, because of the long history of security competition between those two countries. Military relations between Argentina and Chile have grown progressively closer and now extend to limited burden sharing for some border activities, which will be discussed shortly.

At the third DMA, Chile presented a joint report on Argentine-Chilean security institutions that outlined considerable progress. The report began by claiming that the gains to security cooperation were obvious in the bilateral relationship due to commercial linkages, reciprocal investments, shared interests and common political values (Argentina and Chile, 1998). The process to increase security cooperation began in 1993. A Memorandum of Agreement for Security Cooperation between Argentina and Chile entered into force that year to guide the following activities: exchanges between academic institutions, staff exercises for mutual support in disasters, technological developments, security consultations (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). Chile and Argentina began a series of meetings at the commander-in-chief level of the armed forces

based on a supplemental agreement signed in 1994 (Chile 1996 CSBM Submission). That same year, the high commands of the Chilean and Argentina Air Forces signed an agreement to institutionalize contacts. In 1995, the Navy of Chile and Subsecretary of Politics and Strategy in Argentina set up a mechanism to promote contacts between the naval forces of the two countries (Chile 1996 CSBM Submission). There is still no equivalent agreement between the two armies.

In 1994, both countries collaborated to host the OAS Meeting of Experts in Buenos Aires. And in 1995, in anticipation of the OAS conference on CSBMs in Santiago, Chile and Argentina founded a Standing Committee on Chile-Argentina Security (COMPERSEG), established by the foreign ministers, the defense ministers and armed forces chiefs (Argentina 1998 CSBM Submission). The committee held its first meeting in May 1996, with the goal of strengthening security cooperation in areas of common interest. (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). These high-level meetings led to a variety of cooperative endeavors, including joint exercises between military units and the development of a common methodology to compare military expenditures (Argentina and Chile, 1998).

Chile's increasingly institutionalized military relations with Argentina have been characterized as an "interconsultation system," consisting of encounters between the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, the National Defense Staff, and the High Commands of the Argentine and Chilean Armed Forces, as well as nongovernmental organizations (Villagra, 1998).

Chile has also greatly increased contacts with Peru based on a 1991 agreement to deal with issues pending from the 1921 treaty between the two countries. Peru and Chile

established a routine annual meeting between the two high commands of their armed forces.

In light of this strong institutionalization between Argentina and Chile and Chile and Peru – and the even more significant activity between Argentina, Brazil and the buffer states of Uruguay and Paraguay – it is instructive to note the relative absence of institutionalization of security relations between countries once considered informal allies in the balance of power game of the Southern Cone. Argentina and Peru conduct bilateral meetings, as do Brazil and Chile (Brazil 1997 CSBM Submission), but by comparison these institutions have seen relatively little evolution. Institutionalism in the Southern Cone does not follow traditional power axes, but rather cuts across them.

There are three additional points to be made. First, the subregional security organizations function independently of U.S. influence. The United States is not a member or sponsor of any of the organizations nor privy to their operations. Second, security organizations have evolved which directly address the principal security problems of the Southern Cone, despite the potential for unequal distributive gains. The Strategy Symposiums aim to overcome security competition between states in the Southern Cone and bind the region with a common strategic purpose. The Trilateral Border Commission addresses the transnational security threats along the common border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Third, the centrality of Argentina in almost all of these institutions offers strong evidence that Argentina has opted for an institutional route that leads to security cooperation, despite its relative disadvantage in terms of military capability.

The rules that emerge from these institutions are not generally binding, although they are usually respected, as we shall see. They do much to increase transparency in military matters through the extensive contacts the rules establish. They are generally silent, however, in one important area – defense postures. Since arms competition has been a significant factor in the security dilemma of the region, the absence of formal agreements here, even though encouraged by the hemispheric institutions reviewed in Chapter 4, is an important observation.

These findings validate the institutional explanation for understanding patterns of security cooperation and allow us to proceed with a test of our principal hypotheses regarding security behaviors. We will discuss each of those in turn.

Transparency/Verification

We have already seen that there is no significant difference between the major countries in the Southern Cone in terms of their willingness to participate in the transparency requirements established by the hemispheric regime. We have also seen, however, that the data reported can be difficult to interpret. Furthermore, outside of the nuclear regime, there are few strong verification mechanisms that would make declared data on CSBMs and military capabilities more useful.

In the absence of formal verification schemes, military-to-military contacts must substitute for more formal mechanisms. These contacts include exchanges of information/intelligence, which may be accomplished through meetings, conferences, or systems of communications and data exchange, as well as exchanges of personnel, including visits to installations, reciprocal attendance at courses, and unit exchanges in operational areas.

By far the most significant network of exchanges in the Southern Cone is between Argentina and Brazil, as shown by the distribution of CSBMs reported by countries in the region. The network of reciprocal exchanges now includes personnel programs in logistics, operations and support units and courses. It includes officers, non-commissioned officers and cadets. The flow of information that results from such a deep network of interaction is significant. While some of these programs date back to 1980 – such as cadet exchanges and student officer exchanges in the Command and General Staff Colleges of each country – most were initiated in the 1990s. For instance, exchanges of intelligence officers began in 1996, exchanges of naval officers on ship deployments began in 1994 and a program to send officers to each countries' Air Force medical course began in 1996 (Argentina 1997 and 1996 CSBM Submission).

Student exchanges between the two countries have also become more frequent in the 1990s, due to agreements that regulate the reciprocal nature of these kinds of contacts. For instance, in 1994 Brazil and Argentina began a program of exchanges in their senior defense courses, based on a protocol signed in 1988 (Brazil 1995 and Argentina 1995 CSBM Submission). Argentine and Brazil also participate in each country's jungle/survival school (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission).

Sensitive information is being shared. Reciprocal visits between the air forces have involved programs that increasingly include sensitive installations in both Argentina and Brazil. Since 1994, cadets from both countries have participated in reciprocal visits to each other's aviation schools. A similar program with non-commissioned officers began in 1996. In addition, Brazil (1997 CSBM Submission) reports reciprocal visits to fighter bases, aircraft maintenance centers and the survival centers. Exchanges among

pilots of transport aircraft have been ongoing since 1980 (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission), but since 1994 a robust series of pilot exchanges has developed which includes exchanges of instructors and fighter pilots (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission), with simulation training taking place in Brazil since 1996 (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). Other exchanges between Argentina and Brazil include search and rescue crews and flight engineers (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission).

A very significant program begun in 1996 arranges reciprocal visits to units charged with maintaining radar systems for national coverage, as well as organizations responsible for planning future distribution of these systems. The next logical step would be to coordinate purchase of new equipment to ensure compatibility, so that the overlapping national systems could complement on another.⁵

Argentina and Uruguay have developed a similar network, which includes personnel exchanges at all levels and across many functional areas, both in units and courses of instruction. Reciprocal visits are also frequent, including visits to each countries' intelligence centers and visits to air squadrons, which have been ongoing since 1988 (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). The contacts there have led to integration of some sensitive technologies (Uruguay 1996 CSBM Submission) and extensive cooperation in air defense, which has been exercised since 1989 (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission).

⁵ The organizations involved are the *Centro de Instrucción y Perfección* (a training organization for non-commissioned officers), the *Vigilancia y Control de Aeroespacial* (a radar unit); and *Cindacta-1* (a planning organization for the distribution of radars).

Brazil, as well as Argentina, has developed a deep and wide-ranging network with Uruguay, with emphasis on courses made available in Brazil to Uruguayan officers. Naval cooperation is particularly significant, through a Brazilian “ship rider” program known as Passex (Brazil 1997 CSBM Submission).⁶ Brazil's Passex is not limited to Uruguay, but is most consistently reported between those two countries.

Contacts between Argentina and Chile at all levels are increasingly frequent. Most programs are less institutionalized than programs between Argentina and Brazil and generally involve less sensitive areas, with more emphasis placed on cultural and recreational contacts than programs with potential strategic value. For instance, cadets and non-commissioned officers from both countries participate in a program of glider flights in the mountains of Chile and the valleys of Argentina. Other examples include sharing military journals and offering support for cross-border tourist excursions by members of the armed forces (Argentina and Chile 1996 CSBM Submission).

There are, however, some noteworthy contacts between the two countries that produce important information flows. Argentina reported contacts between naval commanders in the Beagle Channel area and bilateral intelligence conferences (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). Those meetings include exchange of information about the composition of naval units operating in the area (Cuevas and Nakata, 1997).

In addition, there are contacts between air force units operating along the shared border (Chile 1996 CSBM Submission) and a permanent system of communication

⁶ Ship rider agreements allow foreign nationals to participate in military operations on board ship or aircraft.

(Cuevas and Nakata, 1997). The content of these meetings is generally focused on the development of new mechanisms to enhance transparency and build mutual confidence. However, there are instances of deeper security cooperation. According to Chile's 1996 CSBM report, the Argentine and Chilean Air Forces signed an agreement in 1994 on cooperation for natural disaster preparedness. It is interesting to note the relative absence of contacts between the two armies ("Chilean-Argentine Joint Exercises," 1997), although agreements have been reached on proposed exercises (Villagra, 1997).

Personnel exchanges between Argentina and Chile have been less frequent than the training and cultural and information exchanges mentioned above, but programs are apparently growing in the context of the recent rapprochement between the two countries. For instance, Argentina and Chile have participated in a reciprocal exchange of professors at the Air War College since 1996 (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). Of these exchange programs, perhaps the most significant is the exchange taking place at the Antarctic bases of each country's Air Force: Chile's "Presidente Frei" and Argentina's "Marambio" (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). This is an impressive show of confidence building in light of the overlapping claims that both countries have made to territory in Antarctica.

Chilean-Brazilian contacts have increased since 1996, with the initiation of a program of ship visits, fighter pilot exchanges and joint simulations training (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission). Brazilian and Chilean naval forces have also participated in joint operations ("Cardoso discusses regional issues," 1997) and their armies have discussed the possibility of conducting joint training on armored vehicles (Brazil 1997 CSBM

Submission). In addition, Chile is currently conducting research trips to the Antarctic with Brazil (Brazil 1997 CSBM Submission).

Chilean contacts with the Uruguayan armed forces occur as well, but at a more reduced level. Chile has, for instance, conducted flight simulator training with Uruguayan pilots. Worth consideration is the fact that many countries of the subregion take part in Chile's annual air show (Chile 1996 CSBM Submission).

Contacts between Paraguay and the other states in the region have been less extensive, although all major countries of the region have institutionalized meetings between their chiefs of the armed forces and those of Paraguay (1996 CSBM Submission). In addition, Uruguay reports that since 1970, both countries have participated in Operation Cimarron (Uruguay 1996 CSBM Submission). Nevertheless, the level of security engagement between Paraguay and Bolivia and the rest of the subregion is relatively low.

Surprisingly, given the density of intraregional exchanges, the United States is the most important partner for both Argentina and Brazil in terms of numbers of contacts reported under the rubric of transparency/verification. The United States is also an important partner of Chile and Uruguay. It is difficult to see, however, how this might affect the subregional security system since the contacts are not multilateral. The pattern more clearly demonstrates U.S. attempts to maintain strong bilateral relations with countries in the region.

Nevertheless, bilateral contacts can make a difference. U.S. contact with Argentina is denser and deeper than with the other countries and includes a confidentiality accord between the two countries which may actually erode regional

transparency ("Confidentiality accord," 1998). The strong U.S.-Argentine connection is an important part of the pattern of transparency/verification that must be considered.

In sum, there is clearly a dense network of contacts in the Southern Cone that produce significant information flows, including some sharing of sensitive information between Argentina and Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Furthermore, the pattern of contacts validates an extremely close relationship between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Contacts between those countries have developed into a trilateral relationship in many areas (Brazil 1995 CSBM Submission). This follows the pattern of institutionalization reviewed earlier.

Three important points follow. The network of transparency and verification is real, involving useful information not publicly available. Second, the pattern runs across axes that formed the traditional ententes of the subregion, not along them. Third, cooperation with large powers and the buffer states is not a byproduct of competition for influence – cooperation in most instances is multilateral and inclusive of the large countries which might be expected to be competitors.

Uruguay, the small state most involved in this activity, participates strongly with both Brazil and Argentina – there is no evidence that the larger states compete for influence. An excellent example of the trilateral nature of this relationship was supplied by Uruguay's 1997 CSBM report: the three countries now provide prior notification of movements in border regions, as well as on equipment modernization programs for border units (Uruguay 1997 CSBM Submission).

However, there are some indications that may point to the impact of underlying rivalries. Compared to Argentina and Brazil, Chile participates less in this activity. And

while Argentina encouraged contacts which might confirm its relative weakness, the one exception to this pattern may be significant – the lack of contact between the Chilean and Argentina armies. The absence of contact between Chile and Bolivia is also noteworthy in this regard.

What is also quite evident is the presence of the United States in these arrangements, especially with Argentina, but also with Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. It is critical to note that more contact is present between Argentina and the United States than any other dyad. Substantial U.S. security cooperation also is present with Brazil and Uruguay, but the Argentine-U.S. connection is in a class by itself. Here is our first indication that Argentina may be seeking a countervailing force to the power of Brazil and perhaps Chile through an association with the United States.

In sum, then, we see significant evidence of cooperative security behavior in the area of transparency/verification. Much of this behavior does seem to follow from subregional security institutions. However, balancing does emerge from the evidence as well. Let us now turn to an examination of defense postures.

Defense Posture

This section will first address military doctrine to try to gauge whether subregional security is a priority for the major countries of the Southern Cone. Security doctrine establishes the primary threats considered priority concerns for defense. Next, we will look at defense orientation to see to what extent countries are willing to accept risk in national security to address regional concerns. What do patterns of modernization, reductions and redeployments show?

With the important exception of progress eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction from the Southern Cone, there have been few important regional arms control agreements in the region. In fact, as we shall see, military modernization has proceeded apace, especially in Brazil (Dominguez, 1998) although at levels below those seen in the 1970s and early 1980s.

However, this does not mean that there have not been significant developments in this area, such as increased contacts along the border, redeployment of forces away from border regions, development of doctrine that de-emphasizes the prospects of subregional conflict and changes in training priorities that emphasize non-confrontational roles for the armed forces of the region.

Defense "white" books have been generated by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Chile reported this measure in 1995, briefing the delegates at the CSBM conference in Santiago on the contents of the book and informing them that, as a further measure to enhance transparency with Argentina, Chilean officials had explained the book and process to their Argentine counterparts (Committee on Hemispheric Security, 1997).

The document itself contains details on the budget, the budget process and defense doctrine. That doctrine does not contain any startling new approaches to security, still basing national strategy on the potential for conflict – citing "hypotheses of conflict" as the starting point for the design of defense forces. Chilean doctrine does accept that the possibility of conflict is remote at this time and that "hypotheses of collaboration" also exist (Chile, 1998, p. 37). However, the stated Chilean view on the potential of CSBMs to foment such collaboration and overcome the possibility of future conflict reveals a strictly realist conception of international relations. The purpose of

transparency measures is to avoid accidental war by clearly demonstrating a viable deterrent threat (Chile, 1998).

Brazil's National Defense Policy shows a deeper commitment to subregional cooperation, but still prioritizes a commitment to national defense (Brazil, 1996). The main goal of subregional cooperation appears to be the maintenance of a "ring of peace," based on cooperative relations with its neighbors. Brazil, at the center of the ring, can thus project its influence in pursuit of hemispheric and global objectives (Brazil, 1996, Article 2.10). At present, arrangements with neighboring states, while deeply institutionalized, are not expressed by formal security treaties. Rather than formal alliances, Brazil has sought to develop a fluid network of contacts that creates confidence and channels of communication that facilitate coordination against common threats.

It is important to note, however, that the Brazilian defense plan recognizes that the prospects of subregional conflict are much diminished; Brazilian policy no longer defines Argentina as a threat (Escudé and Fontana, 1998). Consequently, ancillary roles for the armed forces are explicitly recognized, including a major change which cites a military role in support in the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotics (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997/8).

Argentine doctrine has only recently been reformulated within the government and publication of its defense white book was delayed until 1999. The defense establishment has been consumed by the ongoing examination of civil-military relations, which led to significant restructuring and the adoption of a volunteer force (Bossi, 1998). Earlier national defense plans established the mission of the armed forces as one of territorial defense against external aggression. However, the recently approved 1998

National Defense Plan breaks new ground, stating that the Argentine armed forces are intended not only for "conventional operations for the defense of vital national interests," but also "for operations within the framework of the United Nations ... and operations in support of the national community or that of friendly countries." The Argentine white paper flatly states: "the old view of a neighbor as an adversary and potential threat is being replaced by a new equation: your risks are now also ours" (Argentina, 1999, p. 2-19). The "mutual risk" doctrine has become a cornerstone of Argentine security thinking (Villagra, 1998, p. 21).

In conjunction with the important doctrinal change that now dismisses the possibility of subregional conflict, the defense policy advocates new roles for the military. Of these new roles – which range from environmental action to various forms of civic action – peacekeeping missions is by far the most significant. Uruguay has likewise embraced this new policy, again primarily in the area of peacekeeping exercises and operations (Mermot, 1997). The policy shift to new missions is important to the extent that it implies the diversion of resources away from conventional defense. Argentina's high profile in this new area, which is addressed in some detail later in this chapter, was the public justification given by the Clinton administration for conferring major Non-NATO ally (MNNA) status on Argentina in 1997.

With regard to arms control, little has been accomplished in the area of conventional arms, in contrast to the substantive progress in the control of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Given the lack of substantive agreements on conventional arms control and defense postures, it is not surprising to find little activity in this area.

In fact, the three major countries are all undergoing arms modernization programs of various degrees at this time. General trends as reported in World Military Expenditures, other independent sources, as well as declared data in the UN registries bears this out. While Argentina did undergo a major downsizing during the 1980s ("Economic Problems," 1997), other countries in the region did not follow suit. The trend since the mid-1990s has been solidly towards new procurements to support defense modernization plans ("Senate Approves," 1998; and "Economic Problems," 1997).

Nevertheless, there are signs that this modernization will not escalate into a major arms race. The United States recently lifted a ban on access to high-technology arms – specifically advanced fighters, removing what little supplier restraint had existed on these acquisitions. But no sales of advanced aircraft have been consummated since the end of the ban. Chile, which had indicated its interest in procuring new fighters, put its decision on hold, choosing instead to place priority on other needs.⁷

Furthermore, officials in both Argentina and Brazil have supported each other's modernization programs. For example, the Argentine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, LTG Zabala, also claimed that each country was buying material that could be used for the "regional defense of the Southern Cone" ("Argentine General," 1998).⁸ Brazil's willingness to tolerate increased defense expenditures and arms procurement from

⁷ See Klare (1994) for the details on U.S. sales of high-tech armaments after President Bush lifted the embargo on Chile (1990) and resumed sales to Argentina (1992). U.S. arms sales have risen at the same time that a new security system in the Southern Cone has taken hold.

⁸ Selcher (1992) reports that Brazil and Argentina signed a coproduction agreement for aircraft, although the initiative never matured.

Argentina is supported by border deployments in Brazil. In 1996, Brazil reported that it was transferring the unit which had assumed frontier defense responsibilities on the Argentine border after the Malvinas/Falklands war to duties in the Amazon.

In this context, the United States' growing relationship with Argentina strikes a discordant note. As part of Argentina's foreign policy about face which led to rapprochement with Brazil and Chile, Argentina also reached out to the United States, replacing Brazil as the partner in that "special relationship" (Castro, 1998). Argentina contributed two ships to the 1990 Gulf War, helped maintain the blockade against Haiti and supported the United States in its 1994 intervention there (Pala, 1998). This behavior on the part of Argentina, which lies outside of subregional institutions, seems consistent with strategic balancing.

The United States declared Argentina a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), a status which facilitates transfer of defense items from U.S. inventories, in part as a reward for Argentina's support to international peacekeeping operations.⁹ Under this arrangement, the United States transferred 53 armored personnel carriers to Argentina at preferential prices to support peacekeeping operations ("Confidentiality Accord," 1998). This arrangement has elicited negative reactions from both Brazil and Chile ("Cardoso Discusses," 1997), although neither country apparently sees it as a threat to the ongoing integration of defense policy.

⁹ Prior to the MNNA designation, the United States has already loosened restrictions on transfer of new military technology, previously blocked at the instance of Great Britain. For instance, the United States provided advanced radar for Argentina's A4M Skyhawk fighters (Pala, 1998).

Burden Sharing

Security cooperation related to burden sharing has grown at a phenomenal rate in the region during the 1990s. The prospect of an integrated defense strategy for the Mercosur countries is now considered seriously, based on the ever-increasing numbers and types of combined operations conducted by the member countries. Much of this activity is centered on the three countries of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. There is talk of a specialization of security functions to make more efficient use of resources (Villagra, 1998).

Transnational security problems, although not as acute in the Southern Cone as in other subregions, have spurred security cooperation among concerned countries. In the area of contraband smuggling in the triborder region of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, for instance, new mechanisms are in place to improve coordination. The Tripartite Border Command has now been in operation for over a year ("Justice Minister," 1997). Operations are not inherently military, although Brazil did use its armed forces to react to criminality and smuggling in the region in 1997. This action led to public protests in the area and the closure of Friendship Bridge for several days ("Document Outlines Demands," 1998).

In the area of counterdrug operations, military cooperation has been limited, reflecting both uncertainty in the use of the armed forces in this sector and the relatively low threat this kind of activity presents to the Southern Cone (Bolivia excepted), at least when compared to other parts of Latin America. Military cooperation has been primarily focused on air interdiction, with Argentina conducting detection and intercept exercises with both Brazil and Uruguay. Argentina and Uruguay have conducted aircraft refueling

exercises as well (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). That fact that these exercises have been successful is testimony to the extensive contacts all three countries have pursued in the area of aviation and air defense.

However, Brazil does face a growing problem along its Amazon border with Colombia. The Brazilian military began to recognize that military forces would have to be involved in a solution to the drug trafficking problem as a result of a 1991 skirmish between a raiding party of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and a small Brazilian military outpost (Pinheiro, 1995). Over the course of the decade, the military has become more involved – involvement which has required cooperation with the Colombian military in conflictive situations.¹⁰ This activity demonstrates that Brazilian objections to hemispheric initiatives suggesting the use of military forces in the counterdrug effort are based on a policy of resisting U.S. control, not disagreement with the concept.

With regard to humanitarian operations, Argentina and Chile conduct search and rescue exercises and related communications exercises (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). Until recently, however, these were board exercises using staff officers and gaming simulations. In September 1997, the exercise went "live" with joint maneuvers by air and naval forces of the two countries ("Confidentiality Accord," 1998). In addition, Brazil and Chile have conducted combined training for crews of transport

¹⁰ In November, 1998, 800 FARC attacked a Colombian police garrison 20 miles from the Brazilian border. The FARC controlled the airfield, forcing Colombian reinforcements to land in Brazil. There is informal coordination between security forces of Brazil and Colombia, but no official agreement for this kind of support (Marcella and Schulz, 1999).

aircraft in survival training in the Antarctic. (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission).

Combined action to address natural disasters, while not common, is occurring. Examples include the use of Argentine forces to help combat fires in the Brazilian Amazon ("Argentina General Proposes," 1998).

Burden sharing to address traditional threats to subregional security, i.e., joint actions that pool defense resources to enhance Southern Cone security, have not moved beyond training exercises. However, these exercises involve substantial resources and commitments of time and troops. Combined exercises and operations have been the main vehicle for developing regional capability. Sometimes these exercises are explicitly linked to regional institutions. CAMAS uses several naval exercise help improve coordination in this area: COAMAS (a maritime traffic control exercise) Transamerica and Oceanic. In addition, a large, biannual naval exercise known as *Altas Sur*, began in 1993 between South Africa and Argentina, with Uruguayan observers. The addition of Brazil and Uruguay in 1995, with Paraguayan observers, made the exercise truly multinational. (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission).

Argentina reports a series of combined exercises across all services with Brazil in its 1995, 1996 and 1997 inventories. Exercise *FRATERNIO* is a joint naval exercise that occurs annually, taking place alternately in the territorial waters of each country. Exercise *ARAEX* involved carrier operations on the Brazilian aircraft carrier *Minas Gerais*, with touch and go landings by naval aviation assets on the carrier. This annual exercise also alternates between Argentina and Brazilian territorial waters. Uruguay began participating in 1995 (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission).

Uruguay (1996 CSBM Submission) reports a series of naval exercises with Brazil: Amigo (since 1983); Tenderex (since 1995); Salvex (since 1992); and Aguas Claras, a naval demining operation (since 1996). In addition, Brazil and Uruguay conduct a one-week naval countermeasures operation and a series of independent peacekeeping operations (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission).

Compared to other Mercosur countries, Paraguay has remained relatively isolated. Argentina does conduct a bilateral exercise with Paraguay involving naval riverine forces known at Sirena. Indications are that that exercise has been ongoing since 1987 (Paraguay 1996 CSBM Submission). Brazil also conducts a naval operation with Paraguay known as Platina (Brazil 1996 CSBM Submission).

Chile's contacts and exercises with the original four Mercosur countries are extensive, but not nearly as advanced in terms of regional integration as the other activity already reviewed. One example of operational contact is the coordination to avoid potential confusions during patrolling, taking place between the Argentina and Chilean gendarmes along the border. A more important example is the Military Observer Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE), which Chile participated in along with Argentina, Brazil and the United States (Pamplona, 1996).

Exercises to promote coordination and develop multinational capability in the area of peacekeeping operations offer strong evidence of activity related to burden sharing. The combined forces of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay annually participate in operation Southern Cross, the largest exercise in South America, which focuses on peacekeeping operations. This exercise began in 1994 as a game simulation for staff officers (Argentina 1995 CSBM Submission) called Exercise Amigos, and quickly

developed into a full-scale exercise with military maneuvers over the next three years. The 1997 exercise, which took place in southern Brazil, featured the joint deployment of more than 2400 troops from all three countries for maneuvers which lasted ten days and included the deployment of armored and amphibious vehicles, helicopters, and some of the most advanced weapons systems in the region ("Mercosur Maneuvers," 1997). Bolivia and Paraguay participated as observers ("Mercosur Member Countries," 1997).

Aside from joint participation in the Southern Cross exercise, Argentina and Uruguay participate in a large bilateral peacekeeping exercise called Ceibo, which alternates between countries each year. (Argentina 1997 CSBM Submission). Exercise Ceibo aims to build joint operational capability for U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations ("Argentine, Uruguayan Armies," 1998). In 1997, the exercise for the first time was built around an integrated battalion, in which Argentine and Uruguayan officers planned and implemented combined operations ("Uruguayan, Argentine Armies," 1997).

These exercises have led to joint deployments during actual peacekeeping operations. The 1997 Argentine contingent to the UN mission in Cyprus included five officers from Brazil and Uruguay who were integrated into the Argentine command of 380 peacekeepers ("Military Maneuvers," 1997). Preparation for this deployment was conducted at the Argentine Joint Training Center for Peacekeeping Operations established in 1995 (known as CAECOPAZ), which has taken on a growing subregional training role ("Confidentiality Accords," 1998), accepting students from neighboring countries.

Participation by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in UN peacekeeping operations has grown spectacularly in the 1990s, including deployments by Argentine and Brazilian

peacekeepers to Central America (Pala, 1998). There are clear absolute gains to be gleaned from this activity – combat-like experience for the armed forces; exposure to advanced military systems, communications and organization; training in coalition operations; and receipt of support equipment from the international community (principally the United States). There is, however, an inherent dilemma. The deployment of these forces overseas makes them unavailable in the event of a subregional dispute. This may explain the relative restraint of Chilean peacekeeping policy. Brazil, for its part, can afford the deployment without suffering an important relative decline in force posture. But the willingness of Argentina and Uruguay to participate so extensively in these out-of-area operations indicates a strong sense of assurance that subregional conflict is nearly unthinkable.

Specialization for out-of-region operations does not imply surrender of critical functions to other countries in the region; in other words, there is not necessarily a relative gains problem with these activities. How can we relate the impressive activity in burden sharing in peacekeeping operations to subregional defense integration? There are, in fact, indications that the network of bilateral and regional agreements may coalesce into a regional security arrangement – although the exact parameters of such an institution are hotly debated.

Will this security cooperation and integration lead to a NATO-like command structure, with truly integrated forces? Unlikely as this seems, there is movement in that direction. An important agreement on national and international defense was signed on April 27, 1997, by Presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Henrique Cardoso to harmonize defense doctrines and enhance regional security. While the agreement did not

achieve the "common security system" some anticipated, it did fortify the framework for further military cooperation between the two countries ("Government Denies," 1997).

Menem and Cardoso have agreed that their two countries represent a "strategic alliance," which includes deep measures of confidence and security building, common positions in international organizations and a willingness to work together to confront regional threats ("Mercosur Defense," 1997). Menem did not speak in terms of a military alliance, but rather a process of integration on all levels ("Menem," 1997). President Cardoso emphasized the "common military doctrines" of the two countries ("Mercosur Maneuvers," 1997).

High level officials in both governments have gone further, as thinking has evolved ever closer to true military integration. The Brazilian president's chief of the military staff has spoken openly of a military alliance to pool resources with other Mercosur members ("Military Household," 1997). The Chairman of the Argentine Joint Chiefs of Staff has called for the development of NATO-like units in Mercosur to address regional threats ("Argentine General Proposes," 1998).

The Uruguayan Defense Minister has spoken of deep integration and cooperation, while denying that a new alliance is forming ("Argentine, Uruguayan Armies," 1998). Of the major countries in the region, only Chile has categorically rejected the idea of a security community (Chile, 1998, p. 66).¹¹

¹¹ See Escudé and Fontana (1998) who argue that while Argentina wants to see a cooperative security model for the subregion, although Brazil and Chile are more restrained.

Dr. Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, an academic and government official involved in the development of the national defense plan which underlies the Brazilian "white paper," made several interesting observations about the development of the defense plan at an address at a symposium in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 1997 (Rizzo, 1997). In his address, Rizzo noted that Brazil, rather than developing formal associations for hemispheric defense, preferred the flexibility inherent in a rich, overlapping network of CSBMs with neighboring states:

Instead of creating a small, regional NATO, the Brazilian army prefers the development of mechanisms for crisis management and reciprocal confidence, such as cooperation in the areas of intelligence; personnel exchanges in respective training centers; inclusion of observers in military maneuvers; periodic consultations between military staffs; meetings of military technical experts; combined exercises and maneuvers; student exchanges for officers and non-commissioned officers; systematic bilateral meetings; visits and athletic competitions; combined social events; combined activities between the services (navigation of international rivers, search and rescue operations, air mail, operations during natural disasters, protection of flights, etc.). (p. 14)

The fact that full military integration remains a thing of the future is not prejudicial to the institutionalist explanation. The fact that it is considered so seriously does undermine realist explanations.

The United States is present in some of this activity. The Fuerzas Unidas exercise series, which had consisted of bilateral computer simulations with each country in the region, became a multilateral exercise focused on peacekeeping through the initiative of the United States in 1995. The 1997 exercise included, in addition to the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay ("Army Chief of Staff," 1997). Also, UNITAS, which has relied on U.S. sponsorship since its inception, has gained a multilateral dimension. The Argentine phase includes Brazil and Paraguay, as well as the

United States (Argentina 1996 CSBM Submission). In a recent report, sources indicate that the United States will begin sharing the exercise planning process with Argentina. In addition, the United States is providing support to the Argentine peacekeeping school ("Confidentiality Accord," 1998). This evidence of U.S.-Argentine axis is consistent with the findings under transparency/verification.

What reaction has this elicited from Brazil? Since the late 1970s, Brazil has consistently opposed most initiatives that include the United States in some sort of operational security arrangement. Unfounded rumors that the United States would support the formation of a Mercosur army elicited a negative response from Brazil in the media ("Argentine General," 1998). In the broader, hemispheric context, we have reviewed Brazil's opposition to involvement by the Board in peacekeeping operations, precisely because of the presence of the United States in that organization. The Brazilian army rejected the idea of a formal, operational arrangement with countries in the hemisphere due to problems associated with the "asymmetry of power and disequilibrium in the American continent" (Rizzo, 1997, p. 14), a clear reference to the United States. Furthermore, the Brazilian military rejects what it perceives as an attempt on the part of the United States to replace anti-communism with the threat of narcotics as the new organizing principle for hemispheric defense (Rizzo, 1997). Put in simple terms, Brazil wants the United States out of Southern Cone security affairs (Escudé and Fontana, 1998).

Analysis

There is clear evidence of security cooperation to share the burdens of regional security. While no NATO-like structure has yet emerged, there is considerable

cooperation to address standard patrolling responsibilities (naval and air operations in the Beagle Channel, refueling activity, aircraft carrier operations) as well as new transnational threats (intelligence sharing and coordination between radar systems to locate clandestine flights, cooperation in the tri-lateral border region).

The cooperation in the area of out-of-region peacekeeping operations is clearly unprecedented. The training exercises for these operations are far and away the most extensive multilateral operations in the hemisphere. The integrated nature of the Argentine peacekeeping deployments to Croatia is equally impressive in this regard. Likewise, the deeply institutionalized burden sharing in MOMEPA between Argentina, Brazil and Chile indicates a willingness to share responsibilities in areas contingent to although outside of the Southern Cone. While the involvement of the United States is important to some of these activities (especially MOMEPA and some peacekeeping training exercises), the majority of burden sharing activities does not feature U.S. participation or sponsorship.

What do the geographic patterns reveal? As with contacts covered under transparency/verification, burden sharing concentrates on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, with the United States as an important partner to all three countries. There is little evidence of balancing behavior along the old ententes of Argentina and Peru and Chile and Peru.

Thus, the only pattern which falls most easily to a realist explanation is the strong relationship between Argentina and the United States. That cooperation, fruit of the dramatic change in Argentine foreign policy which led to collaboration with the United States in the Gulf War and peacekeeping operations, has elicited criticism from both

Brazil and Chile. But those countries, which also cooperate with the United States, are reacting primarily by increasing cooperation with Argentina, with minimum balancing against an Argentine-U.S. axis. Their behavior indicates a strong desire to defend of the integrity of the subregional security system. Balancing considerations, possibly behind the rapprochement between the United States and Argentina, go no further than those two countries.

Outside of this, in fact, support for realism is very thin. Realism may shape cooperation on the margin, but it is not able to effectively constrain it.

By contrast, there is much stronger evidence that organizations and networks facilitate increased security cooperation. It seems as if the multilateral network that supports security cooperation is able to pursue absolute gains in almost every area related to defense and security in the region. Burden sharing in peacekeeping exercises and operations, security coordination in sensitive border areas, mutual support for patrolling responsibilities, greater and greater inter-operability, especially with regard to communications systems and radar – these elements of legitimate cooperation are present in the region.

The "nesting" of security within Mercosur is an important characteristic of the subregion. The militaries clearly identify with the broader security concept that Mercosur promotes, although Chile and Brazil less so than Argentina. Nevertheless, economic linkages clearly promote cooperative security – at least at this time in the consolidation of the Mercosur project. The transparency that a common market generates is also an important consideration.

That said, there has been little reduction in defense postures, despite a high level of transparency developed through participation in the hemispheric institutions relating to transparency, the security institutions of the subregion and the dramatic increases in economic and governmental interrelations. But it is unlikely that the countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile fear that a reduction in defense postures would put their security at risk. A more plausible explanation is that these countries see for themselves an important role outside of their subregion and indeed outside of the region. Transparency has created a level of confidence that allows these countries to project power – sometimes in concert with one another – well beyond their once conflicted borders. This may point up one of the limitations of the subregional approach we have adopted here.

Central America "Democratic Security"

Introduction

In December 1996, Central American closed a long chapter of instability, conflict and war with the signing of a peace agreement between the government of Guatemala and the *Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca* (URNG). The end of civil war in Guatemala followed peace agreements in Nicaragua in 1990 and El Salvador in 1992. These civil wars were linked to interstate competition in a variety of ways. Central American states provides safe havens and other assistance to guerrilla movements fighting in neighboring states, while external patrons, principally but not exclusively the United States and Cuba, overlaid their own competition on these internal conflicts.

The coincidence of these conflicts and their resolution demonstrates what was obvious early on in the nation-building phase of Central American states – this subregion

is a tightly bound security community with security linkages that connect its members at multiple levels, ranging from shared social structures and transnational elites to interstate rivalries and competition for external patrons (Mares, 1997). Of major concern in this study are the security linkages operating at the state level. Historically, those have consisted of security competition between Honduras and El Salvador, between Nicaragua and its neighbors to the north and south, and at times competition between Nicaragua and El Salvador. Another important consideration is the role of Guatemala, the most powerful state in the subregion, pulled both towards Mexico and its fellow Central American republics.

In this subregion, far more than in the Southern Cone or the Andean Ridge, the United States has played a direct role in security affairs, both to protect its economic investments and to counteract actions by other states from outside the isthmus. But by the beginning of the 1990s, with the demise of armed resistance movements and the triumph of liberal economic models, the normal triggers for U.S. intervention had disappeared. U.S. presence was substantially reduced, leading some to refer to a “security vacuum” in the subregion (Sereseres, 1998, p. 214). With the balance of forces essentially determined by national capabilities, subregional rivalries returned to prominence. Traditionally, competition has been sparked by numerous security concerns, including the relative gains inherent in economic integration, the fate of extra-nationals immigrating in search of land for agricultural purposes, access to the Gulf of Fonseca and competition for hydroelectric resources. From a realist perspective, this foretells little cooperation between El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua – the triangle at the heart of Central America that provides the focus of most of this investigation.

Nevertheless, the legacy of U.S. involvement in the region and a tendency to look to U.S. assistance when domestic resources are insufficient mean that the United States continues to be an important security "externality" in the subregion (Mares, 1997). The presence of the United States can spur cooperative activity. For instance, as the threat of Soviet sponsored intervention declined, the United States took a more supportive role to Central American initiatives and helped to underwrite a number of cooperative endeavors which strengthen cooperative security.¹² But competition for U.S. assistance can also trigger conflict between states of the region.

In addition to this competitive dynamic, the subregion also has a history of security cooperation and a legacy of security institutions. The impressive institution building involving the security and defense systems of Central America dates back many years, embodied in CONDECA in the 1960s, as reviewed in Chapter 4. But the most significant institution building occurred in the 1980s, with the onset of the peace process initiated in 1983 with the first meeting of the Contadora group (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela). That first meeting did not develop specific military measures between the countries of Central America, but it did issue an appeal "to engage in dialogue and negotiation so as to reduce tension and lay the foundations for a permanent atmosphere of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect among states" (Child, 1996). The immediate concern of these countries was to forestall direct U.S. intervention in Central America (Romero, 1998). The second Contadora meeting, also in 1983, produced the

¹² The evolution of the treaty and the important role that CSBMs played are ably reviewed by Child (1996).

Cancun Declaration, which specifically addresses security, including steps for ending the arms race and arms trafficking, eliminating foreign military advisors and creating demilitarized zones. Perhaps most significantly, the Declaration prohibited states from harboring armed bands intent on destabilizing a neighbor state. Each of these themes is reinforced by later institution building in the region.

As Child (1996, p. 19) observes, the declaration also recommended that verification be ensured through the development of "appropriate supervisory machinery." Other relevant measures contained in the declaration include appeals to establish joint border commissions and provide prior notice of troop movements in border regions. In subsequent meetings, these measures were further developed and codified, but did not see implementation under the Contadora process, which never overcame the differences between Nicaragua's position and that of countries close to the United States. Instead, many of the measures were incorporated into the "Arias Peace Plan" in 1987, as the Esquipulas process took hold (Romero, 1998).

One important step taken by that process was the reactivation of the Central American Security Commission, which was mandated by the April 1990 Montelimar presidential summit. The key objectives of the Commission were to ensure that military postures in the region were defensive in nature and that a reasonable balance of forces was maintained, including foreign military presence. The overarching goal was to develop a new security model based on "cooperation, coordination, communication and prevention." The Security Commission met frequently to discuss reasonable balance of forces, inventories of weapons and troops, establishment of mechanisms to verify and

monitor the agreements reached, including the international military presence in the region (Child, 1996).

By 1991, with the Contras already demobilized in Nicaragua, the peace process had gained significant momentum across the region. At the 1991 Presidential Summit in San Salvador, many of the specific measures mentioned above were incorporated into a draft Central American Security Treaty. This initiative, proposed by Honduras, would not be signed until 1995, but much of its content was put into practice much earlier. For instance, a 1994 agreement on a "Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America," established commitments in the area of national reconciliation, and supported cease-fire arrangements and free elections in order to eliminate the source of internal tension within each country. This approach was linked to commitments that attacked the source of tension between states – commitments to cut off assistance and safe havens to irregulars or rebel movements and to verify, control and limit armaments (OAS, 1994a).

This impressive legacy of security cooperation did not occur in a vacuum. The peace process was complemented by a broader subregional integration process initiated in 1991 with the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, which put into place the Central American Integration System (SICA). SICA is a broad-based program of integration that goes well beyond the Central American Common Market, established in the 1960s. In effect, SICA provides an umbrella organization for many subregional initiatives leading to integration, including extensive cooperation on defense and security matters. The aim is to achieve a level of integration that will allow Central American nations to bargain more effectively over the terms of their participation in the international system (Rojas, 1996b).

In addition, the United Nations under ONUCA and ONUSAL and the OAS International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV), which included one short mission by IADB observers, provided important external support that helped reassure states that security agreements were being respected. Regionally, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela all provided military forces to help oversee demobilization (Pala, 1998; Romero, 1998). But that level of support ended by 1995.

Would security cooperation continue in the absence of external support for verification and third party mediation or would enduring rivalries usher in a new epoch of security competition? At present, with end of the internationalized civil wars, states in the subregion are largely status quo. Nevertheless, the growing economic presence of El Salvador and the looming return of Guatemala into the regional balance of power equation have placed Honduras and Nicaragua at a relative disadvantage. El Salvador's "white paper" frankly recognizes its favorable position (El Salvador, 1998c). Realists would predict that this power dynamic would drive balancing behavior that would preclude the growth of subregional security institutions and binding rules regarding the use of force.

Aside from this potential interstate rivalry, the impact of transnational security threats on calculations of absolute and relative gains is extremely important in this region. Border flows of drugs and small arms, immigration concerns, and cross border criminal activity head the list of concerns of Central American countries (Rojas Aravena, 1996, p.6). Control of these transnational phenomena along the Honduran borders, in the Gulf of Fonseca and on the San Juan River has become the top security concern of the

subregion.¹³ The realist paradigm would expect that these factors would complicate efforts to coordinate security. Institutionalism would expect the opposite result, since the potential absolute gains from coordination and cooperation are high.

These transnational problems require integrated, multinational solutions. Institutions should help by promoting cooperative security approaches to deal with illegal cross border flows, by promoting the sharing of information, pooling of resources and coordination of security operations. In fact, a security regime, dubbed "democratic security" by participating states in the subregion has arisen which emphasizes cooperative approaches to enhance citizen security. As we shall see, the regime demonstrates extensive institution building to facilitate negotiations and counts on a number of binding rules that prescribe certain behaviors. Administrative capacity to maintain this regime is weak, however, leaving open the question of how effective these rules might be.

There also exist relative gains dilemmas that may further constrain the effectiveness of the new security institutions. To the extent that economic dynamism returns to the region once citizen security is enhanced, relative gains will be enjoyed by the more dynamic states, particularly Guatemala but also El Salvador.

Nevertheless, there were good reasons at the beginning of 1990s to expect that institutions might take hold: the common political will to leave behind the devastating experience of the 1980s, the essentially status quo nature of the states in the subregion, the common commitment to economic integration, the dramatic defense down-sizing that

¹³ See Torres (1998) on the recent tension between Nicaragua and Costa Rica over the illegal immigration.

took place once civil wars had ended, and a commitment by international community to support stability in the subregion.

Institutionalization: Organizations and Rules

Involvement by the Central American republics in the hemispheric security organizations is considerable, and has grown during the 1990s. All states in the region are members of the OAS, the IADB, and the conferences of the armed forces. For the most part, all have participated in the presidential summit process and the DMAs. Also, the countries of the region have been strong supporters of the OAS convention on trafficking in small arms and explosives.

There are noteworthy differences, however. El Salvador's participation has included a willingness to host several important hemispheric conferences – of particular note are the second conference of defense university directors in 1997 and the follow-up conference on CSBMs in 1998, both held in San Salvador. In addition, El Salvador hosted an important regional conference with UNESCO, the Armed Forces Forum for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, addressed later in this chapter.

By contrast, both Honduras and Nicaragua have been less active. Nicaraguan participation in the armed forces conferences was only renewed in 1997, after lapsing during the Sandinista era. Nicaragua, although a founding member of the IADB, was absent for most of the 1990s.¹⁴ In addition, Nicaragua did not have a representative at the 1998 DMA, although its nonparticipation was due to the intensity of reconstruction

¹⁴ The Nicaraguan delegate departed in 1989 once it became clear that its neighboring states intended to declare Nicaragua as a threat to the inter-American system during the Board's strategic estimate process.

activities in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras has had students at the Inter-American Defense College in recent years.

Within the subregion, the impressive institution building in the area of security cooperation that began with the peace process has continued unabated throughout the 1990s. The process is principally driven by subregional initiatives, although several institutions have strong connections to hemispheric institutions mentioned above.

Four principal institutions are reviewed here: the Security Commission, which was created as an explicit part of the peace process; the Democratic Security Treaty, which includes detailed CSBMs and an institution charged with developing an annual action plan; the Central American Conference of the Armed Forces, which was granted observer status at the Conference of America's Armies in 1997; and the armed forces forums for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence.

The Security Commission, as reviewed earlier, was a direct outgrowth of the Central American peace process. The Security Commission has met almost quarterly since 1994, rotating its seat to each of the member countries (Honduras 1997 CSBM Submission). It quickly approved a format for military inventories, identified types of weapons for ceilings, and forged agreements on arms trafficking and areas of common criminality.

In recent years, the Commission, which in 1997 was transformed as the Subcommission on Defense and Public Security under the Central American Parliament (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission), has developed a detailed action plan for the implementation of specific measures to enhance military transparency and security cooperation. The 1998 action plan includes among its provisions the reporting of military

expenditures and holdings, including the presence of foreign military personnel; invitations to observe military maneuvers and participate in combined operations; strengthening communications between border units; prior reporting of military maneuvers; and a program of visits to military installations (Guatemala 1997 CSBM Submission).

The signing of the Central American Democratic Security Treaty in December 15, 1995 in Honduras, represented the culmination of years of effort in confidence building in that sub-region. Its many commitments reflected the large number of CSBMs already in place. Honduras ratified all parts 13 December 1996 and the other countries of the region followed suit in subsequent years. The Treaty includes a renunciation of force, support for peaceful resolution of crises, and a recognition that regional security is interrelated – no state should adopt a military posture which threatens its neighbors (Guzmán, 1996).

The Treaty's aims are high – it purports to create a new model of regional security, that is “single, integral and indivisible.” It includes as basic premises civilian control of the military; maintenance of reasonable balance of forces; security of citizens and their property; the elimination of poverty; the promotion of sustainable development; the eradication of violence, corruption, impunity, narco-activity, arms trafficking, organized crime and environment deterioration (El Salvador, 1998c).

What makes the Treaty more than empty rhetoric are its detailed provisions for achieving these lofty aims. The specific provisions related to the armed forces are summarized below, as reported by CSBM submissions from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

1. Notice of Exercises: 30 days prior notification of exercises that meet Security Commission requirements with respect to number of troops, type and quantity of equipment and location in relation to international borders (Article 28 of Treaty).
2. Participation in the UN defense expenditure registry and a commitment to consult with each other on future defense budgets in the Security commission. The stated goal is to develop defense budgets in concert, respecting the internal situation of each country.
3. Commitment to a "reasonable balance." This balance explicitly includes the presence of foreign military forces (Articles 32 and 33).
4. Commitment to eliminate terrorist and organized crime organizations that threaten regional security (Article 18).

The inclusion of military provisions in the Treaty was not supported by Costa Rica and Panama, who have registered disagreement with what they regarded as an overemphasis on military matters (Rojas, 1996b). However, all countries of the subregion were able to agree on rules proscribing the procurement of modern weapons systems, adopting a declaration on "the abstention from the acquisition of high-cost and high-technology strategic weaponry and weapons of mass destruction" (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission).

In November 1997, institution building took another important step forward, with the creation of the Central American Conference of the Armed Forces (CACAF), modeled after the hemispheric conferences and built on the same structure as the old CODECA, which had been functioning from its seat in Guatemala as an organization reduced to protocolary functions with little operational impact. Membership in CACAF is currently limited to countries with formal defense establishments – El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua – although there is no proscription that would prevent Costa Rica or Panama from joining. The seat of the organization, now in

Guatemala, will rotate every two years to the other member countries, in geographical order from north to south (CACAF, 1998).

Several important meetings led to the establishment of this permanent organization. The process began with the "Declaration for Peace, Democracy, Development and Integration of Central America," subscribed to in June, 1995, in the seat of the Central American Parliament by the defense ministers of Guatemala, El Salvador and commander-in-chief of Honduras. In March, 1997, in Roatán, these countries, with the addition of Nicaragua, met to create the Association of Military Chiefs of Central America in support of the Secretary of Central American Integration (SICA). The intent was to provide assistance to SICA in the areas of defense and security. This association led to a meeting in Tegucigalpa the following month of the member country armed forces chiefs, who proposed the creation of a Central American Defense Commission to provide assistance in the area of regional security. In follow-on meetings, these senior defense leaders agreed on the creation of the Conference of Central American Armies, ultimately approved in November of 1997 (CACAF, 1998).

The organization's mission is to "encourage confidence and make a continuous and systematic effort of cooperation, coordination and mutual support with the armed forces of the isthmus, to contribute to security, development and military integration in the region" (CACAF, 1998, p. 7). The objectives of the CACAF are to: (1) recommend concrete actions against threats to democracy, peace and liberty, in order to achieve an optimal level of defense; (2) exchange information and experiences in all areas of cooperation and enhance mechanisms for confidence building; (3) participate in discussions leading to regional integration of defense; (4) promote specialized, technical

studies in areas of common interest; (5) contribute to studies to promote sustainable development and disaster preparedness; and (6) maintain permanent communication with the secretary-general of SICA.

The organization consists of a superior council (comprised of the senior military officer from each member country), a president (senior military official from the host country), an executive committee (service chiefs from each participating country), and a secretariat (from the host country). The superior council, which held its first meeting in April 1998 has authority to establish directives relating to educational programs, disaster assistance and studies that the armed forces of member countries are obligated to respect (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission). CACAF has already spawned specialized conferences some areas, as well as prompting conferences for the subregion in individual services. In 1998, separate conferences took place in the areas of military intelligence, demining operations, military medicine and naval operations (CACAF, 1998).

CACAF is based on the same principles established in the Democratic Security Treaty – that is the model of “democratic security.” Not surprisingly, the CACAF sees the armed forces playing a critical role in that security model, especially as regards citizen security, sustainable development and confidence building between member countries (CACAF, 1998). Future plans include the establishment of a Central American University for Security and Defense, studies on regional military integration, organization of a subregional support unit for peacekeeping operations, execution of a plan of action to implement a “culture of peace and nonviolence” (see below), and the creation of an internet based information system (CACAF, 1998, p. 14).

The belief that the armed forces should play an integral role in the regional model of “democratic security” has taken shape in a series of meetings that have occurred under the auspices of another regional institution –the Central American Military Forum for a Culture of Peace. In two region-wide conferences under the auspices of UNESCO, the first in San Salvador (1996) and the second in Guatemala (1998), the forum has promoted the involvement of the armed forces in the peaceful resolution of conflict, the promotion of human rights and support of sustainable development through a program of civic works.

The meetings defined a culture of peace and nonviolence as:

a set of ethical values, practices, customs and norms of behavior based on respect of life, human dignity, law, rejection of violence, equality of men and women and supportive of principles of democracy, justice, solidarity, tolerance of domestic and subregional groups regardless of ethnic, religious, cultural, social or ideological differences. (CACAF, 1998, p. 12)

Clearly, this set of values is strongly linked to the democracy regime described in Chapter 4.

In addition to these subregional institutions, a network of largely bilateral agreements buttresses efforts to forge cooperative security rules. Three examples stand out: (1) an agreement of cooperation and professional exchange between the Nicaraguan Army and the armed forces of El Salvador in Managua, signed by the defense leaders in 1995; (2) the formation of a binational commission comprised of El Salvador and Honduras to deal with the findings of the International Court of Justice border ruling; and (3) an agreement reached late in 1990 between Honduras and Nicaragua to conduct

coordinated military operations to fight trafficking in contraband, specifically addressing arms trafficking, and to exchange information on troop deployments (Child, 1996).

Security cooperation is also evident outside of the armed forces, especially in the criminal justice systems of the subregion. Multinational rules have been adopted directing the exchange of information on armed bands, the register of firearms, stronger border controls, stiff prison sentences for arms traffickers and the adoption of an arms importation registry (Guatemala 1997 and Honduras 1997 CSBM Submission). Furthermore, El Salvador, with financial support from Japan, is establishing a training institute for the police forces of Central America.

In conclusion, the subregion shows impressive evidence of institution building and rule making around a new concept of security: "democratic security." There is little evidence of balancing along the lines predicted by realism. Rules to support democratic security are binding in the areas of transparency/verification and defense postures. There are fewer rules in the area of burden sharing, but institutions are present that are charged with the responsibility of developing cooperative behavior in this area. Let us now turn to actual patterns of security behavior to see if they are rule-based.

Transparency/Verification

As noted in Chapter 4, the countries of Central America have been relatively less active in complying with transparency provisions and reporting contacts than in the Southern Cone or the Andean Region. The exception is El Salvador, which has published a defense white paper, distributed numerous policy statements at hemispheric conferences, disseminated its annual defense report including information on distribution of personnel and major activities (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission), and rewritten its

budget provisions to allow for more transparency in military expenditures (El Salvador 1997 CSBM Submission). At the other end of the spectrum, Honduras is far less transparent – perhaps partly due to the pattern of international observer missions in the region.

Measuring transparency by participation in the hemispheric regime offers only a partial picture of activity in the subregion. The states that underwent an internationally managed peace process have, by nature of that process, an extremely high level of transparency. The U.N.-mandated process in Nicaragua and El Salvador required that the armed forces reveal troop strength and deployment and weapons holdings in great detail. The reporting was physically verified by independent observers, who also managed the transformation of the armed forces – a process that required significant downsizing and weapons reductions. The Guatemalan armed forces have begun a similar process since reaching a peace agreement with the UNRG.¹⁵

Consistent with its higher incidence of compliance with hemispheric transparency rules, El Salvador has been the most active in terms of reporting actual contacts that could be construed as supportive of verification. Its 1997 report includes periodic meetings of border commanders. The 1996 report lists training courses conducted with Guatemalan and Salvadoran participants. The 1995 report is more general, but does include frequent student exchanges in the declared data.

El Salvador's 1998 report includes several more concrete measures: a "third level course" with Guatemalan officials in El Salvador; Salvadoran participation in a human

¹⁵ See Torres (1998) for outstanding detail on this process.

rights course in Guatemala; attendance by Nicaraguan officials at the Salvadoran Command and General Staff College; and Salvadoran participation in a Nicaraguan civil defense demonstration and the Honduran Soldier Day parade.

There are few other reports of concrete measures of military contacts and verification, although Honduran and Guatemalan reports include many police-related contacts, reflecting concerns about contraband flows on the border.

There are no reported instances of prior notification of exercises or prior consultation on modernization plans between the armed forces of the region, although these rules are well established and supposedly covered by oversight institutions reviewed in previously. El Salvador reports that it has established a mechanism for prior reporting of exercises (El Salvador 1997 CSBM Submission).

What is confirmed by the other CSBM submissions in the subregion is a pattern of transparency that is markedly different from the contacts between various military organizations that characterize the Southern Cone. These contacts are more frequently between non-military security organizations, focused on common criminality, such as auto theft and cross border incursions by armed bands that conduct robberies and kidnappings.

Clearly there are many meetings and “forums” across a very wide spectrum of activity (Honduras 1997 and Guatemala 1997 CSBM Submission). In addition, there is a relatively unstructured form of casual communication between border commanders of Honduran, Nicaraguan and Salvadoran units (Bennett, 1996). But these contacts tend to be of an informal nature, based on personal relationships established in common schooling experiences – often in the United States under the auspices of the military

programs to host exchange officers from Latin American in the regular military schools and the School of Americas. In other instances, regional forums provide a setting to develop personal contacts that lead to informal coordination between leaders of all levels (El Salvador, 1997).

It is difficult to find a pattern in these contacts, beyond the high degree of Salvadoran participation. There is little to indicate that underlying rivalries are driving this verification pattern. What is evident, however, is the disconnect between the dense network of organizations and rules and the actual pattern of behavior reported/observed. Rules are not fully implemented or consistently respected. This may indicate a relative lack of resources within the subregional institutions to perform the administrative tasks of regime maintenance. The fact that verification is accepted when made possible by external organizations supports this conjecture.

Of course, the disconnect may also indicate that security behavior is less than responsive to the rules designed to guide transparency and verification. Let us now turn to another behavior cluster to see what other evidence will bear on this subregion's pattern of security behavior.

Defense Posture

In the 1990s, huge reductions in troop strength in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, pursuant to the peace accords that ended the civil wars in those countries, reduced the risk of militarized disputes between states to the lowest level in many decades. These reductions were not simultaneous (in fact, reductions in Guatemala are still ongoing), indicating that states were able to lower defense postures despite transitional imbalances and relative gains dilemmas. To some extent, the reductions took

place under international supervision, which may have restrained states from taking advantage of temporary imbalances. However, the reductions do correlate well to the rules addressing defense postures. Those rules, as we saw, go beyond reductions and touch on modernization as well, limiting the acquisition of new weapons systems.

At the regional CSBM conference in El Salvador in February, 1998, the opening address by foreign minister Gonzalez Giner, host of the proceedings, laid out the basic parameters for defense postures under Central America's new model of "democratic security" discussed earlier. In his address, the foreign minister reminded his audience – foreign ministers from throughout the Americas – that the Central American security model was based on the supremacy of civilian control of the military, a reasonable balance of forces, security of civilians and their property, sustainable development and the protection of the environment (El Salvador, 1998a).

Interestingly, this doctrine has led, not to a decline of involvement of the armed forces in security, but rather to role expansion. Military participation in police work, civil works, literacy campaigns, medical assistance to rural areas and disaster relief has increased over the course of the decade (El Salvador, 1998c). This pattern is common to all countries in the region. The increase in activity is not, in reality, a doctrinal shift, since the armed forces of the region have long been used to address security threats that were essentially internal in nature. However, there is general acknowledgement that these security threats are more salient than the possibility of armed conflict between countries of the region (Rojas, 1996b).

The evidence, however, does not entirely favor institutionalism. Troop deployments and defense doctrines offer mixed support to both realism and

institutionalism. As noted earlier, El Salvador is the only country in the region that has presented a formal "white paper" on security strategy. That document contains indications of a commitment to subregional defense. For instance, potential obstacles to the ongoing integration process are cited as threats. The "white paper" also recognizes that subregional conflict is unlikely, supports subregional agreements and cites a commitment to collective security (El Salvador, 1998c). At the same time, however, the document affirms the necessity to maintain a strong armed forces for deterrence, traditional territorial defense and the realization of sovereign national objectives.

Public pronouncements from the other countries in the region that maintain a formally constituted defense force do not put this ambivalence to rest. In 1996, the Minister of Defense of Guatemala recognized that the changed regional context allowed for reduction of arms and a focus on "new" transnational threats, such as criminality, narcotrafficking and ethnic unrest in the region (Guatemala claims 23 separate ethnicities). However, his statements indicated a continued concern over border disputes and other traditional security threats. His doubts that the detailed provisions established by the Security Commission under the Democratic Security Treaty could be fully implemented in the short term strikes a strong note of realism (Balconi, 1996).¹⁶

The Honduran high command, although in general supportive of the ongoing security cooperation and a broad view of security, still registers concern over the possibility of militarized disputes along its border with El Salvador. Salvadoran

¹⁶ Sereseres (1998) sees the problem of resourcing these measures as characteristic of the subregion.

authorities also confirm that major issues remain, related to immigration and border demarcation (Guzmán, 1996).

The Costa Rican position, as might be expected, is radically different. A recent suggestion from the Costa Rican President to begin regional disarmament is instructive in this regard. The Salvadoran Minister of Defense reacted strongly to this proposal, stating that El Salvador "cannot mortgage" its security to other countries ("Defense Minister Rejects," 1998). This position by Costa Rica was not an isolated presidential remark. The Arias Foundation, an NGO based in San Jose, regularly critiques the "militarized triangle" of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.¹⁷

The pattern of troop deployments shows that lingering concerns of the possibility of conflict are still present. Friction between Honduras and El Salvador along their common border continues to be a problem, despite mutual acceptance of a 1992 arbitration ruling by the International Court of Justice.¹⁸ Both countries accepted the ruling and created a joint commission to deal with ancillary matters (Guzmán, 1996).

Honduras claims that El Salvador has been slow to complete demarcation of the border in accordance with the agreement. The willingness of Honduras to militarize the dispute as recently as 1997 is particularly telling. The Nauhuaterique pocket, long a flash point for these two countries, was the site of a serious disagreement between the two countries, which culminated in the mobilization of Honduran troops on the border. The

¹⁷ See Torres (1998). Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias argues for drastic reductions, in order to realize a peace dividend for the Central America.

¹⁸ Torres (1998, 226) provides an excellent summary of this dispute.

disagreement stemmed from attempts by Salvadoran nationals, living in territory ceded to Honduras by international arbitration, to transport lumber taken from trees in the area to El Salvador. Honduras claims that the areas in dispute have suffered irreversible ecological damage and blames El Salvador for allowing a situation of insecurity to persist on the border, citing involvement of the Salvadoran armed forces in the illegal border activities (Bennett, 1996). El Salvador did not respond with its own border deployment, but registered strong objections to the Honduran troop presence ("Army Decides," 1997).

Conflict in other border areas has sparked less dramatic but nevertheless vocal protests from both sides. As an example, Honduran suspicions of Salvadoran reconnaissance activities to site a future hydroelectric dam in the border region of El Tigre sparked a heated exchange in the media ("Minister Criticizes," 1997). Likewise, reports of armed bands based in Honduras that allegedly threaten Salvadoran citizens have raised concerns ("Salvadoran Defense Minister," 1998). Fishing disputes in the Gulf of Fonseca also continued to cause friction between Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Honduras also reports similar conflicts with Nicaragua in the Caribbean (Bennett, 1996).

Honduran attempts to exercise its sovereignty in the Gulf have also generated Salvadoran protests. A planned naval exercise between Honduras and the Republic of Korea in the Gulf, ultimately cancelled, caused the Salvadoran defense ministry to complain of destabilizing activity in that sensitive area. It is worth bearing in mind that El Salvador has developed strong ties of its own to East Asian countries -- both with Japan, through construction projects in the eastern region of the country, and Taiwan, through negotiation of investment and access rights to the port of La Unión on the Gulf of

Fonseca. El Salvador has an active diplomacy with other Pacific Rim countries, such as Chile, from which it purchased a computer simulation system for exercising battalion level military operations.

In contrast, Honduran and Nicaraguan cooperation has matured over the 1990s. Not only have the two countries engaged in joint patrols on the frontier, but both have put forth a substantial effort to remove mines from their common frontier. This offers clear evidence of a significant reduction in defense postures. The mines were laid along the principal routes connecting the two countries. Early on, routes were cleared to allow passage across the frontier. Now, the effort is primarily in the removal of mines in the rural areas adjacent to the border, allowing farmers to return the land to productive use. Without question, here is an example of coordination to reap absolute benefits – both those associated with increased economic productivity and the return of displaced persons.

In the area of conventional arms, the Democratic Security Treaty commits signatories to a "reasonable balance." Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala significantly reduced the size of their armed forces as an important part of the peace negotiations that ended the armed internal conflict in those countries.¹⁹ El Salvador, for instance, reduced its budget by 50% and its armed forces downsized from over 60,000 to 20,000 troops, although it still spends more than twice as much as Nicaragua and Honduras (Rojas, 1996b).

¹⁹ Although levels are still significantly higher than they were in the 1970s. The subregion began its peace process with a heavy military burden (Torres, 1998).

All states are also signatories of the Ottawa Convention and are committed to destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Nicaragua destroyed its first tranche of 5,000 antipersonnel mines in 1999, leaving approximately 15,000 reported mines still warehoused. Operations are expected to be complete within the four years stipulated by the convention. Honduras has also begun destruction of its mines.

Modernization programs in the armed forces of the states of the subregion are generally in compliance with these restrictions. El Salvador's Plan Arce guides its current modernization effort, which is primarily focused on changing the organizational structure and professionalizing its officer corps (El Salvador, 1998c) and not on the acquisition of new weapons or the formation of new combat units. Of course, organizational change is an important avenue to enhancing capability in Latin America (Resende-Santos, 1996).

Honduras is undergoing a major restructuring of its armed forces to bring them more effectively under the newly appointed civilian defense minister. The military is losing its police functions, its independent resource base, and ready source of manpower with the end of conscription. Similar steps are underway in Nicaragua. Guatemala's reform has been delayed by the protracted conflict there and the 1999 rejection by plebiscite of a package of reforms that included changes in the military. But the trend there is also towards a reduced role of the armed forces in determining defense policy – a trend that is supportive of the rules regarding the implementation of a regime of "democratic security."

The United States, which maintains a forward presence (Joint Task Force Bravo) at Honduran Air Force Base "Enrique Soto Cano," is still an important factor in the

region. The base is a staging area for deployments of special forces and engineer units sent to work throughout the subregion with host nation militaries, to improve infrastructure in rural areas, assist in demining, and provide assets for disaster relief and support of counterdrug operations. This presence is consistent with the contention that the United States acts as a security manager in the subregion.

While there is no evidence that the permanent presence in Honduras or temporary deployments in other countries have a direct impact on defense postures, the U.S. presence may help reassure Honduras in light of its relative weakness vis-à-vis El Salvador and Guatemala. Military assistance from the United States is still flowing into the region, but it is not providing new offensive military equipment that would markedly affect the subregional balance of power.

On balance, it seems clear that most of the behavior in the area of defense reductions is rule-based, not power-based. While there are indications in defense doctrine and in troop deployments that demonstrate the enduring presence of old rivalries in some sensitive areas, the weight of the evidence shows steady reductions and reorientations that are consistent with the subregional model of security integration. Commitments to maintain a "reasonable balance" appear to be holding, the absence of external monitoring organizations notwithstanding.

Burden Sharing

The last behavior cluster to be considered here relates to subregional burden sharing. From the outset, it is important to note that much burden sharing in Central America in the 1990s has been underwritten by the United States. Two exercises series,

one dedicated to peacekeeping training and the other to humanitarian operations, make up the bulk of that activity (El Salvador 1996 CSBM Submission).

The "Fuerzas Aliadas Peacekeeping Operations" exercise has taken place in the region since 1996. The first exercise in the series, held at the U.S. headquarters of Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras, included participation by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and the United States. The 1997 exercise, based at a Salvadoran facility renovated by the United States, added participation by the Caribbean countries of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago.

These exercises are based on Bosnia-like scenarios, supported by computer simulation, which train military officers from the participating countries in peacekeeping operations by confronting them with a number of realist situations, ranging from initial deployment to an area under a UN mandate to violent conflicts between warring ethnic factions. The participating officers assume command and staff responsibilities in fictional units operating under the special representative of the UN secretary-general.

The simulation exercise itself lasts about a week and is preceded by a week of training in peacekeeping operations, with classes conducted by experts from the international community. In addition, a distinguished visitors program runs concurrently to the training and includes forums for the exchange of national experiences in the area of peacekeeping, generally presented by senior defense officials from the participating countries.

El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala all have some operational peacekeeping experience as well. El Salvador participated in MINURSA, in Western Sahara. Belize, Guatemala and Honduras participated with military contingents in the peacekeeping

operation in Haiti. In the case of the Haitian operation, this participation was supported in large measure with U.S. material assistance.

The "Fuerzas Aliados Humanitarian Operations" exercise, focused on disaster relief, has also taken place in the subregion since 1996 (El Salvador, 1997). The exercise follows the same basing pattern as the peacekeeping exercise, although participation has been much wider. The inclusion of civilian officials due to the nature of the exercise made it possible for Panama and Costa Rica to participate, and also facilitated participation by Nicaragua, a country that only restored military-to-military relations with the United States in 1999, with the return of a Nicaraguan delegate to the IADB.

The humanitarian/disaster relief exercises spawned an independent effort by the Central American armed forces. El Salvador (1998 CSBM Submission) reports that in August 1997, the first multilateral humanitarian exercise took place solely for the armed forces of the subregion. The exercise included the deployment of air assets by participating countries. In addition, an exercise directed by the CACAF in Nicaragua exercised regional civil defense forces, with participation by the armed forces of member countries. CACAF includes provisions for the activation of a combined task force in support of the national emergency centers of countries affected by a natural disaster (CACAF, 1998). This mechanism, currently under review in CACAF, was not used during disaster relief operations pursuant to Hurricane Mitch in 1998 because each country had to react to damage within its own borders (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission), although El Salvador did provide some assistance to Honduras. In a related area, a simulation exercise to prevent aircraft accidents took place in June 1998 in

Guatemala among member countries of the CACAF. This event had also been incorporated into the CACAF annual plan of action (El Salvador, 1998b).

Worth noting is the ongoing demining operation in Central America, the Mission for the Removal of Mines in Central America, known by its Spanish acronym MARMINCA. MARMINCA functions under the auspices of the OAS and the IADB. Since it is not principally a subregional organization, it is not covered in detail here. Operations are ongoing in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, – the operations are conducted by the militaries of each countries, supervised by an international staff from MARMINCA and supported by international donations. Despite the fact that the operations are separate, deminers from the recipient countries interact at periodic training seminars and exercises, which take place primarily in Honduras. There has not been, to date, much intraregional cooperation in this operation. However, El Salvador, which eliminated its anti-personnel mine problem earlier in the decade, provide supervisors to the program, currently stationed in Honduras with responsibilities that include supervision of the Honduran sappers removing mines along the border with Nicaragua.

Other important regional exercises, reported by Honduras in its 1996 CSBM submission, include a riverine, counterdrug exercise sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command. In 1995, the exercise included Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, operating under U.S. sponsorship. In 1997, this exercise included El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. According to Salvadoran reports, the 1997 exercise was based in both El Salvador and Honduras, and featured combined operations in the waterways included in the Gulf of Fonseca system, a potential flash point for conflict. A

related exercise, denominated Coastal Forces 98, included Guatemala and El Salvador, along with the United States (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission).

More explicit international counterdrug coordination (beyond U.S. bilateral arrangements) has not been reported or is unavailable. A series of subregional meetings, which have taken place annually since 1991, have recommended the adoption of several concrete mechanisms, ranging from coordinated air and ship control measures to intelligence sharing, demonstrate a commitment to a subregional approach that, to date, has apparently not born fruit. Cooperation is still primarily limited to bilateral programs with the United States and information sharing networks among the regional police forces. (Guatemala 1997 CSBM Submission).

Other examples of independent activity, consistent with the institutional focus on criminal activity, include combined naval operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua (El Salvador 1996 CSBM Submission). Cooperation in the Gulf is important since it has been the site of much security competition between the countries that border that body of water. In addition, there have been a number of coordinated actions between Honduras and Nicaragua on their common border. Honduras reported (1996 CSBM Submission) four patrols with Nicaragua in 1995 to protect populations, fight crime, protect coffee, and avoid fishing problems. Honduras also conducted an airborne exercise "Francisco Morazon" which included regional participants (El Salvador 1998 CSBM Submission).

In addition to these contacts between the militaries of the region, substantial police activity is reported as declared data under individual CSBM submissions. For instance, Guatemala reports a series of meetings in the area of vehicle theft that

recommend the creation of a regional information net and enhanced border controls. But again, as in the case of concrete measures in the fight against illegal drug trafficking, there are no reports of actual activity in this regard.

Realism hypothesizes that cooperative burden sharing activity should either be driven by the United States and consistent with its security agenda or emerge as a byproduct of strategic balancing. The evidence does not support the balancing hypothesis. The pattern is most concentrated on the three countries most likely to compete with one another – El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Substantive U.S. support to cooperative security initiatives is a more plausible explanation. This is certainly the case with the "Fuerzas Aliadas" exercise programs. Peacekeeping operations in particular appear to be primarily driven by the United States, since there is no obvious reason for the subregion to be concerned with this activity.²⁰ Demining programs also count on U.S. assistance, principally training and logistics support provided in coordination with the Inter-American Defense Board.

That said, independent security cooperation is evident in several important areas, such as the Gulf of Fonseca and the Nicaraguan borders. In addition, independent cooperation in the area of humanitarian operations is growing. Furthermore, the inclusion

²⁰ The United States, grateful for the participation of Central American peace forces in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Haiti (1994) interventions, sees utility in helping to maintain that capacity. The militaries of Central America certainly benefit from the "combat-like" experience and exposure to a large multinational operation. But it is difficult to see how that capacity relates to security threats in Central America since the conclusion of the peace process there.

of Nicaragua in these operations shows independence from the United States, which until very recently has had a policy of limited engagement with that country.

That policy changed dramatically in the wake of Hurricane Mitch in 1998. The U.S. Southern Command deployed an engineer and medical task force to Nicaragua to assist in reconstruction efforts after the hurricane.²¹ The country has now been included in the regular humanitarian exercise program conducted by the United States in Central America.

Institutionalism, as opposed to realism, would expect this pattern, which combines both activity by the United States and independent cooperation between the countries most likely to gain from cooperation. Furthermore, the cooperation is strongest precisely in those areas that present transnational threats – criminal activity on the border, control of the Gulf of Fonseca and humanitarian operations.

Some of this cooperation is nonmilitary, especially that concerned with the transnational threats of criminal activity. In counterdrug operations, an area where the United States is involved, the regional partners are normally police forces. But this behavior is consistent with the rules the institutions established for these areas. Thus, it is fair to say that rule-based behavior dominates over power-based behavior.

²¹ The United States also temporarily established an aviation headquarters in El Salvador, at the invitation of that government. Disaster relief efforts in Honduras were supported from the permanent U.S. based in Honduras.

Analysis

The subregion presents mixed results for our contending hypotheses, but the weight of the evidence seems to support institutionalism. Clearly, there is substantial activity in the area of institution building and rule making, with little evidence that they are directly sponsored by the United States.²² While security institutions sometimes lack the capacity to manage the complex set of rules they create, when resources are available, the rules are implemented. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how institutions will address underlying competition between El Salvador and Honduras.

Cooperative security in Central America has been heavily affected by the hemispheric regime on democracy, with its emphasis on positive civil-military relations, learning between the civilian and military sectors, military transparency and respect for human rights. U.S. programs have supported this trend as well. This has influence the nature of burden sharing, perhaps diverting those efforts away from transnational threats that might entail involvement of the military in police-like activities, towards humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

There are divisions in the subregion which affect efforts to make rules inclusive. A clear divide exists between the four northern countries and Costa Rica and Panama. In addition, some relative gains problems remain unaddressed which have caused friction between Honduras and El Salvador. In addition, evidence of competition for U.S.

²² The United States does pay for much of the operation of CIAV, still functioning in Nicaragua. But that organization has shifted its focus from verification to strengthening democratic institutions. There is also substantial U.S. support for the Central American demining program.

resources shows that underlying rivalries exist between Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Salvadoran dynamism shows up throughout the subregion – particularly in the areas of transparency and burden sharing activities where it is a subregional leader in many respects. El Salvador's excellent relations with the United States may be a cause for envy. However, despite these factors the trend is firmly in the direction of more institutions and more binding rules.

Actual security behavior is less solidly supportive of institutionalism. Transparency and verification are incomplete. There are many mechanisms that have yet to be implemented. But much was accomplished under third parties and the trend since those elements have departed is still positive. Downsizing of defense postures is ongoing and directly related to institutions. Countries of the subregion have been willing to realize absolute gains implied in defense reductions even in the absence of reciprocity. Relative gains were not addressed by institutions, but do not appear to have presented a serious obstacle. Burden sharing is less common among militaries, but does occur. It is difficult to find much balancing behavior in the pattern of security cooperation.

Andean Region "Insecurity Dilemma"

Introduction

Of the three case studies considered in this work, this may be the least developed in terms of its identity as a separate subregional security order. At the northern extreme, Venezuela is pulled towards the Caribbean, where it competes with Mexico and the United States for influence (Griffith, 1998; Kelly, 1997). At its southern extreme, Chile is more closely involved in Southern Cone security issues, at times pulling Peru, a

principal competitor, along with it. Brazil's presence in the Amazon and its shared frontiers with Venezuela, Colombia and Peru acts on the subregion as another centrifugal force.

Nevertheless, a system does emerge from the CSBM data, reviewed in Chapter 4. That system is centered on Colombia, an Andean country with a large expanse of Amazonian territory, coastlines on the Pacific and Atlantic and borders with Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru, as well as Panama and Brazil. Colombia's centrality is important in another regard as well – it has become the focal point of the emblematic transnational security problem in the hemisphere – guerrilla and paramilitary warfare fueled by illicit trafficking in drugs.

Consider this assessment:

Colombia is the most troubled country in the hemisphere. Law and order have broken down. Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary "self defense" organizations are feeding a spiral of violence and corruption that makes "colombianization" a metaphor for a failing state. Every day, about 10 Colombians are killed in politically related strife, while 85 percent of the 30,000 annual homicides are caused by pervasive criminal violence. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced by war. To some, the country appears beyond redemption. (Marcella and Schulz, 1999, p. 1)

The inability of Colombia to contain this violence within its own borders spells security problems for its neighboring states. Brazil, Venezuela and Peru have reacted by deploying forces to the border region – adding to the potential for conflict as well as cooperation. The subregion suffers from an "insecurity dilemma."

There are three practical reasons for including this subregion in the study. First, it frames the transnational security problems of guerrilla movements and the drug trade in a subregional context. Drug trafficking is widely recognized in the hemisphere and the

subregion as a serious transnational issue, affecting countries all along the chain of production, refinement, transit and consumption. Solution of this security problem may require comprehensive subregional cooperation to shut down drug trafficking, cross-border criminality and guerrilla movements.

But in the Andean Ridge, such cooperation carries with it a more serious relative gains dilemma. In this subregion cooperation would have to involve assistance to Colombia to control its own territory. Absolute gains would accrue most directly to that country. There might well be a marked tendency to shirk and allow another state to bear the cost of containing the security problem. The high threat levels that have only recently begun to decline between states of the subregion mean that sensitivity to relative gains will be high. To date, there has been little progress in addressing transnational problems at the subregional level. Bilateral cooperation between Venezuela and Colombia is impressive, as we shall see, but has not been replicated elsewhere.

Second, this case study offers a middle-range example of U.S. influence. The subregion's relationship with the United States is far more direct than that of the Southern Cone, but nowhere nearly as pervasive as in Central America. The U.S. security agenda includes drug trafficking as a major priority and has pursued wide-ranging bilateral agreements, which have sometimes led to dramatic successes, such as the dismantling of the aerial trafficking route over Peru in the mid 1990s. The United States has also acted to contain bilateral conflict in Ecuador and Peru in its role as one of the guarantor states. There are, however, far fewer instances of the United States promoting subregional cooperation here than in Central America.

Third, the case study focuses on a subregion with the least effective experience in regime nesting. The Andean Pact has been bedeviled by defection. Measures taken to revitalize the economic accord, beginning in 1991, increased trade and investment between members countries. But results are poor when viewed comparatively. Furthermore, the Andean Pact has not included security items in its portfolio until very recently. It is important to note, however, that economic relations between Colombia and Venezuela (members of the Group of Three with Mexico) are characterized by a relatively high level of interdependence.

The historical pattern of conflict and cooperation in the subregion, as developed in Chapter 3, showed a major power dynamic to be competition between Colombia and Peru over the status of Ecuador. The Leticia conflict between Colombia and Peru (1932-3) nearly escalated into a major war (Kacowicz, 1997). But from the 1960s on, both Peru and Colombia became involved in protracted internal struggles with powerful guerrilla movements. These internal concerns sapped some of the salience from bilateral security competition remoting to the 19th century.

In any case, that competition was overshadowed in the latter half of the century by the Peru-Ecuador conflict in the Cenapa region, near the Colombian border. The Peruvian-Ecuadorian conflict in 1995 shocked the inter-American policy community in Washington. The assumption that democracies are pacific lay at the heart of initiatives to strengthen democratic institutions and hastened their consolidation in the region.

In the 1970s, arms competition between Colombia and Venezuela also became an important security concern. The pattern became one of bilateral competition between Peru and Ecuador on the one hand, and Colombia and Venezuela on the other, while to

the south Peru continued to compete with Chile. These rivalries still vibrate at the core of security relations in the subregion. Tension remains high between Colombia and Venezuela; the 1987 Caldas incident was categorized as a military dispute, but lower level conflict in the 1990s has also been observed (Mares and Bernstein, 1998). Significantly, while much of Latin America downsized its military forces in the 1990s, the countries of this subregion did not (Dominguez, 1998).

However, it is difficult to cast the subregion as it entered the 1990s as one solely based on power-constraining-power. Venezuela, despite border disputes with both Colombia and Guyana and an exposed national territory (Kelly, 1990), has remained remarkably pacific throughout this century. Venezuelan troops have not been involved in outside armed conflicts and until their deployment to Central America under ONUCA had not taken part in any military operations under the OAS or the United Nations, with the exception of small observer missions (Romero, 1998). In addition, Venezuela has taken pains to reduce conflict with Colombia. Torres (1998) argues that Venezuela expanded its economic ties with Colombia precisely to overcome the effects of their border dispute. And Colombia, despite a long history of internal violence, has not taken territory by force from another state since the wars of independence.

The security dilemma does not appear to operate as the principal dynamic. More reasonably, the "insecurity dilemma" centered on Colombia drives competition and cooperation. The presence of powerful guerrilla movements based in the headwaters of the Amazon and along all Colombia's international borders, as well as a shared drug trafficking problem, cross-border criminality, displaced persons, ecological damage, and

corruption are transnational security issues that require some form of subregional cooperation.

Colombia will not be able to solve these significant problems without cooperation. It is true that Peru, acting virtually alone in the early 1990s dramatically improved its security solution vis-à-vis guerrilla activity. However, the costs of independent action were very high and Peruvian tactics provoked harsh criticism from the inter-American community for disregard of democratic institutions and human rights. In any case, it is doubtful that such a strategy could now succeed. Since the early 1990s, the FARC, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) and paramilitary militias have become increasingly involved in the drug trade, which now provides them with an important source of financial support (Marcella and Schulz, 1999).

The conflict between Ecuador and Peru, at least for the time being, appears to be resolved, although solution to the conflict required third party mediation from outside the subregion. The guarantor countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States helped create the conditions for peace (an example of security cooperation among Southern Cone countries). Ultimately, a comprehensive peace agreement emerged that included side benefits intended to redress relative gains problems inherent in the border settlement between Peru and Ecuador. But peace negotiations were accompanied by arms build-ups in both countries and it is too early to confirm that a new relationship, based on a shared set of security priorities, will take hold.

What role might institutions and rules play in the resolution of security problems in the subregion? Let us now look at those institutions in more detail.

Institutionalization: Organizations and Rules

All the countries in the subregion demonstrate a strong commitment to hemispheric organizations – primarily the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Inter-American Defense Board and College and the DMAs. This is most marked in Colombia, which has maintained an important presence in the Board and College. Colombia held leadership positions in both organizations during the 1990s, endowed a chair at the College, commanded the MARMINCA headquarters in the Central American demining effort and hosted the third DMA. In all of those organizations, Colombia maintained a posture clearly supportive of democracy and human rights, as we shall see in more detail later.

The principal problem in the subregion, terrorist acts by guerrilla units funded largely by the drug trade, has elicited some cooperative action. Peru hosted the inter-American terrorism conference that led to the convention described in Chapter 4. There is also strong cooperation in legal regime established by CICAD, again as presented in Chapter 4.

Subregional institutions and rule making in the Andean Ridge suffer by comparison with the other regions. However, two bilateral cases stand out – cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela over transnational concerns and the recently signed peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru.

As a result of a 1991 agreement to reactivate border coordination, which had lain relatively dormant since an earlier agreement in 1978, Colombia and Venezuela began an extensive phase of institution building for cooperative security. Meetings occur twice a year between the chiefs of each of the armed forces. Lower level meetings, between local

commanders, occur more frequently in the border zone. Most impressively, Colombia and Venezuela established an Ad Hoc Commission on Frontier Incidents and an organization known as COMBIFRON (*Comisión Binacional Fronteriza Colombo-Venezolana*). The commission has actively intervened to address alleged border violations by security forces.

At the third Defense Ministerial, held in Cartagena de Indias in 1998, the Colombian and Venezuelan delegates made a joint presentation on COMBIFRON (Colombia and Venezuela, 1998) which demonstrates a sophisticated approach to transnational security issues in the subregion. The presentation noted that the shared border, one of the most dynamic frontiers of the continent, had suffered serious security problems since the beginning of the 1990s – principally due to the presence of cross-border "narcoguerrilla" activity. Solutions to this problem were hampered by lack of communication and understanding between the military forces and police of both countries.

In August, 1996, the defense ministers decided to create a bilateral commission to promote direct relations between border units, allow for the exchange of information and coordinate of operations. Responsibility for carrying out these initiatives fell to COMBIFRON.

COMBIFRON is based on two principal documents: 1) a standing order which prescribes its mission, composition and functions and 2) a standing operating procedure which establishes the norms for continual cooperation between military commanders of border units, from the platoon level up.

The mission of COMBIFROM is to supervise fulfillment of obligations, promote mechanisms to solve security problems and strengthen relations between armed forces. It is composed of the intelligence chiefs of each country's joint staff, representatives from each of the armed forces and the national police. Its functions include the execution of a program of inspections and permanent liaison with counterparts. Information is shared through a system of border communications and future plans include the sharing of data through a binational computer network. While it is too early to judge the impact of this organization on actual operations, the many commitments that it represents offer important evidence that, at least in the case of Venezuela and Colombia, the trend is towards a cooperative approach to address transnational security problems.

Military relations between Ecuador and Peru were understandably strained during most of the 1990s. But since the last conflict, both Peru and Ecuador have reported their efforts to reinitiate CSBMs ruptured by the 1995 war. In March 1996, the two countries established a series of detailed measures for implementation in the conflict area and committed themselves to supporting the peace process of the guarantor nations. Among the measures proposed were mutual humanitarian aid, bilateral intelligence conferences down to the regional level and coordination for search and rescue operations. Some of the measures reported bear more symbolic than actual value. Ecuador reported a measure in 1994 that would have established an "Ecuadorian-Peruvian Center for Peace Studies," to promote shared patrimony between Ecuador and Peru to and develop a culture of peace between the two countries. At this time, Ecuador was in the process of rearming for a war it would initiate the following year.

Nevertheless, the comprehensive and binding agreement forged by the two countries, with the help of the guarantor states, offers a dense network of specific rules regarding not simply military aspects, but also political, cultural and economic factors. The rules include measures to ensure the Ecuador has an outlet to the Amazon, while respected Peruvian sovereignty as established by the 1942 peace accord.

There is far less institutionalization between Colombia and Peru and Colombia and Ecuador on the transnational problems that addressed through COMBIFRON. Both Peru and Ecuador have criticized the Colombian peace process, which has temporarily ceded territory to the FARC in hopes of reviving stalled negotiations (Marcella and Schulz, 1999). This action at least temporarily increases the strength of the guerrilla movement in Colombia, now recognized as a threat to subregional security. However, with the resolution of bilateral problems between Ecuador and Peru, more helpful cooperation may emerge.

The impact of the United States on subregional institutions is mixed. The United States has been directly involved in two aspects of regional institution building. First and foremost has been its important contribution to the success of MOMEF. But the second area of U.S. involvement has been far less successful. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has promoted the creation of a multilateral center for coordinating counterdrug activities, which have largely consisted of bilateral arrangements with the Andean and Central American countries. As noted in Chapter 4, that proposal met with significant resistance from the countries of the subregion.

Several important conclusions flow from this analysis. First, there is evidence of institutionalization and binding rules regarding security behavior. Agreements between

Colombia and Venezuela and between Peru and Ecuador stand out in that regard. Second, institutions emerged in precisely the most conflicted issue areas. They include comprehensive agreements and verification mechanisms that address both the transnational security problem centered in Colombia and the interstate competition between Peru and Ecuador. Third, there is no subregional security institution of comparable strength to either Central America or the Southern Cone. What about the pattern of actual security behavior? Evidence will show that concrete activity is limited principally to Colombia and Venezuela.

Transparency/Verification

By comparison with other subregions, contacts between Andean countries have been far less significant. The most prevalent activity has taken place in the institutionalization of bilateral security meetings, mostly contacts between intelligence officers at the national level, with some activity down to local commanders in border areas.

Peru's military diplomacy in this regard has been fairly impressive. Peru has bilateral meetings on military intelligence three times a year with each of the armed forces of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. These meetings are complemented by other meetings between regional commanders. Much of the activity at this level began during the early 1990s (Peru 1996 CSBM Submission). In addition, Peru reported in 1998 that it had signed conventions with Chile for technical logistical cooperation.

Colombia's activity is also worth reviewing (Colombia 1997 CSBM Submission). Colombia has bilateral intelligence meetings with Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay, but most of its activity is with neighboring countries. Colombian military and police meet

twice a year with Brazil. Meetings with Ecuador, Peru and Panama occur down to the local commander's level and take place as often as three times a year. The main purpose of these meetings is to exchange information about regional security problems – especially guerrilla and drug trafficking activities (Colombia 1996 CSBM Submission). In addition, Colombia holds annual meetings between its defense minister and counterparts in Panama, Ecuador and Peru.

Contacts between Colombia and Venezuela under COMBIFRON, by contrast, are frequent and continual. The system of frontier communications sponsored by that organization includes radio links between ground, air and riverine units to coordinate operations and exchange information. This network is complimented by cellular phone between commanders at battalion level and above.

In addition to these substantial contacts, COMBIFRON also promotes verification and conflict resolution. In 1997, when Colombia accused Venezuelan troops of illegally detaining Colombian citizens in Colombian territory, the COMBIFRON verification commission investigated the claim, despite attempts by Venezuelan defense leaders to prevent such action. Ultimately, Colombia's claims were upheld and Venezuela apologized for the transgression. The fact that the verification mechanism functioned as planned is an important indication of the strength of this security institution.

Elsewhere in the subregion, the verification mechanisms under MOMEPA bear consideration. Although overseen by the guarantor states, a significant portion of the operating costs of MOMEPA were borne by Peru and Ecuador. Now, with the absence of a physical presence of the guarantors, troops from Ecuador and Peru have assumed joint verification responsibilities. That these functions are undertaken in a border environment

that is still in process of demarcation, where demining operations are ongoing, is a significant demonstration of mutual confidence.

But none of these transparency mechanisms reaches anywhere near the level of scrutiny focused on the Colombian military as a result of the war and alleged human rights abuses committed by its soldiers. Colombian strategy, tactics, equipment, readiness and conduct are a matter of regional debate in the hemisphere. Frequent visits by senior Colombian officials to Washington as part of bilateral discussions on the problems heightens interest. Military assistance from the United States is subjected to end-use monitoring, adopted under the Leahy amendment (Marcella and Schultz, 1999). There is little about the Colombian armed forces that the neighboring states do not already know.

Defense Posture

In contrast to the evidence presented for institutions and transparency/verification, there is little indication of reductions in defense postures in the Andean Ridge. In fact, the armed forces of Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela have all undergone modernization programs in the 1990s. This is not surprising in the case of Colombia, given the continued presence of a powerful insurgent forces operating in its territory.²³ But Colombia's neighbors have not reduced forces either, despite the successful peace negotiations between Peru and Ecuador, the economic crises in Venezuela, or the growing rapprochement between Peru and Chile.

²³ On the contrary, what is surprising is the low level of mobilization given the severity of the conflict (Marcelli and Schulz, 1999).

Changes in troop deployments do not offer solid evidence of a trend towards reduced defense postures. Ecuador has begun demining operations in the Cenapa area, but progress is slow in Peru, where most of the mines planted by Ecuadorian troops lay. Peru, in an unrelated action, has announced that its military will no longer be involved in combating illicit drug trafficking, a decision made in the wake of the defeat of insurgent groups operating there. The task of dealing with criminal organizations involved in the drug trade has been passed to Peru's well-endowed police force. But in 1998, Peru moved military forces back to its border with Colombia in response to transborder criminality (Marcella and Schulz, 1999). Venezuela, for its part, has always maintained a strong military presence along its border with Colombia.

In any case, there are no subregional agreements that limit arms, troop deployment or maneuvers, as there are in Central America. Perhaps such measures will follow from a resolution of Colombia's internal conflict, in a parallel to the Central American subregion. In the meantime, the lack of institutional rules that address this behavior cluster means that we can gain little analytical traction from this area to evaluate our contending theories. It seems clear that the recent history of interstate tension and the severity of the transnational problems have created a threat environment that is simply not conducive to reduction of threat postures.

The use of the military within Colombia is a story fraught with irony and conflicting claims. Recent human rights reporting by the U.S. State Department shows measurable progress made by the armed forces in investigating alleged violations, instituting training programs and reducing new violations to a low level when compared to other internal conflicts of this kind. And yet human rights organizations continue to

condemn the human rights record of the military and its purported links vigilante groups. There is a perception in the Colombian military that they are victims of an information war that often targets their most successful battlefield commanders.

It is clear that Colombia, at the end of the 1990s, has chosen to maintain as open a society and to respect human rights during the conflict. The alternative presented by the Peruvian experience was not the road taken by Colombia. But the Colombian path, while conforming to the hemispheric democracy regime, cannot succeed without massive subregional and regional assistance. This will require a high level of burden sharing from neighboring countries.

It may be, in fact, that the lack of a trend towards reduced defense postures may be in anticipation of a subregional effort to deal with the transnational problems spilling over the borders of Colombia. Venezuela, for one, has linked its defense posture in part to the conflict in Colombia. But this would imply that burden-sharing activities are being developed to deal with the Colombia problem. Let us now turn to that behavior cluster to see what the evidence shows.

Burden Sharing

Along Colombia's 6,000 kilometer border, there are 71 guerrilla fronts and 45 paramilitary militias ("Regional Security," 1999). Many are involved in drug trafficking and other forms of criminality that directly degrades security in neighboring states. Security cooperation between states is urgently required. As an example, consider the binational security agenda between Colombia and Venezuela, which includes:

fighting off the insurgents, denying them control of the border areas, checking continuing actions of drug mafias associated with them, dealing with the large number of undocumented immigrants, and mitigating

rapidly progressive environmental degradation. (Marcella and Schulz, 1999, p. 19)

Cooperation to address this agenda is present in the Andean subregion, but only the cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela can be compared to the activity reported in the Southern Cone.

In total, the Venezuelan Army has 20,000 soldiers along a 2,000 plus kilometer border, supported by air and naval bases, as well as ground radar ("Regional security," 1999). Activities along the border range from joint action against guerrillas and common criminals, to joint civic action projects such as infrastructure repair and new construction conducted by engineer troops. Colombia and Venezuela also conduct joint naval operations in the Gulf of Venezuela – a waterway with a disputed boundary.

But elsewhere, the pattern is different. Ecuador and Colombia do cooperate along their common border, but to a much lesser degree. Cooperation with Brazil is ad hoc and low level, despite the substantial Brazilian military presence near the border. With Panama, there is even less cooperation, due to the limited control the government has over its border province of Darién.

The U.S. presence is marked in all counterdrug programs in the region, although this has not spurred independent subregional cooperation as in Central America. The countries of this subregion, as yet, have not developed a coordinated mechanism for this particularly crucial form of military cooperation.

Other types of cooperative activity are present. Colombia has entered into an agreement with Brazil and Peru to offer medical services in hospitals to military and civilians of all three countries (Colombia 1996 CSBM Submission). The U.S.-led

UNITAS program has offered opportunities for some naval coordination: both Ecuador and Colombia join the United States for naval maneuvers off the Colombian Pacific Coast (Ecuador 1995 CSBM Submission). Peru conducted naval operations in support of civic action on the Putumayo river with Colombian forces, as well as similar operations with Bolivians on Lake Titicaca (Peru 1996 CSBM Submission). Peru reported some combined operations with Chile. For instance, Peruvian forces worked with Chilean engineers on road construction in the south of Chile (Peru 1997 CSBM Submission).

Analysis

The high threat levels that predominate in the subregion have undermined cooperation, not attracted it. The general pattern is squarely supportive of realism, even though the balancing hypotheses proved untestable due to the pervasiveness of transnational security problems.

Low levels of subregional institutionalization also conform to realist predictions. Lack of hemispheric consensus on the use of military to fight the drug trafficking threat means that there is not even a forum in which to discuss security cooperation in this area. But where institutions are available and linkage to other issues is strong, cooperation has emerged. Venezuela and Colombia have institutionalized security cooperation at a level commensurate to the Southern Cone. Peru and Ecuador reached an historic accord with the help of the guarantor states.

These positive trends may eventually lead to subregional cooperation, but that is unlikely to emerge without sustained assistance from outside the subregion, principally from the United States.

Conclusions

With the exception of the Andean subregion, the evidence provided by these cases supports an institutionalist explanation more readily than one based on realism. While there is some balancing behavior present, the strength of subregional institutions, the density of their rule making and the generally compliant security behavior demonstrate that subregional security regimes work. They work most effectively when they are nested with other regimes that reinforce their prescriptions for behavior.

Let us review the major findings in more detail. In the area of institution building, it is clear that far more activity here is present than realism can explain. To begin, subregional institutions are generally stronger, more prevalent and more effective than their hemispheric counterparts – a finding that validates the institutionalist approach. Secondly, they enjoy broad legitimacy, are reinforced in other subregional forums and represent important investments in time and personnel from their member states. They do not always have the resources to carry out their ambitious plans of action – Central America suffers in this regard – but their impact is growing, not waning.

Rules are frequently binding at the subregional level, a marked difference from what we discovered at the hemispheric level. This has progressed furthest among states that share security problems, especially complex transnational issues. Again, this finding is not consistent with realism. There is a problem, however, with inclusiveness, even in the reduced context of subregional security orders. Binding rules with strong verification were possible only among the trilateral states of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in the Southern Cone; between the four states of Central America with military forces; and between Colombia and Venezuela and between Peru and Ecuador in the Andean Ridge.

To the extent that rules are comprehensive enough to adequately address shared problems, the number of states willing to obligate themselves to those rules declines to include only those intimately involved in the issue that a particular cooperative activity addresses.

Cooperative security behavior likewise is more consistent with institutionalism than with realism. Balancing is still present in all regions, but with the exceptions of Argentina's new relationship with the United States, continued U.S. presence in Honduras, and growing U.S. assistance to Colombia, balancing only shows up as a secondary effect in behavior patterns. Although this may be due to the partial nature of the evidence, it is an important finding nonetheless.

All the subregions studied strengthened transparency and verification mechanisms to some measure. The absence of measures between Bolivia and Chile does show, however, that underlying rivalries can still limit cooperation.

Defense postures, in general, attracted less attention than transparency, although significantly more progress was possible at the subregional level than at the hemispheric level. Clearly, movement was most marked in Central America. Countries there were able to downsize to realize absolute gains even without immediate reciprocity. The relative lack of progress in the Andean Ridge is surely related to the serious security problems still affecting that subregion. In the Southern Cone, lagging progress on conventional arms may point up a relative gains problem. Since these countries produce arms and arms producers have more to lose than consumers do, the differences between that subregion and Central America could relate to relative gains. Here is some countervailing evidence for realism.

Burden sharing activity was reported in all subregions. Burden sharing appears to occur where problems require combined efforts and where resources are available for a multilateral approach. We found a puzzle in Central America – a disconnect between the ambitious organizations and the actual burden sharing activity. But where the United States was willing to sponsor such activity, it occurred. In the Andean Ridge, the lack of reported cooperation between Colombia and her neighbors other than Venezuela was significant and supportive of realism.

To compare the subregions more systematically, we need to recall the principal differences between the cases: the impact of the United States, the nature of security problems and the degree of nesting. U.S. behavior is generally as predicted. The United States acts as a balancer in Southern Cone, approaches a security manager in Central America, while the Andean subregion offers a mixed picture. In any case, the United States was not the principal factor behind institution building in any of the subregions. In fact, some efforts appeared in the Southern Cone to maintain the area free of U.S. influence.

Realism predicted that transnational security problems would be the most intractable to cooperative approaches. Yet we saw in Central America that these problems were the most likely to be approached cooperatively. The cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela shows a similar pattern.

Finally, the high incidence of nesting in Central America and the Southern Cone contrasts to the low degree in the Andean Ridge. This correlates well to the general pattern of subregional institution building, rule making and cooperative security behavior. Linkages have raised expectations of larger absolute gains, provided more opportunities

for negotiation, and extended the shadow of the future as countries come to anticipate more and broader cooperation.

There are outliers. In the Southern Cone, the hyperactive peacekeeping program of Argentina stands out, as does the deep involvement in the transparency regime by Chile. That transparency is a puzzle, given that Chile is neither reducing its defense posture or engaging in burden sharing activities at levels commensurate with the other large states of the subregion. In Central America, El Salvador stands out as leader in the areas of transparency and subregional burden sharing. These anomalies can perhaps best be approached by connecting civil-military relations internal to the state with the international context in which it operates. We will explore this possibility in the conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

Review of the Evidence

The purpose of this chapter is to review the evidence presented in the study and consider in what ways the analysis may contribute to institutionalist and realist theory. The chapter also includes a discussion of the limitations of system-level theory and a brief excursion that suggests examination of the interactions between international and domestic institutions may improve the explanatory power of institutionalism. Finally, I conclude with a modest policy proposal.

On the whole, that evidence offers significantly more support to institutionalism than realism. With the exception of the Andean Ridge, this is true for all of the cases studied, both at the hemispheric and subregional levels. That is not to say that power and interests do not play an important role. The U.S. security agenda holds as the single most important factor affecting the evolution of both the post-WWII and post-Cold War hemispheric security regimes. U.S. power and resources are usually necessary to establish hemispheric organizations. Consistent with realism, Latin American states are reluctant to entrust their security to those organizations. The rules they promote are for the most part voluntary, partial and weakly supported by verification measures. Furthermore, in each of the subregional cases studied, balancing patterns are visible in the observed cooperative security behavior.

But institutions also have a strong, independent impact on security rules and behavior. At the hemispheric level, the security agenda escapes U.S. control. Organizations facilitate balancing against the United States that would not be possible otherwise. They restore symmetry, giving voice to smaller countries and allowing other security priorities to emerge. Linkages with other issue areas enhance the bargaining power of smaller states. A more comprehensive review of the evidence reminds us of how that occurred.

In the post-WWII period, the United States used institutional approaches to build a “multilateral” system of continental defense through the late 1950s, but that system ultimately floundered as Latin American states began to resist the United States on a number of issues: the relationship of the IADB and the OAS, Cuba policy, anti-communism, and the formation of a permanent inter-American peace force. In the 1990s, the United States once again embraced “hemispherism” and a hemispheric security regime reemerged. That regime effectively developed security rules to promote transparent security behavior – a consensus goal in the Americas. Clear linkages to the “democracy” regime bolstered transparency in military matters. Table 6-1 summarizes some of the key historical events in the evolution of the IASS since WWII.

But U.S. efforts to develop military capacity to address transnational threats were far less successful. And, more telling, smaller countries were able to use the hemispheric regime to advance their own priorities; examples include a multilateral evaluation mechanism for the counterdrug effort, a ban on anti-personnel mines and the gradual marginalization of the IADB.

Table 6-1: Historical Evolution of Hemispheric Security

Period	Key Event
WWII and aftermath	1942: IADB ESTABLISHED -- Oldest multilateral regional security body. Promotes interoperability and begins planning for continental defense.
	1945: ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC – Reaffirms the principle of collective responsibility for the security of the hemisphere.
	1947: INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE – Provides the machinery to maintain peace and security in the hemisphere. Provides for the Advisory Defense Council.
	1948: NINTH CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES – Establishes the OAS and confirms charter of Inter-American Defense Board.
Cold War	1954: CARACAS DECLARATION – Establishes communism as trigger threat for the Rio Treaty.
	1962: COMBINED QUARANTINE FORCE – Collective action during Cuban missile crisis.
	1965: INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE – High water mark of hemispheric security cooperation.
	1967: BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE – Effort to rationalize IASS defeated.
Post Cold War	1991: SANTIAGO DECLARATION -- Commitment to democracy.
	1993: WASHINGTON PROTOCOL -- Commitment to the defense of democracy.
	1994/5: OAS HEMISPHERIC SECURITY COMMITTEE -- New vision of cooperative security.
	1995/8: SANTIAGO AND SAN SALVADOR CSBM DECLARATIONS -- Codified rules for cooperative security.

Although we yet lack sufficient historical perspective, it appears that the 1990s attempt to organize hemispheric security may have also passed its high water mark: the introduction of the concept of cooperative security in 1994 and the creation of a permanent hemispheric security committee in the OAS in 1995. The dynamics of institutional politics under conditions of asymmetry militate against further centralization

and rationalization of hemispheric security institutions and preclude the creation of more binding rules with strong verification.

Table 6-2 summarizes the key observations for security organizations, rules and behavior at the hemispheric level in the 1990s. The institutional design suffers from tension over the role of the IADB in the OAS, creating a division between the political and technical-military bodies of the system. This division reflects the unwillingness of states in the region to create a powerful regional security body that could serve U.S. interests; it also reflects uncertainty about the role of the military in the security context of the 1990s. This uncertainty appears in the make-up of the hemispheric security agenda, which although multilateral and comprehensive, does not enjoy consensus on core security threats or the role of the armed forces. This is especially true for burden sharing. Although numerous rules exist at the hemispheric level related to burden sharing to address transnational threats (drugs, terrorism, smuggling of small arms), few include a military component.

Because of the divided structure and the lack of a consensus agenda, few rules are binding and verifiable. Transparency is an exception, due primarily to its strong linkage to the democracy regime. Finally, in the area of security behavior, three important observations stand out. First, transparency is fairly wide spread. Second, substantial burden sharing and some reductions in defense posture are taking place despite the absence of strong hemispheric rules. Third, all the behavior clusters reveal geographic patterns that center on specific subregions. This evidence led us to examine the three subregional case studies.

Table 6-2: Characteristics of the Hemispheric Security Regime

Characteristics		Observation
Organizational Features	Forum	Many overlapping organizations, many with US support. No centralized system. Fractured at top between the IADB and OAS.
	Agenda	Multilateral issue agenda, but many security issues have no agreed military component. Transnational threats problematic. Many instances of institutional balancing.
	Linkages	Democracy crosscuts cooperative security regime. Economic linkages underdeveloped at hemispheric level.
Rule Creation	Bindingness	Largely non-binding and voluntary. Deference to subregional contexts.
	Verifiability	Weak network of contacts only. Formats gradually being designed to facilitate cross-checking.
Cooperative Security Behavior	Transparency	Well developed; strongest behavior cluster; linked to democracy.
	Defense Postures	Weak: only weapons of mass destruction and anti-personnel landmines. Deference to subregional contexts.
	Burden Sharing	Extremely contentious. Much U.S. support. Numerous examples at subregional level.

The hemispheric security institution clearly falls well short of the ideal type – the cooperative security regime laid out in Chapter 2. If the shortfall had followed patterns expected by realism, then we would have to conclude that realism provides a better explanation than institutionalism. But, in fact, the organization and rules of the IASS allowed institutional balancing to take place, which thwarted U.S. attempts to steer the multilateral security agenda and the evolution of the security institutions themselves, despite periodic acts of reassurance on the part of the United States.

Unlike institutions at the hemispheric level, subregional institutions clearly facilitated cooperation necessary to achieve absolute gains, whether in transparency, defense postures or burden sharing. Subregional institutions added specificity to rules established at the hemispheric level, making them more binding and more comprehensive. Verification through an extensive network of contacts assured states that neighbors were respecting those rules, although no formal mechanisms for reciprocity were developed. Relative gains dilemmas did not, for the most part, prevent cooperation. Where linkages were present, they generally reinforced cooperative behavior.

This was especially true in the Southern Cone. While no formal security organization emerged there, numerous, overlapping organizations and structures – some with formal ties to MERCOSUR, the economic pact – combined to guide security behavior in ways that promoted cooperation. Within the Southern Cone, the MERCOSUR countries – particularly Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay – achieved unprecedented military transparency and burden sharing capability. Transparency measures went well beyond those established at the hemispheric level, to include prior notice of maneuvers and deployments in border regions, detailed sharing of budget data, and visits to sensitive installations. In burden sharing, the scope of peacekeeping exercises and actual deployments was astounding. Some balancing behavior was evident, such as the strong U.S.-Argentina relationship, the relative reluctance of Chile to participate in burden sharing, and the lack of contacts between Chile and Bolivia. But on the whole, institutionalist expectations were confirmed by the evidence.

In Central America, more formal security organizations emerged, such as the Security Commission and the CACAF, that promoted an aggressive agenda of

cooperative security behavior. These organizations were subordinated to the formal integration structure of SICA and guided by a well-defined concept for subregional security, dubbed “democratic security.” The organizations developed an ambitious plan of action to forward that concept. In short, all the formal elements of a cooperative security regime were present. Actual cooperative behavior often fell short of the institutional standards, but where the United States or other countries provided resources to support implementation of the plan of action, cooperative behavior generally emerged, precisely in the areas that promised the greatest absolute gains.¹

In the Andean Ridge countries, the evidence appears more supportive of realism. Countries there were generally unable to cooperate to address the most significant threat to the subregion – the nearly intractable security problems along the borders of Colombia. The United States was unable to spur multilateral cooperation and no linkages to other unifying regimes were operable. However, cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela was significant in the areas of transparency, verification and burden sharing. The activity was supported by a strong binational organization and a rich network of cross-border contacts. This security integration parallels the high levels of economic integration that characterize Colombia and Venezuela. Elsewhere in the subregion, Ecuador and Peru ultimately agreed to binding measures with verification necessary to implement the peace accord in the Cenapa region brokered by the guarantor states. The

¹ The trade integration system in Central America shows some of these same characteristics. It features a formal structure and an ambitious agenda, while actual progress implementing the measures lags considerably (Jata and Weintraub, 1997).

accord is comprehensive in scope, with links to economic development and resource exploitation that may prove key to maintaining peace.

Table 6-3 summarizes the subregional case studies in terms of the key characteristics identified by theory.

Table 6-3: Characteristics of Subregional Security Regimes

Characteristics		Southern Cone	Central America	Andean Ridge
Security Context		Emergence of Mercosur. Argentine drop in relative power. Absolute gains in defense postures.	Formal integration movement. Reductions under external control. Absolute gains in burden sharing.	Colombia-Venezuelan economic cooperation. Transnational threats. Absolute gains in all areas.
Organizational Features	Forum	No central forum; numerous overlapping organizations.	Hierarchical, centralized.	COMBIFRON for Colombia-Venezuela. MOMEF for Ecuador-Peru.
	Agenda	Emerging agenda on subregional security.	Emerging agenda on problems of organized and common criminality.	No consensus on subregional security issues except Colombia-Venezuela.
	Linkages	Strong linkages to Mercosur and hemispheric security institution.	Directly linked to other areas of integration through SICA.	Economic linkages between Colombia-Venezuela and Ecuador-Peru (through peace accord).
Rule Creation	Binding-ness	Rules more binding at subregional level: e.g. defense expenditures and border deployments.	Much more binding than hemispheric counterpart (CA Democratic Security Treaty).	Colombia-Venezuela much stronger than hemispheric institution. Ecuador-Peru bound via outside mediation.
	Verifiability	Deep network of military contacts. Strong U.S. presence.	International verification very strong. Underdeveloped subregionally.	Colombia-Venezuela much stronger than hemispheric institution. Ecuador-Peru bound through MOMEF.

Table 6-3 -- continued

Characteristics		Southern Cone	Central America	Andean Ridge
Cooperative Security Behavior	Transparency	Cuts across rivalries. Reveals sensitive information.	Low levels of implementation. El Salvador is the outlier.	Colombia is transparent due to internationalization of civil war.
	Defense Postures	Very little -- more concerned with power projection.	Downsizing and strengthening of civilian control is ongoing. Some saber rattling	No downsizing except that associated with MOMEPA in Cenapa region.
	Burden Sharing	Peacekeeping operations strong. US-Argentine connection. Little competition for buffer states.	Dependent: occurs with U.S. assistance.	Colombia-Venezuela well developed. Failure to realize absolute gains.

Comparison of the subregional case studies shows that the United States did influence cooperative security in those areas as predicted. In Central America, the U.S. role approximated that of a security manager, while in the Southern Cone, the U.S. served primarily as a security partner and/or rival. Comparison of the subregions in terms of their security dilemmas shows that transnational problems may be more difficult to resolve than traditional security challenges. Finally, comparing nesting/linkages across the case studies shows them to be critically important in broadening the prospects for iteration and the scope for absolute gains. Cooperative security did not always emerge in an orderly fashion -- "grassroots" dynamism produced an unruly set of individual measures in some cases. But if the structures and behaviors were not always perfectly hierarchical, they nevertheless formed a coherent whole that facilitated cooperative security behaviors in important ways.

Contributions to Theory

Aside from a general endorsement of institutionalist approaches, this study makes a number of potentially useful contributions to international relations theory. First, the study helps us to better understand security cooperation in asymmetric orders. Analysis of the interplay between the United States and Latin American countries in the context of hemispheric security organizations contributes both to institutionalism, through enhanced understanding of institutional political processes identified by Keohane and Nye (1989), and to realism, especially in the area of hegemonic regime theory.

Keohane and Nye developed a new understanding of institutional politics in their examination of cooperation under situations that they described as “complex interdependence” (1989). Those situations approximated what Deutsch (1957) would consider a political security community: a system of states with high levels of economic interaction, information exchange and an understanding that use or threat of force within the community was not legitimate. These conditions do not entail in Latin America and yet the processes identified as belonging to complex interdependence are operable. Inclusive decision-making procedures restore symmetry. Organizational forums allow smaller states to voice their preferences. Linkages reinforce multilateralism. Contrary to Krasner (1991), power cannot always be used effectively to dictate agendas and determine players. Institutional balancing is possible.

When the United States chooses to promote its agenda through multilateral institutions, the process by which power is translated into outcomes becomes essential to our understanding of international relations. Institutionalism – with its focus on organizational structure and rules – is much better equipped to understanding this process

than realism. The analysis conducted in this study of the IASS during WWII and the post Cold War era shows how the dynamics of institutional balancing and bandwagoning are supported by institutional features. Table 6-4 provides some examples of this institutional balancing, taken from our analysis in Chapter 4.

Table 6-4: Balancing Acts – Institutional Politics

Characteristics		US Reassurance	Institutional Balancing
Organizational Features	Forum	Support to multilateralism Sponsorship of leadership roles for other countries	Mexican resistance to closer IADB-OAS relationship
	Agenda	Endorsement of transparency	Mexican exclusion of IADB in Education for Peace role. Brazil (et al.): resistance to new focus on peacekeeping and counterdrug operations. Canadian inclusion of mine ban.
	Linkages	Support to democratic institutions and training for improved civil-military relations	Caribbean attempts to broaden security agenda to include economic security.
Rule Creation	Bindingness	Efforts to enhance response mechanisms (democracy, natural disasters).	Mexico (et al.): resistance to legitimizing “democratic intervention.”
	Verifiability	Offers use of “open skies” aircraft. Visits to US installations.	Development of multilateral evaluation mechanism.

At the same time that institutionalism is bolstered by these findings, hegemonic realist theory is undermined. Multilateral institutions cannot be fully co-opted by powerful states. While power may be fundamental to the creation and perhaps the

maintenance of these institutions, power cannot determine their direction. Furthermore, it is not enough for a hegemon to simply bear the costs of regime maintenance in order to ensure the survival of multilateral institutions. The hegemon must also engage in acts of reassurance to forestall balancing. Ultimately, if mutual interests are not strong, no act of reassurance, side payment or leadership outlet will suffice to maintain the viability of hemispheric institutions.

Second, the analysis in this study shows that the debate over relative gains between institutionalists and realists appears overdrawn. In the case studies analyzed here, once institutions were established to facilitate flows of relevant information between member states, relative gains concerns rarely prevented cooperative action where such action could realize absolute gains. “Hard” verification schemes and formal mechanisms for reciprocity were not required. The numerous military contacts that exist in the Southern Cone, for instance, produce a large volume of information and assurance that neighbors were committed to subregional security. This has permitted extensive burden sharing activity, despite the presence of arms modernization programs in each of the larger states.

In areas where cooperative security behavior falls short of the ideal, the most logical explanation does not lie with obstacles associated with relative gains, but rather with the absence of strong mutual interests – that is, the absence of common absolute gains from cooperation. The relative lack of reductions in defense expenditures in the Southern Cone, for instance, is best explained by the fact that the countries of the subregion want to maintain viable military capability to project their image internationally (through peacekeeping operations), while protecting their domestic arms

manufacturing base. The relative success of defense reductions in Central America, which continues even in the absence of international verification missions, is surely related to the pressing need to prioritize social and economic development in that subregion.

Third, the strong connection observed between transparency in military matters and the preservation of democracy bolsters the democratic peace argument that transparency inherent in democratic governments offers the best explanation for the relative lack of conflict between democracies (Starr, 1999). Internal transparency reinforces external transparency, which precludes worst case security analysis and demonization of the leadership of potential rival states.

While in Latin American studies, the belief that democracies are more pacific than military-authoritarian regimes is widespread (Varas, 1985), supporting evidence has not been easy to muster. The claim that democracies rarely engage in conflict with each other has not fared well. Democracies have fought each other; Ecuador and Peru have done so several times since 1981. Democracies have also been attacked; Costa Rica, a country without an army, was invaded twice by Nicaragua (Mares, 1997). Political leaders of democracies have militarized relations with their neighbors in order to garner popular support – in Colombia and Venezuela, as well as in Ecuador and Peru.²

² See Mansfield and Snyder (1995) and Mares (1997).

Pittman (1988) studied the impact of democratization on disputes in the Southern Cone and concluded that its effect on most subregional conflicts was negligible.³ He found that the governments in the Southern Cone “pursue their own national interests and geopolitical goals regardless of the type of regime in power” (Pittman, 1988, p. 51).⁴ Van Klaveren (1996) agrees that regime type is a poor predictor of changes in strategic orientation towards a state’s principal partners. Mares (1997) is blunt in his rejection of this approach.

As Norden’s (1998) review of recent scholarship on consolidation of democracy reveals, there is still a lingering concern over the remaining traces of military autonomy in the region.⁵ But the newest research on how that might affect prospects for peace in the region has proven inconclusive. As Hirst (1998) notes, there is a consensus that the

³ In the case of Bolivian aspirations to gain a “salida al mar,” the last serious negotiations occurred from 1975-1978, years coinciding with authoritarian governments. Pittman (1988) concludes that the impact of democratization on this dispute “must be regarded as nil” (p. 34). With regard to the Argentina-Chilean dispute over the islands in the Beagle Channel, and by extension, control over the sea space and claims in Antarctica, he finds that democratization in Argentina may have been a factor in successful resolution, but was by no means the only or principal cause.

⁴ It is important to note that others have challenged this assertion, at least as it applies to Argentina-Brazilian relations. In the same volume that published Pittman’s (1988) conclusions, Russell (1988) makes a powerful argument that the emergence of democracy in Argentina greatly facilitated agreements with Brazil that led to cooperation in the Río de la Plata region. However, Russell’s counter-argument can be questioned. Cooperation in this region predated the return of democracy to the region – the Corpus-Itaipú agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, a landmark agreement to jointly develop hydro-electric resources, was signed October 19, 1979. Russell treats this agreement as an exception.

⁵ Recent study on the issue includes research on emerging democracy in Eastern Europe and the newly independent Soviet bloc states (Lovell and Albright, 1997).

new wave of democratization has an effect on interstate security relations, but little agreement on how.

This study of hemispheric and subregional security institutions shows the critical importance of military transparency as an enabler for more cooperative security behavior and the strong linkage that cooperative security and democracy share in this area. Numerous security transparency measures endorsed at the hemispheric level directly empower civilian control of the military. These include preparation of defense white books, reporting on military expenditures and arms transfers, and training of civilians on CSBMs. The end result of these measures is a strengthened democracy and a more pacific security system. This important theme – the links between external and internal institutions – is taken up again in the next section.

Limits of System-level Theories

The purpose of this section is to examine the limitations of system-level institutionalism and to explore extensions that may offer an alternative explanation for the patterns of security cooperation that we have observed at both the regional and subregional levels. The focus here is on the linkage between the security institutions we have examined and institutions at the domestic level, particularly the constellation of civil-military relations that prevails in individual countries. Because of the wide scope of such an undertaking, we will necessarily be selective. The intent here is not to offer definitive explanations, but rather to suggest directions that might prove productive in future research.

A major limitation of system-level theories is that unit-level preferences are assumed, not derived. State behavior is simply the rational outcome of pursuing those

preferences in a given international context. Our previous examination established that context by looking at: (1) the threats and opportunities faced by states (interstate and transnational threats, absolute and relative gains of cooperation); (2) the capacity of cooperative security institutions at both the regional and subregional level and (3) the presence of nesting and linkages (both in terms of their impact on iteration and on relative and absolute gains). State preferences were assumed to derive from an interest in maximizing both absolute and relative gains while preserving core capability to ensure survival in a competitive environment.

Once the state is disaggregated into its military and civilian components, we can investigate the security politics between those sectors and determine preferences as an outcome of that interaction as well as strategic interaction at the system level. Such an investigation does help understand some of the major issues left unexplained by institutionalism at the system level: the Argentine emphasis on peacekeeping operations and Chilean and Salvadoran activism in the area of military transparency, for instance.

Jervis (1999) states that one of the most important ways that institutions can change preferences is through the processes of domestic politics. And yet, theoreticians have "underestimated the importance of these dynamic effects of institutions" (p. 61). By adopting a "two-level game" (Hasenclever et al., 1997) we can look at civilian and military sectors as players who negotiate with each other at the domestic level and with their counterparts at the system level.

A focus on civil-military relations goes well beyond simple comparisons of civilian and military governments, which are not generally useful for explaining interstate behaviors. Acuña and Smith (1994) found for instance that the relationship between

regime type and "military economics" (military expenditures and arms production) was weak (p. 201). They did find, however, that "arms production has a higher level of correlation with the degree of political power exercised by the armed forces than with budgets" (p. 225), pointing to a need to understanding military prerogatives regardless of regime type.

Theory building in this area is incipient; little work has been directed at specifying links between the two levels in the area of security and in determining when those links might matter. But there is much related work: a vast body of literature that addresses the impact of domestic institutions on foreign policy on the one hand, and the bargaining process that goes on between civilian and military on the other hand. Building bridges between these two schools of thought might prove productive.

After Skocpol (1985) triumphantly announced the "return of the state" a new debate on the merits of the institutional approach to understanding international relations exploded in the academic literature (Almond, 1988). The new institutionalists borrowed from the work of March and Olson (1984), among others, to argue that institutions at the domestic level contributed to a better understanding of state preferences. This new paradigm was consistent with productive work already ongoing in a wide variety of fields and found immediate application in understanding how foreign economic policy was determined (Lake, 1988; Ikenberry, et al., 1988). Latin Americanists used the institutionalist focus to analyze development strategies (Adler, 1988), revolution (Dos Santos, 1970), bargaining with multinational corporations (Evans, 1992), bureaucratic authoritarianism (O'Donnell, 1973; Stepan, 1978) and regime change, both breakdowns of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1978) and the bargaining between civilian and military

sectors that marks the transition back to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988; Diamond, et al., 1989).

Despite a consensus that the internal make-up of the state "mattered" in security decisions – the "second image reversed" – understanding of how and when remains elusive in Latin America. The effort has been complicated by global trends in the 1990s. Just as the state "came back in," it went out. The winds of globalization seemed to overwhelm domestic institutions; there was a sameness in the adoption of open markets, open political systems and open borders to new transnational interests.

How did "globalization" affect the military sector? The liberalization of economic policy reduced the role of the state and forced a decline in central budgets that directly affected the armed forces (Downes, 1998). In addition, the changing threat environment made some military missions obsolete, while imposing others for which the armed forces found itself unprepared. Finally, as the democratic norm became globally accepted, military establishments bore the brunt of reactions against authoritarian excesses. Civilian control was exerted over the military in varying degrees, gradually in some case and more abruptly in others.

There are many ways to characterize the state of civil-military relations in a given country. Possible indicators of military subordination include a declining resource base, loss of policy-making autonomy, loss of coercive power, and loss of immunities. The appointment of civilian defense ministers, increases in legislative oversight, removal of the military from policing and intelligence roles and loss of conscription are also factors

which could be compared across civil-military complexes in the region.⁶ But the argument here is a relatively simple one. In states that underwent a process of democratization during the 1990s that connected civilian and military domestic actors to their hemispheric counterparts, cooperative security behavior emphasized elements closely associated with the hemispheric democracy regime. That is, where reorganization of the civil-military balance involved the participation of the international community, an emphasis on military transparency emerged.

The clearest case of a country that democratized directly under the tutelage of the international system was El Salvador. El Salvador's national reconciliation in the early 1990s was aided by massive international assistance and direct verification (Tenneriello, 1996). Most of its reforms have been implemented. This is in stark contrast to the other states of the subregion, particularly Honduras and Guatemala, which have not yet undergone a reform process open to outside verification. Nicaragua, although penetrated by international organizations, has yet to consolidate civilian control over the military. The civilian defense ministry remains weak.

This is not to say that the Salvadoran military has ceased to be an important player in domestic politics. But the Salvadoran military – as well as the civilian government sector – had substantial international contact during the transition and was directly influenced by international organizations and other international actors.

⁶ Pion-Berlin (1992) and Stepan (1988) have fairly exhaustive comparative templates.

What is also clear is that El Salvador, again in contrast to the other states of the subregion, has adopted a comprehensive set of measures in the area of military transparency. El Salvador participates in the UN registries, submits comprehensive lists of CSBMs to the IADB and the OAS, and alone in the subregion has published a defense "white book" that describes its force structure, defense policy and defense budget. El Salvador hosted a UN peace forum, a regional symposium of war college directors and the second OAS conference on CSBMs. It has been a subregional leader in this field and its high level of participation is unmatched by its neighbors. The military has aggressively supported this effort, almost in competition with its foreign policy counterparts. El Salvador maintains a strong presence at the IADB and a close affiliation with the OAS delegate assigned to security matters.

The Chilean case is less straightforward, but suggestive nonetheless. Frohman (1996) argues that Chile's transition – although "managed" internally by Pinochet – was internationalized in the sense that the civilian leadership had extensive international contacts, primarily through the links established by exiles during the authoritarian years. A scholarly tradition of peace and security studies has become an important source of thinking on security matters in the region. Work on CSBMs from the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* has provided academic credibility to the OAS meetings of experts, conferences and committee work. A FLACSO scholar made a major presentation at the third Defense Ministerial of the Americas on the next steps for CSBMs in the region.

Not surprisingly, Chile has been at the forefront of military transparency in the Southern Cone, as well as the region as a whole. But it is not so much that Chile's

promotion of military transparency is at odds with Argentina and Brazil – both those countries participate in the UN registries, have produced defense white books and are seeking ways to enhance the transparency requirements established at the hemispheric level. Chile has taken all of these steps, but has been far less willing to move forward with subregional burden sharing. It is this lag in the Chilean pattern that is puzzling. The answer may relate to the internationalization of its democratization process. It is also possible that civilian democratizers sought support in the hemispheric security regime to help force its military establishment to become more transparent. They are far less interested in other forms of cooperative security.

When more factors in the civil-military balance are considered, more extensions seem plausible. Colombia, for instance, in the process of internationalizing its fight against guerrillas and drug traffickers, has adopted the rules of the democracy regime, which may limit the ways in which its military can be employed. Consequently, there is less military involvement in the drug fight and less military burden sharing with neighbors (Venezuela excepted) than might be expected. Argentina's pattern of aggressive involvement in peacekeeping operations has been explained as a way for the civilian sector to provide its military with a democracy-friendly, external role (Pala, 1998; Norden, 1996). These linkages between domestic civil-military relations and the international community merit further investigation.

In politics with closed, pacted transitions, such as Brazil, civil-military relations appear to have less of an impact on interstate security behavior. The Brazilian military is still relative autonomous, its opening having been implemented according to the military's terms (Manwaring, 1996; Zaverucha, 1993). A more stable pattern of security

relations emerges there, characterized by a cautious approach to hemispheric initiatives. This is perhaps because there is not an active domestic constituency for military transparency. In Mexico, where civilian dominance was long ago decided (Wager, 1996), enthusiasm for most of the rules promoted by new hemispheric security institutions has also been muted.⁷

Thus, where questions of civilian control are settled – whether favoring the military or the civilian sector – domestic civil-military relations appear to have little impact on external security behavior. In polities where these questions are still open, we find that civilian and military sectors seek international allies. Security preferences are not completely specified by the external environment because a two-level game is taking place.

A Modest Proposal

The issue of civilian control occasionally emerges within the security institutions at the hemispheric level. This is most evident in the criticisms of the IADB as a relic of authoritarianism and the Cold War. The anti-democracy charge against the IADB bases its argument in the lack of civilian oversight of the institution. We have already reviewed the steps taken by the IADB to bring it more firmly under the control of the OAS

⁷ Consider this historical anecdote on the question of whether to include a permanent defense council in the OAS Charter during the 1948 conference in Bogota: "After others had spoken at the small meeting, it was the turn of the Mexican general. Standing behind him in the crowded room was the Mexican Foreign Minister, who headed his country's delegation. Quietly the Mexican general said that, while he personally was in agreement with his military colleagues from the other countries, his government had adopted a contrary position and that, as Mexico's representative, he must oppose the creation of the permanent military body (CFR, 1962, p. 47).

Committee on Hemispheric Security. Ironically, that institutional change, designed to make the IADB dependent on civilian leadership, has been resisted precisely by those who criticize the IADB for its independence. Clearly, the conflict there relates not to the issue of civilian control but rather to the resistance on the part of balancing states to initiatives that would rationalize and centralize the hemispheric security system.

The debate over the Board has recently been subsumed by the overarching review of hemispheric security mandated by the 1998 Summit of the Americas. Over the next two years, the OAS will: 1) analyze concepts of hemispheric security, 2) develop common "management" approaches to security problems and 3) suggest ways to reform hemispheric security institutions.⁸ This three-part security review provides the backdrop to analysis of the Board's future and its relationship with the OAS.

What is the larger goal of the United States with respect to the ongoing review of hemispheric security architecture and what role might the Board play in the new scheme? U.S. policy on these issues will undoubtedly be framed by key principles derived from national security strategy, presidential decision directives and other policy guidance (Buchanan, 1998). Three of these principles are broadly recognizable in U.S. security policy for the region. First, support for democracy – the United States works to strengthen democratic governments as a way to promote freedom, ensure human rights

⁸ The process derives from a 1998 Summit mandate to the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security "to analyze the meaning, scope, and implications of international security concepts in the Hemisphere, with a view to developing the most appropriate common approaches by which to manage their various aspects, including disarmament and arms control" and to "pinpoint ways to revitalize and strengthen the institutions of the Inter-American System related to the various aspects of Hemispheric Security" (IADC, 1998, p. 30).

and provide the most effective mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts, both internal and external. Second, multilateralism – the United States leverages multilateral institutions to develop consensual approaches to common challenges. Third, cooperative security – the United States seeks to engage its partners in cooperative endeavors to address shared security concerns before conflict escalates.

The second and third principles create a bias for some sort of multilateral forum to promote security cooperation. The first requires that such a forum be consistent with democratic norms in the sense that it is responsive and responsible to a hemispheric political body. These broad parameters are consistent with many futures for the Board, including outright closure.

Given what we have discovered about the institutional politics of hemispheric security, insistence on maintaining the Board, either by incorporating it under the OAS charter or transforming it into a military staff for the OAS Secretary-General, is likely to be counterproductive.

An approach not yet tried is to draft a design that starts with the Inter-American Defense College, not with the Board. This is viable for several reasons. First, the College enjoys a broad legitimacy that goes beyond the Board. It has a dynamic curriculum that is in demand. Canada sends students, for example, and more OAS ambassadors and other dignitaries visit the College than the Board. Second, the College has few of the handicaps suffered by the Board (uncertain mission, mandate and future). Third, an expanded College can replace many of the functions performed by the Board.

With a properly resourced research department, the College could measurably improve the quality of security studies produced by the Board. The College already has a

small research nucleus, but it is woefully underfunded. The College library is also in need of modernization. With a more direct relationship to the OAS, it could also serve as a special collection for the OAS library. Finally, the College could expand enrollment. The College is in the process of establishing a distance learning center to expand its reach without having to increase its residency requirement. This is an important opportunity that can have a positive impact on the next generation of defense leaders in the Americas.

Given funding and personnel support, the College could also promote a more ambitious conference schedule. This is a proven capability; over the past five years, the College has provided excellent support to international conferences on a number of important security issues. But an even more aggressive schedule, synched with the Committee on Hemispheric Security perhaps, would go a long way towards replacing the IADB's function of providing a forum for discussion of hemispheric security issues.

This may be a fairly modest proposal, but fairly modest measures are precisely what is called for when considering the design of hemispheric security institutions in the 1990s. At a recent working group of senior defense officials from throughout the Americas, participants addressed the theme of how best to strengthen hemispheric security institutions. Several suggested ways to rationalize, centralize and otherwise improve the efficiency of existing institutional tools for cooperative security. One offered a contrarian idea: perhaps we have exactly the hemispheric security system we want – inefficient, ineffective and decentralized.⁹

⁹ The occasion was a November 1997 conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico, cosponsored by the IADB entitled *The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century*.

In the absence of a unifying military threat, states are unlikely to agree on rules that prescribe how to train, maintain and employ their armed forces. The United States, supporter and shaper of hemispheric security institutions, ultimately finds itself frustrated by what it sees as lost potential to cooperatively address transnational threats with military means if necessary. When the frustration boils over unilateral action is a possible outcome. A better approach is promotion of multilateral responses stepped down below the hemispheric level, where neighboring countries can agree on what constitutes a clear and present security problem. As we have seen institutions can then facilitate coordinated security action.

The hemisphere is at peace and that peace will best be kept by a multilevel set of security institutions that compliment each other, allowing space for subregional initiatives without becoming paralyzed by the old cleavages of U.S.-Latin American security relations. This recommendation, supported by the results of our study, is not new. In the early 1980s, Varas (1983) argued for a variety of institutional forums, both within and outside the OAS, to support crisis resolution and promote military transparency. At the beginning of this decade, Poitras (1990) observed that "new multilateral efforts to resolve Latin American conflicts could be constructed around specific subregions or issues areas, including arms control and proliferation, the containment of domestic conflict and confidence building measures" (p. 126). More recently, Mares (1997) saw promise in a "multitiered and integrated security structure" that might "facilitate working out disagreements locally first, and, as necessary, subregionally, regionally, and globally" (p. 216).

With a mixture of admiration and mistrust, Latin America generally looks to the United States – not hemispheric institutions – for leadership in the area of hemispheric security. Except for situations where a clear, consensus threat affects the key Latin States, hemispheric institutions are not appropriate tools for action. Attempts to strengthen, centralize and otherwise rationalize hemispheric security institutions are likely to prove counterproductive. But it does not follow that security institutions cannot make a contribution at the hemispheric level.

As the natural leader in the hemisphere, the United States should try to use hemispheric institutions to better understand Latin American priorities, find areas of common interest and gradually build towards consensus. Such an approach requires from the United States patience, good listening, respect for dissenting positions and a sustained focus. The historical trend shows that U.S. focus on Latin America is periodic rather than sustained. Whether this will change in the future may depend ultimately on a factor that is a staple of realism – the distribution of power. As long as Latin America remains marginal relative to the great powers, it will be difficult for the United States to remain permanently engaged on hemispheric security issues. Institutions help by promoting continuity and demanding a predictable level of attention. These are important prerequisites to effective foreign policy. In asymmetric systems lacking a clear common threat, it appears that “weak” institutions provide these better than “strong” ones.

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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

William B. Fullerton, a 1981 graduate of the United States Military Academy, is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army with extensive experience in Latin America. His past assignments include tours in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Panama. In addition, he served as the executive officer to the Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board from 1997-1999 and an associate professor of international relations at the Military Academy. His current assignment is as the Joint Engineer Officer, Joint Staff.

LTC Fullerton attended the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro as an Olmsted Scholar from 1988-1989. He completed a Masters of Arts in International Relations and a Master of Science in Civil Engineering at the University of Florida from 1990-1991. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Florida in 1999. LTC Fullerton speaks Spanish and Portuguese.

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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1999


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